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ABSTRACT 
This thesis draws upon the literatures of disaster research and the geographies of space in 
order to investigate vulnerability, a concept implicated in the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. Four conceptions of vulnerability are distinguished. In the first, Socialproblenis 
without social content, clear distinctions are drawn between 'natural' and 'man-made' 
disaster(ous) events, where the social world of people is lost in a focus upon technocratic 
solutions to some hazardous condition. In The roots of disaster vulnerability relations 
between nature and society and the agency of social life come to the fore. Disasters are no 
longer divorced from nonnal life, they are a reflection of it. The melding of the third (The 
vulnerability of place) and fourth (The hidden voices of the vulnerability of place) gives 
voice to the disaster affected. Tying them to geographic location and the situational 
complexity of daily life provides an opportunity to examine underlying elements that 
contribute to and, potentially, ameliorate vulnerability. However, there remains a lack of 
understanding of the spatialities and temporalities of livelihoods and the resource importance 
of social networks. 
Theoretical explorations are grounded by multi-site ethnographies of space of two disaster 
realities: the United Nations World Food Programme, and among the Reewin clan group in 
southern Somalia. This region, devastated by chronic political instability and prone to 
drought and flood, poses challenges for the way that aid agencies respond to the problems of 
vulnerability and food shortage. 
The confluence of these three elements, evident in a contestation of place, reveals limitations 
in the policies and practices of the organisation: the problems of the vulnerability ofplace 
cannot be remedied by resource provision in place. I suggest that greater sensitivity to the 
spatial impacts of disaster, the multiple livelihood networks of place, and the scales of 
humanitarian action is required. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
"The war against hunger is truly mankind's war of liberation" (from a speech made by 
American President IF Kennedy, (1963). 
Profound social, political, economic, moral, ethical, and nutritional issues are involved at 
every level of the production, provision and consumption of food. It is an important building 
block of international relations, and it is an overtly political resource (Uvin, 1994). Its 
production, marketing, and consumption are global and local, rural and urban (Friedmann, 
1995; Marsden and Arce, 1995; Jarosz, 1996; Watts, 1996; Goodman and Watts, 1997) and 
its production and preparation is estimated to engage a majority of the working time of the 
world's population (Grigg, 1995). It is a provider of work and livelihoods. Food is a 
carefully chosen and classified means of social communication and the object of a richly 
expressive and varied aesthetic (Mennell, 1987; Fine, 1993; Harriss-White, 1994). 
For Gill Valentine (1999), food and eating are important in the way we are positioned in 
social space - in terms of the moral, cultural and religious significance we attach to certain 
foods and attitudes to proscribed eating habits. Thus food becomes "... a symbol of 
connectedness... " (Valentine, 1999: 54) across class and ethnicity, by production and 
transportation, by shared meals and taste, and at levels from the personal to the global. The 
histories of most basic staples of the Western diet, from tea, coffee and sugar, to potatoes 
and wheat attest to the historical importance that global interconnections (notably, for 
example, colonialism) have had on consumption patterns. 
Yet at the same time sheer biological necessity for human beings to take nutrients at regular 
intervals, and even the importance of meals and commensality in the social life of most 
human societies, is so obvious that food is often taken for granted (Mennell, Murcott, and 
van Otterloo, 1992). Some do not have that luxury. 
Assured access to nutritionally adequate and safe food is essential for individual welfare and 
for national, social, and economic development. The alleviation of malnutrition and the 
promotion of food security have powerful moral incentives. The right to food and to be free 
from hunger is firmly established in international law. Article II of the International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which was adopted by the United 
Nations (UN) General assembly in 1966, and came into force in 1976, recognises the right to 
adequate food as part of the right to an adequate standard of living and accords the right to 
be free from hunger the status of the fundamental right of mankind. This legal recognition of 
the right to food built on the declaration of "the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services... " set out in Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. It can also be 
viewed as an essential element of the right to life accorded legal recognition in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly 
also in 1966. The right to food has since been explicitly recognised and further defined in a 
number of international instruments and declarations such as the Declarations adopted by the 
UN Food Conference in 1974, by the International Conference on Nutrition convened by the 
FAO and WHO in 1992, and more recently by the Plan of Action adopted by the World 
Food Summit in Rome in 1996. The right to food is also protected under certain more 
specialised international agreements such as the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols in times of war, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child in respect of 
children (see also Moore, 1998). In addition, international humanitarian law makes specific 
provision for assistance to civilian populations during conflict, obliging states and other 
parties to agree to the provision of humanitarian and impartial assistance when the civilian 
population lacks essential supplies. 
Few human rights have been endorsed with such frequency, unanimity or urgency as the 
right to food, yet probably no other human right has been as comprehensively and 
systematically violated on such a wide scale in recent decades (Alston, 1994). 1 In the 1990s, 
1 See, Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966; common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; Articles 23,55 and 59 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention; Articles 69 to 71 of Additional Protocol I of 1977; Article 18 of Additional Protocol 11 of 1977 as 
well as other relevant rules of international humanitarian law; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984; Articles 10,11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights 1966; Articles 6,37, and 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; and elsewhere in international 
law. In 1997, the Sphere Project was launched to develop a set of universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian 
assistance and to promote observance of fundamental human rights principles, to improve the quality of assistance provided to 
people affected by disasters, and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response. A cornerstone 
of this project is the Humanitarian Charter that defines the legal responsibilities of states and parties to guarantee the right to 
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whilst millions of people are concerned about the diseases of diet and obesity, hundreds of 
millions of human beings go hungry (see, for example, Garrow, 1994). Over 800 million 
people in the world do not have enough food to meet their daily needs. I There are many 
whose hunger is so severe that they starve, become ill and die. 
"Like reproduction, eating unites all living things" (Mintz, 1994: 102). But food also 
excludes. Food production, food provision and food preparation are everywhere activities 
marked by sexual or, more properly, gender divisions of labour (Whitehead, 1994). Food is 
power and is a subject of conflict within the household, between social groups, within and 
between nations and may be a cause of dependence and subordination (el Bushra. and Piza- 
Lopez, 1994; Jacobson, 1999). 
In the last two to three decades, food, or rather the lack of food has been associated 
increasingly with disaster. It is not difficult to find examples in history where food has been 
used as a weapon, or where hunger is a consequence, of war (see, for example, Newman, 
1990). In Livy's The War with Hannibal (de Mincourt, 1965) starvation, as a directed 
strategy, siege, is commonplace. Both are features of (post)World War 11 Europe 
(Farquharson, 1985). A lack of food is a component of the associational trinity of war, 
drought and famine (Watts and Bohle, 1993) and poverty and hunger (Dr6ze and Sen, 1989; 
Lipton, 1994). Three out of five people in the Third world lack basic sanitation, one third 
have no access to clean water, one quarter no adequate housing, and one fifth no access to 
modem health facilities. While these problems compose a nagging backdrop food, or more 
correctly hunger, is now also associated with the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
In recent years, one form of disaster that has taken centre stage and captured the imagination 
(and resources) of humanitarian actors is that of the 'complex emergency'. With the removal 
of the negative orientation of Cold War defined superpower spheres of influence, there has 
been a profuse flowering of demands (Bloom, 1989; Nederveen Pieterse, 1997). As a 
consequence, post cold war politics are much more fluid and unpredictable and a new sense 
assistance and protection. When states are unable to respond, they are obliged to allow the intervention of humanitarian 
organisations. See, http: //www. sphereproject. org. 
2 Rome Declaration on World Food Security, Rome 13 November 1996. Although this estimate, and the methodology 
employed to generate it, is challenged (see, Svedberg, 1999) it is useful in highlighting the need for remedial action. 
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of unease has settled amongst the humanitarian community. (Or, in contrast, perhaps we 
should accept that the world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, it is only our failure to 
understand and act that makes it seem so (Ignatieff, 1998)). In the midst of this uncertainty it 
seems overwhelmed by the number, extent and complexity of numerous internal ethnic and 
territorial conflicts (Weiss and Minear, 1993). For those caught up in this shadowy world, 
the demise of this conflict of ideologies did not signify a celebratory moment (Agnew, 
1995), as all too numerous and familiar emblematic examples testify: Sudan, Liberia. Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia (including Bosnia and Kosovo), the Caucasus 
(Chechnya), Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Nicaragua, Angola, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, East Timor, Sri Lanka, the Great Lakes region, and Somalia. For those affected by 
these crises, what the world invariably sees represents the four scourges of humanity: war, 
disease, hunger, and refugees. 
The challenges to the international community posed by these 'complex political 
emergencies' (CPE), an unwieldy term that has become a commonly used label for a variety 
of disaster situations involving political upheaval and violent conflict, and often 
compounded by droughts or floods, are numerous? Significantly, these disasters pose 
problems for humanitarian actors at every level (Slim, 1995). 
One of those problems, the identification of vulnerability, is a concept that is implicated in 
all discussions of food security and hunger (Watts and Bohle, 1993) and the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. It has thus become a key operational concept within the UN's 
World Food Programme Vulnerability Analysis Mapping (VAM) unit, the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation Global Infon-nation and Early Warning System (GIEWS) and Food 
Insecurity Vulnerability Mapping System (FIVIMS), and the United States Agency for 
International Development Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). " Despite the entry of 
vulnerability (and the associated vulnerable) into the international vocabulary of these and 
3 De terms 'complex emergencies', 'political emergencies', 'complex political emergencies', 'complex humanitarian 
emergencies', and 'situations of chronic political instability' are often used interchangeably. The term 'complex emergency' 
emerged in Africa in the late 1980s (Duffield, 1996). It gained wider currency with the Gulf War and, especially, following the 
creation of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs on 17 December 1991 by GA 461182, and coming into force in April 
1992. 
4 See, respectively, http: //www. wfp. org, http: //www. fivims. org, and http: //www. fews. net. 
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other organisations and into the lexicon of development there is no common 
conceptualisation of the concept. 
It does not, however, warrant a discreet entry into the current edition of The Dictionary of 
Human Geography (DHG) (Johnston et al, 2000). This is a shame because as Andrew 
Leyshon (1995: 1021) suggests, when questioning the absence of the term 'poverty' from 
the 1994 edition (Johnston et al, 1994), "... entries are particularly valuable, not least in the 
way in which they point the uninitiated to many of the key sources that curved the trajectory 
of geographical research into new and fruitful areas of inquiry. " ' 
This lacuna is surprising as the topic rests, or at least should rest, squarely at the centre of 
geography. It concerns human interaction within the lived environment, or "... the synergies 
of land and life... " (Tuan, 1991: 100). By bridging the two central traditions in human 
geography, nature-society and space-society, its understanding attempts to answer some of 
'the big questions in geography' (Cutter el al, 2002). As a topic of applied peoples 
geography (Howitt, 1998) it provides a reference point for evaluating the efforts to 
understand and intervene in the world, by questioning the categories and concepts we use to 
describe and analyse material, social and cultural realities (Harvey, 1984). Studies into 
disasters and the way they are responded to by those affected provide the data for addressing 
basic questions about social organisation - its origins, adaptive capacities and survival 
(Kreps, 1984; Appadurai, 1984). And its application provides a basis for questioning the 
actions of humanitarian action. 
This absence though does mask the significant contributions that geographers have made. 
Although the topic of vulnerability appears to fall into the cracks between the disciplinary 
divisions of human and physical geographies, the discipline has done more than most to 
claim this area of research as its own. The concept of vulnerability began to ý be seen 
frequently in the literature on natural disaster research in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see, 
Hewitt, 1983,1997; Blaikie et al, 1994). Prominent amongst the early theoretical 
explorations in the discipline of geography are those of Blaikie et al, (1994), Watts and 
Bohle (1993), Wisner, (1993), and Bohle et al, (1994). In addition, it is impossible to ignore 
5 Leyshon's concern has been addressed in the latest edition. 
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amongst these early explorations the significant contribution made by Robert Chambers 
(1989) in the field of social anthropology. It has found its way into research on HIV/AIDS 
(Delor and Hubert, 2000), poverty (Morduch, 1994), and technological threats such as 
chemical hazards (Cutter and Tiefenbacher, 1991; Cutter and Solecki, 1989). It has, though, 
been most often associated with environmental factors in the Third World, such as the 
adverse effects of global climate change (including drought and flood). 
It is only more recently that geographers have paid attention to war and its part in disasters. 
In Kenneth Hewitt's edited volume, Interpretations ofcalamity (first published in 1983) war 
receives only passing reference. More than a decade later Hewitt (1997) devotes a whole 
chapter to the topic of war, or social hazard to borrow his phrase. However, this is no more 
than a superficial description of the nature of the hazard itself, the technologies of war and 
the problems of violence. To date, the geographies of vulnerability in war have received 
little attention. 
Susan Cutter (Cutter, 1996), in her analysis of vulnerability in the environmental hazards 
literature, identifies three distinct themes in vulnerability research, although others, such as 
Liverman (1990) and Dow (1992) have suggested alternatives. While not mutually exclusive 
or exhaustive, this basic typology helps to distinguish, between the theoretical and 
methodological orientations of the recent research. These are vulnerability as social 
probleins without social content, and vulnerability as social response. The third direction 
that is emerging combines elements of the first two, but it is inherently more geographically 
centred. In this perspective, vulnerability is conceived as both a biophysical risk as well as a 
social response, but within a specific area or geographic domain, the vulnerability ofp1ace. 
This direction is noticeable in Young's (1996) analysis of famine in Ireland and the Scottish 
Highlands in the 1840s, the social structures of disaster (Cutter, Mitchell and Scott, 2000), 
and Ilarada's (2000) research on social space in the aftermath of disasters. 
This general shift has had a profound effect upon the way are disasters are viewed and, 
importantly, acted upon. The emphasis is now upon how individuals or communities are 
exposed to dangers or become unsafe, who is affected and their ability to withstand, mitigate 
and recover from damage, rather than the character of the agent of disaster itself. For 
'natural' disasters at least this has come to exemplify, quoting Ulrich Bcck (1992: 80), 
15 
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"... the end of the antithesis between nature and society... " It is now increasingly clear that 
droughts and floods alone do not produce massive disasters of hunger (O'Neill, 1994; 
Albala-Bertrand, 1993,2000; Alexander, 1997). They do so only when social and economic 
structures are too fragile to cope with normal fluctuations. It is, then, not too surprising to 
find that, more than 90% of deaths from 'natural disasters' occur in developing countries 
(Albala-Bertrand, 1993). " 
Although the vulnerability of place is a marked improvement in our understanding of 
disasters and vulnerability this orientation does not go far enough in engaging with the 
geographies of space. The principal aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of 
vulnerability by inserting these theoretical geographies that are challenging this discipline 
and others in the social sciences. In doing so the spatial practices of humanitarian assistance 
are brought into focus. 
These theoretical explorations of vulnerability are then grounded by empirical research of 
two disaster realities: of the Reewin clan group in the Somali regions of Bay and Bakool (see 
Figure 1.1), and that of a field based humanitarian organisation, the World Food Programme 
Somalia. Southern Somalia, a country of chronic political instability, compounded by 
frequent drought and occasional flood, poses particular challenges for the way that aid 
agencies respond to the problems of food shortage. This includes the assessment of 
vulnerability, the identification of beneficiaries and, ultimately, the provision of food 
assistance. The confluence of these three elements, evident in a contestation of place, reveals 
limitations in the policies and practices of the organisation in endeavouring to address 
vulnerability. 
6 Ina study of 'natural disasters' (which were for the purposes of this study based on a minimum of 1,000 deaths or USS1,000 
million in overall losses) from 1977-1996, only 12.6 per cent of the deaths occurred in the developed world, while 82 per cent 
of the damage costs listed occurred there (Alexander, 1997). 
16 
INTRODUCTION 
I, ixý 'tiý 
---YEýEN fUT- ýA 
Adýn 
Gul' of Ader, MMEM 
m v 
VIM DJIBI)V, T- 11 
V, ' 
' 
A 11 UL 
SAN AAý,, 
Dire ýaw a eargirysa - re D wa 
J1110 
rei 














-h-co ý, ;, - 




Chapters 2 and 3 lay the theoretical foundations of the thesis. Chapter 2 (An analytical lens 
and the 'two-dimensional victim ) demonstrates that the particular discourses of 
humanitarian practice provide a powerful lens through which disasters and the disaster 
affected are viewed. The first part of this chapter rehearses the debates surrounding the 
discourses of development. This provides an epistemological route map, an analytical lens 
and my own moral terrain for the chapters that follow. 
The discourses of humanitarian practice endeavour to render the complexity and disorder of 
disaster into a coherent system and an enabling environment for action. But I assert that in 
the process of identifying and labelling vulnerability geography disappears. Those affected 
by disaster are reduced to 'two dimensional victims' as the ties and resource networks of 
social interaction between individuals and groups dernaterialise. These networks that may 
reside in the household and community, and wider networks such as kinship may be central 
pillars of the survival strategies for the disaster affected. This limited spatial discourse 
produces a particularly narrow view of vulnerability that in turn shapes the way 
humanitarian actors respond to disasters. 
Drawing upon the literatures of disaster research and building upon the brief outline given 
above Chapter 3 (The geographies of vulnerability) questions the nature of vulnerability. 
The main method of moving beyond the vulnerability of place is an engagement with 
understanding how people actually live. This thesis, however, does not uncritically adopt 
this new emphasis, which has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. The lived spaces of 
livelihood approaches are not the analytically hermetic and structured social spaces that are 
evident in current conceptions. By combining recent theoretical explorations of place, space, 
network and scale, and fashioned around Henri Lefebvre's (1991) spatiology, this chapter 
offers one way of achieving a re-framing of this spatial contestation. We find instead spaces 
of disaster that are alive with the movement of people and things functioning through scales 
between the local and the global. Consequently, and importantly, 'the two dimensional 
victim' is reinvigorated. 
Somalia has become symptomatic of a deep unease within the aid industry, an unease that 
has developed as a consequence of the fundamental changes taking place in the new world 
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order and the changing nature of state responsibilities at the end of the Cold War. That 
Somalia challenges the machinery of aid becomes evident to those who work there. Its 
policies so often become the sites of contestation as their intended aims do not materialise. 
And it challenges the messengers of these policies, the aid worker. It often appears to have 
become a proving ground for new recruits, as the oft-overheard phrase "if you can work 
there you can work anywhere" testifies. 
For many, Somalia signifies drought, violence, death and suffering. Few will forget the 
images of the death of 18 American Rangers or the helicopter pilot being dragged through 
the streets of the Somali capital Mogadishu in 1993 after an abortive attempt to capture the 
'warlord'power-broker Mohammed Aydiid. " The inaction in Rwanda and the arms length, 
out-of-harms-way intervention in the former Yugoslavia exemplifies the impact Somalia has 
had on the international humanitarian machinery ever since. 
Chapter 4 (Somalia: a narration) provides a narrative for the reader of the factors that led to 
the collapse of the State and describes a history of problems (including the provision of 
humanitarian assistance) that continue to dominate contemporary discussions of 
international aid. It describes the aggregated dynamics of vulnerability and it serves as a 
reminder of the very real problems facing many Somalis today. It therefore provides a 
contextual background for the chapters that follow. But in many ways Chapter 4 is out of 
place. It is more than just a review, it also is central to our understanding of the networks of 
place that are unravelled in Chapter 6. 
Having outlined the main theoretical influences of the thesis Chapter 5 describes a multiple 
site research methodology used to investigate firstly, as participant-observer, the spatial 
imaginaries of the policies and practices of the World Food Programme and, secondly, the 
geographies of vulnerability of the Reewin of southern Somalia. The theoretical issues of the 
first are reasonably well covered in the literatures of the social sciences. The first part of the 
chapter describes my working role within one site, the World Food Programme Somalia, and 
the problems of 'insider-outsider' boundaries that I encountered. 
7 The BBC2 series Timewatch held a post-mortem of this operation (3 November 1998, An American firefight). The incident 




The second challenge is very much uncharted territory (and is therefore given greater 
emphasis) and required more than just 'fieldwork by chatting'. Rather, it demanded a 
framework for the ethnographies of space that would expose the submerged networks of 
vulnerability. It also meant going beyond the wider processes of vulnerability described in 
Chapter 4 to gain a 'view from the doorstep'. This meant grappling with the huge stretch 
between the local and the global that is described in Chapter 3.1 review the literatures of 
multiple site approaches and the spatial issues of multiple site selection. 
Conducting research in areas of the world of which little is known (or at least documented) 
is hard enough. Conducting fieldwork in areas of conflict presents another set of challenges. 
Often the researcher has to juggle theoretical and practical objectives against the constraints 
of time, finance and personal safety. What are less familiar (and which are discussed here) 
are the constraints of kinship, language and seasonality that were such integral components 
of this research. I then describe the selection of particular sites in Bay and Bakool and 
elsewhere in Somalia and the methodological bricolage of place that I employed to uncover 
the geographies of vulnerability of the Reewin. 
The following two chapters provide the empirical focus of this thesis. Chapter 6 (The 
extended networks ofplace) unravels the diversity and interconnectedness of the networks 
that link people to places and people to things. I describe the importance of place (embedded 
in relations of kinship, religion and friendship) to the agro-pastoral Reewin and then work 
inwards and outwards to fashion a picture of the networks of place. Individuals, households, 
families and communities are bound together by the resource transfers of social networks. I 
describe the nature of these transfers at different scales (household, community and at the 
wider level of kinship). 
These result in a high degree of social cohesion and resource support for those within the 
network. However, Chapter 3 suggested that non-members are potentially excluded from 
these benefits. The following section delves into the murky waters of network endowment 
and social stratification. Lastly, it is wrong to assume that these networks are lifeless 
misrepresentations of 'traditional society'. I therefore explain how livelihood shocks and 
stresses (such as those outlined in Chapter 4) shape these important social networks. 
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The complexity of the networks of place that has been exposed here has implications for the 
targeting of emergency food resources. Chapter 7 investigates the interface between the 
spatial practices of the World Food Programme Somalia (evident in their policies and 
practices that are described here) and the livelihood networks of the Reewin. In so doing the 
scales of vulnerability analysis and action that colour the policies and practices of 
humanitarian assistance are questioned. While this study is informed by a theoretical 
exploration of issues, it is also reinforced by an understanding of the constraints and 
limitations faced by the organisation in southern Somalia. 
Finally, the concluding chapter (Chapter 8) summarises and draws together the themes of 
the thesis. While this is a study of an organisation, of its policies and practices, and of the 
Reewin in southern Somalia, it is argued here that the expanded understanding of 
vulnerability that has been uncovered in this thesis has wider implications for humanitarian 
practice in general. 
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CHAPTER 2 AN ANALYTICAL LENS AND 'THE TWO- 
DIMENSIONAL VICTIM' 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is hardly newsworthy to suggest that development is no longer an unquestionable truth. 
Postdevelopment positions query the ideological baggage of classical Marxist and neoliberal 
development metanarratives. These debates help us to render problematic what was once 
conventionally self-evident - development. More recently the discourse of humanitarian 
assistance has been challenged. Alex de Waal's (1998) comments on famine and 
humanitarian assistance in Sudan would suggest that what now passes as humanitarian aid 
(both bilateral and multilateral assistance, channelled through the agencies of the United 
Nations or through international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) is 
both a business and driven by (and inseparable from) the neo-liberal nostrums that drive 
development (Watts, 200 1). 
This chapter rehearses these debates. More importantly, while keeping in sight the very real 
problems of disaster, they bring into focus a new intellectual world and with it an expanded 
set of interrogative and narrative tools. In doing so, they provide an epistemological 
routemap, an analytical lens and an acknowledgement of my own moral terrain for the 
chapters that follow. Using this analytical lens I demonstrate that the discourses of 
humanitarian practice provide its own powerful lens through which disasters and the disaster 
affected are viewed. 
2.2 QUESTIONING DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYTICAL LENS 
The very real problems of those who exist on the margins of society have their roots in the 
development 'project'. Problems that are leading to, as Michael Watts (Watts, 1991) 
suggests, "... a crisis of development, in which some reaches of the Third World, Africa 
most palpably, seem to be sliding inexorably off the face of the world economy into a 
terrifýing Heart of Darkness" (see also, Duffield, 1997; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000a). Poverty, 
environmental degradation, polarisation, exclusion, inequalities and hunger are hardly 
withering away in the wake of "... revivified global capitalism" (Slater, 1998: 667) (see, also, 
Th6rien, 1999; Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, 1993). While this crisis is most often 
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associated with Conradian images, ' or the simplistic Kaplanesque (Kaplan, 1994) spectre of 
anarchy in Africa (a convenient whipping dog somehow conveniently aggregating the 
experiences of this vast continent and ignoring the success stories (Ryle, 1997)), this 
'thereism' hides the perhaps unpalatable truth that these problems can be also found closer to 
home. Urban (and rural) poverty, homelessness, increasing lawlessness, an ethnic sub-class, 
and a growing drugs problem are concerns that will be recognised by many in the northern 
hemisphere. 
Against this all too tangibly negative backdrop, it is perhaps inevitable that development as 
theory and practice is mired in debate and controversy (Corbridge, 1990,1992; Nabudere, 
1997; Watts, 1999). Perplexity and extreme dissatisfaction with business-as-usual and 
standard development rhetoric and practice have become symptomatic of this malaise. This 
is evidenced in the rise of the so-called new social movements, indigenous grass-roots 
organisations that are typically local and outside of the organised state sphere (Parajuli, 
1991; Escobar, 1992,1995; Routledge, 1992,1995 and 1996; Watts, 1999). 
This resistance reflects a growing disillusionment with the universalising Western vision of 
development of the non-West, symbolised by an institutional panoply that includes the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) that is brought to life through 
programmes of structural adjustment, deregulation of the economy, privatisation and more 
recently good governance. Anti-development thinking - oppositional discourses that have as 
their starting point the rejection of development, the end of Enlightenment and the failure of 
development as a modernist project - repudiates the fact that the West became the model, the 
prototype, and the measure and yardstick of social progress, where the worlds problems 
could be solved by the application of western technology and economic organisation. 
Indigenous and traditional systems of knowledge, economy, and culture were devalued and 
pushed aside in the rush to modernise. Development in this sense threatened diversity, 
homogenising local traditions through the lens of Western rationality and assumptions and 
general conceptual categories (such as poverty, gender, and human rights). 
' Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, first published in 1901, has been the inspiration for countless, invariably negative, 
metaphors about Africa that continue to taint impressions of the continent. 
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Standing at the centre of a heterogeneous field of 'alternatives to development' (that 
includes anti-development, beyond-development and post-development) (Nederveen 
Pieterse, 1998,2000b) is, broadly speaking, a philosophical sympathy towards 
poststructuralism, and correspondingly a strenuously enforced antipathy to the 
metanarratives of neoliberal orthodoxy and Marxism (Watts, 1999). Although lacking clear 
consensual definition (Slater, 1998), poststructural, and the closely allied postcolonial, 
concerns with power, discursive strategies (the interplay of ideas, images, myths, and 
language in defining worldview), and cultural difference have proven compelling in the 
rethinking of development theory (Peet and Watts, 1993) and in human geography more 
generally (Peet, 1998). 
Central to these concerns is a fascination with discourse that originates in its rejection of 
modem conceptions of truth (Dear, 2001). Enlightenment philosophy considered all minds 
to be structurally similar, truths to be universal, and knowledge potentially the same for 
everyone. In the poststructural view truths are statements within socially produced 
discourses, rather than 'facts' about reality. From such a position postructural-postmodem 
thinkers distrust 'totalising' systems of knowledge, stress the singular and the contingent, 
and seek a knowledge that respects the other without absorbing it. 
One of the recurring themes in this literature is the complexity of power. Against the older 
structural models of power, which propose fixed or essential oppositions between the 
'powerful' and the 'powerless' (for example, the state and peasantry, or bourgeoisie and 
proletariat) poststructuralist feminism insist on the fundamental heterogeneity and instability 
of such binary categories. What comes out of such discussions is a set of tools for thinking 
about power in more lived ways, for seeing the ways in which different axes of power 
productively (or destructively) coexist, cross-cutting and complicating one another 
(Ferguson, 1994). When these axes of power are explored they may show how a complex 
structure of inequality becomes a lived experience. Such axes are, though, never complete 
but are part of an ongoing process of contestation and negotiation, adjustment and 
readjustment. 
Development is no longer a sacred cow or an unquestionable truth. One of the main 
attractions, and a common theme, of these relatively recent perspectives is of its recognition 
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of the reality of a variety of viewpoints, a plurality of cultures, (Massey, 1991) and a move 
away from the ethno-centric gaze of the West. Enriched by the influence of feminist and 
post-colonial theories (McDowell, 1995; Sidaway, 2000) hitherto hidden or suppressed 
accounts and voices from the periphery are released (at least metaphorically) from their 
oppression - non-western societies, colonised victims, women, disadvantaged or 
dispossessed groups, refugees, exiles, subaltems and so on. ' However, the deconstructive 
gaze of postmodemism can also be exceedingly unsettling in that it calls into question most 
of the categories that are traditionally worked with (Corbridge, 1992) - not just development, 
but also reason, and truth. It also questions the rise and fall, and the construction and 
dcconstruction of various, and numerous, types of boundaries - biological, geographical, 
cultural, social, political, and economic (Oommen, 1995). 
Similarly, it would be wrong to assume that these debates have remained within the confines 
of particular academic disciplines. While it may seem that these debates reside with the 
linguistically privileged adherents of postmodern philosophy the field-based skills of the 
anthropologist have long been fruitful in uncovering hitherto hidden voices. These can be 
seen in, for example, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard's (1940) description of the livelihoods of 
the Nuer of Sudan, in Colin Tumbull's (1973) -account of Ik, the Mountain People, of 
Uganda, and James Scott's (1976 and 1985) uncovering of peasant institutions in South East 
Asia. More recently, the hidden violence of impoverished and powerless women in Brazilian 
favela (slums) has been narrated so tellingly by Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992). Indeed, 
since Clifford Geertz: (1983) introduced the term 'local knowledge' into social anthropology, 
the concept has had an amazing career (Diawara, 2000). Parallel arguments in social 
anthropology can be traced most notably through the work of Robert Chambers in the field 
of agricultural research, extension and development (Chambers, 1983; Chambers et al, 
1989). 
What distinguishes current research is a postmodem awareness of the problems of 
representation by predominantly western, otherwise distant, scholars and researchers of non- 
9 For an overview of the post-colonial ism and post-developmentalism debates see, for example, Corbridge (1999), Roudedge 
(1999), Radcliffe (1999), Slater (1998), and Schuurman (2000). See Peet (1998ý notably Chapter 6, and Dear (1988 and 2001) 
for wider discussions on the ramifications of the post-modem turn for human geography. 
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western others (Ferguson, 1996). " Edward Said's (1978) Orientalism, which has probably 
been the most influential text in the evolution of new ways of thinking about Western 
imperialism, brought the issue of representation and the creation of a series of identity 
oppositions into sharper focus - for example, civilised versus barbaric, modem and 
traditional, ideal types of a Weberian vintage, and of us and them (Slater, 1995). 
2.2.1 Criticisms of postdevelopment 
That the micro-endogenous voice seems to have established itself firmly in the vocabulary of 
development is a measure of success. Terms rooted in the functionality of practice such as 
'bottom-up' and 'participative' (highlighted by preoccupations with participatory or action 
research methods) signal new styles of interaction with communities and reflect the 
ascendancy of the 'local' in the theory of development (Chambers, 1992,1994a, 1994b; 
Ray, 1999; Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Participatory Poverty Assessments have become 
common practice in the World Bank and seek to identify local people's perceptions of 
poverty and its causes. " 
While this turn to the postmodern in development theory has generated a richness that was 
otherwise lacking there have been a number of noteworthy criticisms. The first has to do 
with the fetishism of the local and issues of scale. As Michael Watts (1999: 92) suggests, 
"[a] striking feature of so much of the alternatives school is the constant uncritical appeal to 
the local, to place and to the cultural... ", that ignores the potentially reactionary aspects of 
such local particularisms. 
ýj The dangers o7f 'localism' 
Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke (2000) note that although this apparent move is a 
promising tendency, they also point out a number of potential dangers. Firstly, "[o]ne 
obvious problem is the tendency to essentialise and romanticise 'the local'. This means that 
local social inequalities and power relations are downplayed" (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 
249). Furthermore, this privileging of the 'local' either leads to an isolation from broader 
economic and political structures or ignores these issues altogether. This means that the 
10 See, also, Crang, (1992), foradiscussionofnewtextualstrategiesandthepolitiesandpocticsofrepresentation. 
11 See (www. worldbank. org/poverty/Voices/reports/). 
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contextuality of vulnerability, for example, national and transnational economic and political 
forces, is underplayed. To assume that vulnerability is 'contained' within a specific area or 
geographic domain is flawed. Current preoccupations with porous places, hybrid identities, 
and the dissolving distinctions between global and local that underlines growing recognition 
of a world of changing experience of people in space (Smith, 1998) suggests that 
vulnerability cannot be seen in such bounded terms. - 
Since this politics of the 'local' is never purely local, but is created in part by extra-local 
influences and practices over time it is crucial in any analysis of vulnerability to transgress 
analytically the boundaries between 'local', 'national' and 'global' to endeavour to capture 
this web of relationships (Bebbington, 2001). At the same time we should question the 
formative nature of those scales and their spatial milieu (Lefebvre, 1991; Gould, 1997b; 
Newman and Paasi, 1998; Marston, 2000) and, to borrow from political economy 
approaches, the nature of the contestation of political, economic and social spaces that 
highlight the exogenous and endogenous causes and processes of disaster vulnerability (see 
Keen, 1994; Le Sage, 1998 and personal communication, 2001; Duffield, 1999; Le Billon, 
2000). 12 
So little that is concrete 
Having dismantled its very foundations (Minca, 2001) and while offering liberation from the 
homogenising language and practices of development the second criticism suggests that at 
the same time these approaches appear threatening in as much as they offer so little that is 
concrete. Stuart Corbridge (1998b) " has written that 
to proponents of post-development too often trade in non-sequiturs (the failure of 
development project A, B or C condemns development in all its manifestations), in 
unhelpful binaries (modernity is bad, anti-modernity is good), infalse deductions (the 
problems of poor countries are always and everywhere the result of a surfeit of 
capitalism or development and not their relative absence), in wobbly romanticism 
12 In a recent edition or Third World Quarterly several case studies discussing the origins and processes of conflict are 
presented: Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 1999), Liberia (Outram, 1999), Angola (Munslow, 1999), and Rwanda (Andersen, 
1999). And see Bush (1996) for a political economy approach to the causes of hunger in Africa. 
13 See, also, Corbridge, (2001). 
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(only the rich get lonely, only the poor live hospitably or harmoniously), in sejr- 
righteousness (only the simple life is a good life), or in implausible politics (we can all 
live like the Mahatma, or would want to). " 
The question is whether this is a tenable and fruitful position. Post-structuralist-postmodern 
positions are troublesome. By finding so little that is recoverable within the practice of 
development, by failing to address in any detail the economic dimensions of alternatives, 
and above all, by not exploring the diversity of development processes and outcomes, they 
fail to develop the empirical bases of a possible counter-narrative (Bebbington, 2000 and 
2001; and Nederveen Pieterse, (2000b). Put another way, one gets the impression of a 
methodological and practical nihilism (Diawara, 2000). Simon takes this criticism one step 
further, 
"[t]he emphasis of much post-modern literature on playful, leisured, heterodoxical 
self-indulgence also has little to offer those who can still only aspire to safe drinking 
water, a roof which does not leak and the like. How convenient, then, to abandon 
concern, resource allocation and action in the name of fraternal ethical 
concerns! ... Most postmodernists and post-colonialists 
have great difficulty in 
embracing the concrete development aspirations of the poor in practice, despite their 
theoretical sophistication" (Simon, 1997., 184,185). " 
2.3 AMORAL TERRAIN 
That general models generated from afar will not suffice is now, or at least we hope, self- 
evident. What is exciting is the implicit invitation this makes for us to engage in field-based 
richly textured empirical work. This is turn generates its own set of problems: the plurality 
of voices, issues of representation, an increased awareness of complexity, and in the case of 
fieldwork in the hazardous environments of disaster reality a potential personal danger. 
So, whilst it seems that many researchers have come to accept that social science must be 
critical of the practices it studies (Sayer and Storper, 1997), a rejection of humanitarian relief 
per se is not sought, but rather a tenable and fruitful discussion of its negative and positive 
14 See, also, Portes and Kincaid, (1989), for similar criticisms. 
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aspects. Where real hunger exists, we should celebrate the moral principle that somebody 
cares. We should celebrate the fact that humanitarian workers often put their lives at risk, 
and in many cases lose them, in the desire to help others less fortunate. Whilst criticising the 
concept of humanitarian assistance from the comfort of our academic armchairs, we must 
not lose sight of the fact that the experiences of poverty and hunger have real referents in 
social reality, especially for those caught up in the ravages of conflict and drought. Hunger is 
unacceptable. 
The consequences, then, of a circularity of posturing are inaction and a tacit endorsement of 
the status quo - the elimination of the reality of hunger slips off the map. " The question 
should be how do we improve the policies and practices of its provision, not just an outright 
theoretical condemnation. For all its faults humanitarian assistance has undoubtedly saved 
peoples lives. If we aspire to eliminate hunger action is required. So unless we are to 
abrogate any responsibility for both distant and not so distant others, we need to remain 
concerned with relief in practice as much as relief in theory. Both sides of the debate must be 
brought together in a symbiotic and synergistic fashion: counter-narratives and practice need 
to be brought together if people are to be truly empowered. Consequently, the success of this 
approach, measured at the local level, will be seen only if the real problems, as lived by and 
expressed by the voices of the local, are reduced. Whether such direct payoffs occur or not, 
research of this nature is one way that human geographers can contribute. 
This perspective conveys a clear sense of moral duty or commitment to engagement, and a 
commitment to work as sensitively and responsibly as possible (see, Harvey, 1974; Smith 
1997,1998,1999; Corbridge, 1991. The most effective way of doing this is to unite 
understanding and action, or theory and practice, into a single process which puts people at 
the very centre of both (see, Edwards, 1993; Corbridge, 1993), a debate which is certainly 
not new within geography (see, Chisholm, 1971; Prince, 1971; Berry, 1972; Blowers,. 1974; 
Blomley, 1994). As Jonathan Crush (1991: 395) has argued, "[flhe major challenge which 
confronts the progressive is to cross the divide between academic theories and people's 
lives". As human geographers we need to take heed of Stoddart's (1987: 332) impatient cry, 
is not enough to stand by and describe. We need to ask what can be done". We have, 
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as Stuart Corbridge (1993,1998b) has asserted on several occasions, a responsibility to 
distant (and not-so distant) strangers. 
It is easy to criticise the policies and practices of humanitarian relief from afar. It is far less 
easy to construct practical, achievable alternatives. Therefore, to address the problematic of 
vulnerability, alternatives must first be gounded in the realities of particular disaster 
situations. Instead of questioning the narratives of humanitarian assistance from the outside 
we may be better served by rethinking how it can be profitably contested from within. '6 This 
involves, asserts Shipton, "... getting dusty ankles, then muddy ones... " (Shipton, 1990: 
353). It involves working and living in situations that are unfamiliar, that are culturally and, 
at times, physically challenging. It may involve the challenge of being in the minority, the 
odd one out in terms of skin colour or in terms of relative wealth (or health). 
But immersion in the disaster reality also reinforces the fact that many issues are so 
entwined and so complex as to become impossible to disentangle analytically for those, like 
me, seeking clarifying analysis. In this sense, distance from that reality can also prove 
beneficial. Just as understanding how the double-helix DNA molecule is constituted 
materially makes possible causal arguments about genetics, disease, and ultimately, we 
hope, about finding cures, so understanding the interaction of these discourses of relief with 
the politically, economically and socially constituted spaces of disaster can lead us to find 
more informed 'curative' action. 
2.4 THE CRITICAL PHANTOM OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
The critical phantom of development also stalks the humanitarian arena. Calls for local 
voices and place-based ethnographies have become louder and louder in recent years in the 
context of humanitarian relief activities (D'Souza, 1979,1981,1985; Harrell-Bond, 1986; 
Waldron, 1988; Jok, 1996; Hendrie, 1997; Lautze, 1997; Harragin, 1998; Pottier, 1999; 
Apthorpe and Atkinson, 1999; Vaux, 200 1). 
One common theme is that relief operations are characterised as centralised, top-down, 
standardised, resource-intensive, donor-dependent and subject to sudden termination. There 
16 See Arun Agrawal (1996) for a discussion of this perspective within development. 
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is no room, and some would say no time, for local voices to be beard. Taken to its 
conclusion, this uniphony undermines local capacity and local institutional structures 
(Adams and Bradbury, 1994). But as Mary Anderson argues, "... it is possible always, 
everywhere, and under every circumstance, to provide emergency assistance in ways that 
rely on and promote the participation of the people receiving the aid" (Anderson, 1995). 
Whether one agrees with this particular stance or not, few would argue that the shortcomings 
of humanitarian aid and its delivery in particular situations are generally outweighed by a 
political and moral motivation that action should be taken however selective that action may 
be. But in practical terms what that action is or should be has been a frequent topic of debate. 
Although definitions of relief differ between organisations, in the parlance of most 
humanitarian agencies relief operations are normally taken to mean action to save lives in 
the wake of a disaster (Macrae et al, 1997). It is commonly understood to compose one of 
five activities: the provision of food, shelter, water, sanitation and medical care (Natsios, 
1995a; White, 1999). To this may be added the provision of security and the more 
rehabilitative efforts to bring a society traumatised by a complex emergency to minimum 
self-sufficiency: for example, animal husbandry, agriculture and primary health care. 
Responding to humanitarian emergencies is fraught with difficulties from the outset. 
Humanitarian responses invariably involve communication across several languages, 
interpretation across more than one cultural divide, and the negotiation of political 
agreements at every step (Ilyndman, 1998). Increasingly, assistance is being provided in war 
zones where the conditions for humanitarian workers are far from ideal. The creation of 
humanitarian space is often problematic. 
Clearly, there would be no geographies of vulnerability if the effects of disasters were 
spatially uniform. Self-evidently, they are not. Disasters are spatial phenomena, as their 
dynamic, destructive and disarticulative processes constantly reshape and reconstitute the 
boundaries and spaces of every day life (Harada, 2000; Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott, 2000). 
War is only the most outwardly visible exemplar of this truism. In the penumbra of war 
ravaged societies a stroll through the newspaper headlines of the last few years illustrates 
this destructively metamorphic world: disintegration, drought, exclusion, internal 
displacement, marginalisation, failed state, civil-unrcst, riots, hunger, poverty, ethnic 
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cleansing, violence, balkanisation, refugees, chaos, famine, tribalism, inequality. Advances 
in human fulfilment are undermined as the countries' political, economic and social 
structures are exposed in a destructive process of undevelopment: a series of interconnecting 
movements leading to increased poverty and vulnerability, to insecurity and ill-being. " 
This destructive process of becoming vulnerable is not dependent upon proximity to the 
physical event alone with its immediate physical outcomes, for example damage or deaths, 
but it is also the product of a particular set of social, political, economic circumstances. As 
Cutter et al (2000: 716) note, "[t]he interplay of social, political, and economic factors - 
interacting separately, in combination with one another, and with the physical environment - 
create mosaics of risks and hazards that affect people and places they inhabit ... 11 ý 
Many long-lasting complex emergencies set in train profound, but perhaps less immediately 
discernible (at least for those on the outside looking in), changes in livelihoods, social 
structures and demographic patterns, in the physical environment and in the macro-economy 
(Cliffe and Luckham, 1999). While at peak times of crisis, the outwardly visible symptoms 
of violence or of hunger, may be headline news in the rest of the world, the conditions of 
violence and insecurity may continue over many years and form the backdrop for people's 
lives. 
In the midst of this turmoil, whilst people may be victimised they are not passive victims, as 
the expanding literature on coping strategies testifies (de Garine, 1972; Dirks, 1980; Corbett 
1988; Shipton, 1990; Ogden, 2000). People attempt to get on with their lives, although this 
ccoping' may well have negative longer-term implications than the generally accepted 
positive connotation that the term implies. 
As Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald (1998) suggest, one response to the destabilising 
and destructive impacts of conflict is a reinforcement of subsistence and informal activities. 
While informality in this sense is not new, of course, its rediscovery in recent years (through 
the insertion of social capital) is the product of increasing awareness of its social 
17 The author recognises Duffield, (1994: 38), "Development is a normative process of becoming: a series of interconnecting 
movements leading from poverty and vulnerability to security and well-being. " 
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significance in weak or failing economies (Portes, and Kincaid, 1989). Households attempt to 
counter economic hardships through informal social an-angements arising between 
individuals and communities on a personalised basis, rather than through more formalised, 
and institutionalised mechanisms (Morduch, 1999; and Dershem and Gzirishvili, 1998). 
These informal social networks can provide a financial safety net by way of borrowing, 
identifying and gaining access to scarce goods and services. People may even come to rely 
upon these relations, which, for example, may take the form of reciprocal gift exchange or 
remittances, to plug the holes in public welfare nets and buffer the effects of the continuing 
stress confronting households (Devereux, 1999). Not only may informal social networks 
provide food and financial assistance, but they may also provide physical and labour 
support. 
Certainly, for the losers of internal conflict, the human costs are on the whole negative and 
are not only the result of direct violence. For these people, livelihood spaces become 
increasingly fluid, mutable and violate. As part of their military strategies warring parties 
target not only the armed forces of the opposing side but the political, social systems and 
economic networks which maintain the social cohesion of the opposing group (Lautze, 1997; 
Harvey, 1997; Palmer and Zwi, 1998). This exacerbates structural tensions, and deepens 
existing social divisions and inequalities, including gender relations (el Bushra and Piza- 
Lopez, 1994; Palmer and Zwi, 1998; Enarson, 1998; Hyndman, 1998; Jacobson, 1999), 
whilst at the same time destroying the systems, such as public services, that now face 
increasing demands (Lautze, 1997). Hunger, increasing poverty, declining enrolment in 
education, and a decline in the provision of health services including an increase in infant 
mortality are symptomatic of this malaise (Fitzgerald and Stewart, 1997; Stewart and 
Fitzgerald, 1998). 
In the struggles for dominance in the political arenas of Somalia and Sierra Leone, and even 
more so in the openly genocidal landscapes of Rwanda and Burundi, civilian casualties were 
not 'collateral damage' but measures of strategic gain. Civilians may have nothing to do 
with the aims of the warring factions, but they make up 90% of today's war casualties, a 
marked reversal from the battlefields of World War I when 90% of casualties were enlisted 
soldiers (Eade, 1996; Adam, 1998). Child soldiers as young as six are not uncommon in the 
war in Sierra Leone (see also, Buwalda, 1996, on the children of war in the Philippines). 
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In turbulence of the social spaces of disaster, the disruption of food networks is, in the main, 
entirely predictable. The manufacture of machinery and tools, and the production of 
agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides, become problematic. 
Distribution networks, the transportation of these products and harvested crops, between 
field and consumer, whether local, regional or international, can be severed. People's access 
to goods, services and resources are disrupted. A perception of continuing pervasive 
insecurity amongst the beleaguered population diminishes the willingness to take risks in, 
investments of time and resources for future production as time horizons shrink. 
It is in response to the imminent threat or actual occurrence of hunger that food aid networks 
are established by local, national and international agencies. In more advanced or more 
stable economies, formal safety nets are in place to cushion the impact of economic shocks 
and any type of disaster. These exist as formal, publicly supported protective measures, such 
as state welfare systems. As we have seen, in war torn environments, these formal 
arrangements collapse entirely or function inadequately. In the absence of an organised 
government system, this role falls increasingly upon the international community and to 
lesser extent local non-governmental organisations. 
2.4.1 'The two dimensional victim' 
Endeavouring to render the complexity and disorder of the disaster reality into a coherent 
system and an enabling environment, international bureaucracies define institutional tasks 
and create spaces of action (like development or relief). Categorisation and classification are 
central features of this reification of complexity. This essentialist discourse creates and gives 
form to a particular functional interpretation of social and humanitarian reality. Ultimately 
this will have important implications for those included and for those excluded from this 
process. New categories of actors are created and defined, some purely operational (women 
headed households, malnourished, children, and the all encompassing 'vulnerable') but some 
with much wider political and legal connotations (like 'refugee, 'internally displaced 
person', 'minority') (Barber, 1997; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). 11 
18 For example, the legal and operational definition of 'refugee' strongly influences who is or is not granted refugee or asylum 
status. 
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The institutional field extends from global regulatory agencies such as the World Bank, 
bilateral donors (governments), United Nations agencies (such as the United Nations 
Children's Fund, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, United Nations 
Development Programme, and the World Food Programme), and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Moreover, local NGOs ignore this lexicon to their financial peril. In 
the competing spaces of the disaster environment resultant labels also become the defining 
terms for aid agencies. These same categories of actors create divisions of labour as their 
actions become compartmentalised each with their own set of defining terms: UNHCR 
'does' refugees, UNICEF women and children. These divisions are then brought together 
under the confusion of co-ordination. " 
This categorial discourse of humanitarian action, embodied in the rights based machinery 
and cultural values of Judeo-Christianity, not only constitutes the activity (what relief is), the 
creation of humanitarian space, but also who is considered powerful and privileged. It also 
constitutes the 'victim', who are typically seen to be passively at the mercy of forces beyond 
their control. Once their suffering has been made public, responsibility for their fate is seen 
to lie with the international community (Hendrie, 1997). This done in the name of human 
rights and the desirability of meeting basic human needs and of saving as many lives as 
possible. " 
The operational manifestation of this responsibility depends upon the ability to identify, 
select, and then deliver resources to those that are identified to be those most in need on the 
basis of how they fit some set of predetermined criteria. Namely the labels of vulnerability. 
Here the focus is on affected populations as individual and aggregate units with homogenous 
characteristics, rather than as diverse social groups or communities. In this process of 
homogenisation, individual people in large-scale emergencies tend to disappear into the 
crowd (Bakewell, 2000). But as Mark Bradbury (Personal communication, 09 September, 
2001) suggests the prioritisation of individual rights, espoused in international and 
humanitarian rights law, may lead to a situation where community or group rights are 
overlooked. 
19 In the United Nations system, co-ordination of humanitarian assistance is undertaken by the Office for the Co-ordination of 
I lumanitarian Affairs (OCHA). See (www. reliefweb. int/ocha-ol/0nlinehp. html). 
20 Qizilbash (1996)provides a useful insight into the basic needs school. See pages 1212-1213. 
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The technical selection of potential 'beneficiaries' shapes the flow of resources from giver to 
receiver. This transfer of a resource, in turn, establishes a hierarchical relationship of power 
and a set of implicit assumptions: that is, who controls the resources and who receives them 
(Apthorpe and Atkinson, 1999). " In extreme cases, the ultimate expression of this power 
determines who lives and who dies. It may even lead to situations where resources are 
"... actually or potentially responsible for introducing new violence and disasters into the 
established violence and disaster pattern, for which it was supposed to be a major part of the 
amelioration (Apthorpc and Atkinson, 1999: 27). " 
This normative vision that makes them appear so efficient in the calm of the paperwork 
bureaucracies, where programme evaluations are measured by the flow of resources to 
particular categories and by the statistics of aggregate analysis sent to agency headquarters 
and represented in reports to donors, can also make them unrepresentative in different 
cultures and the complex and dynamic social reality of disaster situations. In the constructed 
world of humanitarian discourse there are no blurred edges, no contours - people are either 
included or excluded. This is most tangible in the objective selection of the physical 
manifestation of the hunger-affected, malnourishment. This depends upon the application of 
anthropornetric measurements, such as MUAC (mid-upper arm circumference), and weight 
for height, set against established standards of 'normalcy'. 
In the 'real' world, the more subjective categories, where there are no such clearly defined 
analytical tools, such as the assessment of vulnerability, are less tangible. The 
operationalisation of these discourses are not played out in a social void, where an action 
produces a desired goal or product. In this mechanical view of the social world and the lived 
experience of disasters, X+Y=Z. That these categories do not always yield analytically 
tractable or coherent groups of people is not surprising. As Lakshman Yapa (1996) has 
argued in the context of poverty, they do not carry universal meanings valid for all cultures 
and social groups. Furthermore, as Michael Watts (1993) suggests, this lexicon is rarely 
stable or singular: the reification and codification of dynamic complexity may not find 
reciprocal meanings in the vocabularies of the disaster affected. However, language, and the 
21 This is in the Foucauldian sense that power can only be exercised, it cannot be possessed (Hannah, 1997). In this case power 
is exercised through the transfer of resources. 
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construction of categories, are not simply a set of words and sentences with particular 
meanings. They also communicate and they have history. 'ney accumulate in complex 
configurations to the point when they become totemic and symbolic and, in the case of food 
aid, sites of contestation between giver and receiver. An example of this is the adsorption of 
these words by members of the disaster-affected communities in a bid to gain access to 
resources, including highly fungible food aid. This undermines the basic assumption of this 
discourse of codification that the objects of inquiry contain stable internal characteristics that 
can be objectively examined (see Yapa, 1996), and the data can be collected to inform 
diagnosis, policy recommendations, and the implementation of programmes of assistance. 
Human behaviour is infinitely more complex than any programmatic formula (Smart, 1983, 
cited in Hendrie, 1997). The nexus of power that is visible in the flow of resources between 
the humanitarian agency and the 'beneficiary' is but one manifestation. As Melissa Gilbert 
(1998: 596) notes in her analysis of the survival strategies of working poor women, - power 
should be conceptualised in terms of "... a multiplicity of interconnected, mutually 
transformative, and spatially constituted social relations. " 
By conceptualising power as having a single reference point, and residing with, for example, 
the humanitarian agency, it creates two illusions. Firstly, it flattens out the differences within 
and between categories and minimises the complexity of the categorised. Geography 
disappears. Life becomes two-dimensional in the process of categorisation as these 
'invisible ties' (Mazlish, 2000) of social interaction and association between individuals and 
groups dernaterialise. This reinforces the stereotype of the helpless victim, images of which 
are so often used in the marketing of humanitarian disaster. But, power also resides in the 
household, family and community, and wider networks of affiliation and interaction, such as 
the tribe or clan, and through processes of political and economic transaction. These place- 
based and affiliative networks may be central pillars of the survival strategies of disaster 
affected. Secondly, and consequently, it over-emphasises the importance of humanitarian 
assistance within a given situation. Alex de Waal (1989,1996) suggests that during the 
famine in Sudan between 1984-5 food aid accounted for only 10-20% of the means to 
survive. 
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The discourse of its constituent parts does not add up to the social, economic and political 
whole. Ultimately, in other words, the intended programmatic aims of a particular discourse 
do not automatically create the intended consequences (see, Ferguson, 1994) in the disaster- 
affected society which their content intends. A rather glib acceptance of the complexity of 
all complex emergencies leads Andrew Natsios (1996a) to frame the law of unintended 
consequences: the greater the degree of disarray, even dissolution within a social order, the 
more unpredictable the outcome of any intervention, whether military in nature or 
humanitarian. Thus, humanitarian assistance, ignorant of the multiple and interconnected 
power relationships within the conflict setting, may exacerbate existing problems or have 
contrary effects to those intended. 
Finally, the issue of complexity holds true for societies whether affected by disaster or not. 
As Gordon observes, "[flhat life is complicated may seem a banal expression of the obvious, 
but it is nonetheless a profound theoretical statement" (Gordon, 1997: 3, cited in Thrift, 
1999a). In rccognising this Deborah Eade (1996) asserts that the complexity of complex 
emergencies refers not to the social reality of the disaster but to the problems that face the 
international community in response to these situations. 
Important questions remain for those seeking to understand the nature of vulnerability and 
remedial action. To what degree have institutions of the state survived? What, if anything, 
has replaced the state: warlords, local autonomous authority structures, or self-help by local 
communities? What services are provided by local institutions and how effectively? How far 
have social networks been destroyed? What if anything has replaced them? How far is 
society, at local and broader levels, polarised? And what have been the gender implications 
of the above? Instead of the simplification of reifying particular single causes to hunger 
disasters, how have people's entitlements to food changed over time (Bush, 1996)? Prior to 
the eruption of conflict low incomes and a lack of social integration may have made some 
groups particularly vulnerable to the failure of the formal economy or the breakdown of 
public services. How have these groups fared? 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has demonstrated that an analytical lens that draws upon theoretical turns in 
human geography and the social sciences in general proves effective in challenging the 
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nature of development. What these recent intellectual travels have helpfully highlighted and 
reminded us of is the need for greater self-consciousness, reflexivity and encouragement of 
difference and heterogeneity. This same lens can also be applied to question the discourses 
of humanitarian practice. But I argue that in so doing the criticisms of these post 
development narratives must be kept in mind: the dangers of localism, and a possible failure 
to offer a counter narrative. 
How disasters are understood shapes the way humanitarian actors respond to them. The 
homogenisation of this functional reality, evident in the categorisation and labelling of 
vulnerability, minimises the spatial complexity of the social world. The ties of social 
interaction and association between individuals and groups dcmatcrialise: geography 
disappears, leading to the humanitarian stereotype of the helpless 'two-dimensional victim'. 
Research related to social needs and capacities and grounded in the spatial geographies of 
the disaster reality will lay the foundations for more sensitive humanitarian relief strategies. 
The problem is to define such spaces and their transformation in such a way that we can 
make them visible and immediate, comprehensible and functional (for the policies and the 
practices of humanitarian relief). Rather than paralysing the practices of humanitarian 
assistance from afar I wish to broaden the conversation to promote ways of thinking 
critically and constructively about what aid practitioners do and do not do. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most basic definition of vulnerability is, not surprisingly, derived from its Latin 
root vulnerare meaning 'to wound' and, following on from that vulnerability is 'the capacity 
to be wounded'. The concept conveyed is basic and familiar, perhaps so familiar and widely 
used that it strains against more precise definitions and the diversity of terminology enlisted 
in definitional efforts. 'Vulnerability' as a condition is also implicit in related terms such as 
resilience, marginality, susceptibility, adaptability, fragility, and risk. This variation is not 
necessarily a matter of ambiguity or semantic drift, but disciplinary orientation (political 
ecology, human ecology, physical science, spatial analysis) and subsequent methodological 
practices. There is also considerable variation in the types of hazards themselves (famine, 
floods, drought, seismic events, technology, war - and we could add acts of terrorism) and in 
the regions chosen for examination (developed versus developing countries). 
Vulnerability and vulnerable sometimes serve as convenient substitutes for poverty and poor 
(see, Cuny, 1983; Morduch, 1999). More often, vulnerable is used simply as a synonym for 
poor. While there is strong correlation between income and access to resources with the 
ability of people to protect themselves and, especially, to recover after disasters vulnerability 
is not the same as poverty (Wisner, 1993). It is this failure to distinguish vulnerability from 
poverty that "... blurs distinctions and sustains stereotypes of the amorphous and 
undifferentiated mass of the poor" (Chambers, 1989: 1). The vulnerability of an individual 
or a group changes in respect to a particular hazard. And as Cutter et al (2000: 713) also 
suggest "... the most biophysically vulnerable places do not always spatially intersect with 
the most vulnerable populations. " 
Ultimately vulnerability has to be seen in a more dynamic context than poverty. Although 
poor people are usually among the most vulnerable, not all vulnerable people are poor 
(Swift, 1989), a distinction which facilitates differentiation among lower income 
populations. For Robert Chambers (1983), vulnerability is just part of the deprivation trap 
that also includes poverty, physical weakness, isolation, and powerlessness. 
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In the food security literature, there are, in addition to income, a multiplicity of other factors 
that codeten-nine whether an individual will go hungry: this is at the heart of Sen's (1981) 
notion of different commodity bundles and entitlements. Starvation is the characteristic of 
some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there not being 
enough food to eat. Although not without its criticisms (see, Devereux, 1993; Nolan, 1993; 
Fitzgerald and Stewart, 1997; de Waal, 1990; Watts and Bohle, 1993), the most important 
feature of Sen's entitlement approach is that it directs attention away from the supply-side 
analyses of food crises, towards an analysis which treats them instead as symptoms of 
demand failure. Generalisations drawn from crude aggregates, such as food availability per 
capita, erroneously imply a totally equal distribution of food. The corollary of this 
observation is that the effects of famine are rarely shared equally among all elements of a 
population because of, in Sen's terrns, inequalities in their respective entitlements. In the 
words of Amartya Sen: 
"The entitlement of a person stands for the different alternative commodity bundles 
that a person can acquire through the use of the various legal channels of 
acquirement open to someone in his position. In a private ownership market economy, 
the entitlement set of a person is determined by his original bundle of ownership 
(what is called his endowment) and the various alternative bundles he can acquire 
starting respectively from each initial endowment, through the use of trade and 
production (Sen, 1990. - 36). " 
The processes that endeavour to account for why some rather than others are more likely to 
experience hunger define what is typically referred to as vulnerability. 
Despite this loose consensus, vulnerability still means different things to different people. A 
review of the disaster literature of the last twenty years shows just how much the definitions 
of vulnerability have changed (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 The changing de finitions of vulnerability 
Definition 
Timmerman, (1981) Vulnerability is the degree to which a system acts adversely to the occurrence of' 
a hazardous event. The degree and quality ofthe adverse reaction are conditioned 
by a system's resilience (a measure of the system's capacity to absorb and 
recover from the event). 
UN DRO, (1982) Vulnerability is the degree of loss to a given element or set of elements at risk 
from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude. 
Chambers, (1989) Vulnerability, which is not the same as poverty, refers to exposure to 
contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with them. Vulnerability has 
thus two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual 
or household is subject; and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a 
lack of means to cope without damaging loss. 
Downing, (199 1) Vulnerability has three connotations: it refers to a consequence (for example, 
famine) rather than a cause (for example, drought); it implies an adverse 
consequence (for example, maize yields arc sensitive to drought; households are 
vulnerable to hunger); and it is a relative term that differentiates among 
socioeconomic groups or regions, rather than an absolute measure of deprivation. 
Dow, (1992) Vulnerability is the differential capacity of groups and individuals to deal with 
hazards, based on their positions within physical and social worlds. 
Alexander, (1993) Human vulnerability is a function of the costs and benefits of inhabiting areas at 
risk from natural disaster. 
Cutter, (1993) Vulnerability is the likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and 
adversely affected by a hazard. It is the interaction of' the hazards of'place (risk 
and mitigation) with the social profile of communities. 
Watts and Bohle, (1993) Vulnerability is defined in terms of exposure, capacity and potentiality. 
Accordingly, the prescriptive and normative response to vulnerability is to 
reduce exposure, enhance coping capacity, strengthen recovery potential and 
bolster damage control (that is, minimise destructive consequences) via private 
and public means. 
Blaikie et al, (11994) The characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, 
cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural haz. ard. It involves a 
combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone's life and 
livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society. 
Bohle et al, (1994) Vulnerability is best defined as an aggregate measure of human welfare that 
integrates environmental, social, economic and political exposure to a range of 
potential harmful perturbations. Vulnerability is a multi-layered and multi- 
dimensional social space defined by determinate, political, economic and 
institutional capabilities of people in specific places at specific times. 
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Cutter, (1996) The vulnerability of place is conceived as both a biophysical risk as well as a 
social response, but within a specific area] or geographic domain. This can be 
geographic space, where vulnerable people and places are located, or social 
space, who in those places are most vulnerable. 
Hewitt, (1997) Vulnerability is a product of the circumstances that put people and property on a 
collision course with given dangers, or that make them less able to withstand or 
cope with disaster. It depends, in large measure, upon ongoing conditions of 
material and social life, or their transformations. For that reason, this perspective 
also draws attention to cultural and ecological contexts that constrain or enhance 
people's abilities to respond and cope. 
Adger, (1999) Vulnerability is defined as the exposure of individuals or collective groups to 
livelihood stress as a result of the impacts of environmental change. It is 
constituted by individual and collective aspects which can be disaggregated. but 
are linked through the political economy of markets and institutions. 
Cutter el al, (2000) Vulnerability is multifaceted in nature demanding a thorough consideration of 
both the biophysical and social systems that give rise to the hazards. Spatial and 
temporal variables in hazard vulnerability must be considered with the particular 
context in which the hazard takes place. 
Cannon, (2000) Vulnerability is derived largely from a political, economic and social context and 
is not simply about people who are 'victims' in some aggregated and apolitical 
manner. The key issue is that people's own (very variable) characteristics - their 
capacities, resilience and vulnerabilities - are recognised as a significant part of 
the disaster equation. If people are perceived only or mainly as victims then the 
problem of what causes vulnerability may be evaded. 
Bankoff, (2001) Argues that development and vulnerability form part of one and the same 
cssentialising and gencralising cultural discourse that denigrates large regions of 
the world as disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone. 
Wisner, (2001 a) Situational vulnerability describes, by recognising the importance of local voices, 
the changing nature of daily life of groups or individuals and their actual 
situation in respect to a particular hazard. Vulnerability is the product of the 
complex interaction of particular overlapping identities and forms of 
empowerment or marginality. 
In this chapter I explore the disaster and hazard research literature to discuss these changing 
meanings, and the associated paradigms of vulnerability (outlined in Chapter 1) that have 
shaped research and policy agendas and the ways that disasters and food crises are 
responded to. This leads us to the main emerging set of methods for moving beyond the 
vulnerability of place: those based upon the sustainable livelihoods concept being explored 
by several development and humanitarian agencies. 
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However, I find these approaches troubling. I argue in this chapter that these debates do not 
engage with the spatial dilemmas that are stretching the imaginations of human geographers 
and others in the social sciences. What I lay out is a quest for these spaces of daily life and a 
subsequent call for the reinsertion of the geographies of space into the vulnerability of place 
and 'the two dimensional victim'. Consequently, a series of doors are then opened onto the 
mobile geographies of social space. Firstly, the spatiology of Lefebvre offers one option for 
the reconciliation of place. Furthermore, it offers a means of bridging the policies and 
practices of humanitarian actors and the everyday activities of the disaster affected. 
Secondly, livelihoods are discussed under the guise of the under-networked concept of social 
capital, a core component of livelihood models and what should be a means for breaking 
down the boundaries of place. Thirdly, I consider the framing of scale. This has very 
tangible and material consequences that are evident in the hierarchical constructs of 
humanitarian analysis and action: for example, household and community. And, lastly, 
however much we talk about connectedness and a networked society spatial boundaries 
continue to exist. These inequalities of social position determine ultimately access to various 
forms of network resource. 
The reader may feel that by the end of this chapter instead of finding a clarifying simplicity 
of the issue under discussion, vulnerability, they are plunged further into the troubled waters 
of complexity. There are, after all, no glib formulae for determining the vulnerability status 
of individuals or groups, a problem that confronts humanitarian agencies when faced with 
the complexity of disaster situations. 
3.2 THE ANATOMIES OF VULNERABILITY 
Three main themes of vulnerability, and an emerging fourth, can be distinguished in the 
disaster literature. These are vulnerability as social problems without social content; the 
roots of disaster vulnerability; the vulnerability of place; and the hidden voices of the 
vulnerability of place. While not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, this typology helps to 
distinguish between the theoretical and methodological orientations of the current research 
and also outlines potential areas of future interest and involvement. If not exactly coherent 
fields, each has become the focus of a community of researchers and publications, agencies 
and practitioners. 
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3.2.1 Social problems without social content 
The first theme of vulnerability, or as Kenneth Hewitt (1995a: 319) has labelled it 'social 
problems without social content', is characterised by a focus on the distribution of some 
hazardous condition, whether biophysical or technological, the human occupancy of this 
hazardous zone (for example, floodplains, seismic zones), and the degree of loss (life and 
property) associated with the occurrence of a particular event (flood, hurricane, earthquake). 
Magnitude, duration, impact, polygons and zones, frequency and rapidity of onset all 
characterise the vocabulary of these exposure or biophysical studies (UNDRO, 1982; Cutter I 
and Solecki, 1989; Alexander, 1993). 
Individuals and communities are reduced to collective units, statistically distributed data 
points, and functions of abstract dimensions. Society is redescribed - it is labelled population 
or GNP, or aggregated in national food balance sheets. The implication in this conception of - 
vulnerability (see the former United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) 
definition above) is that human beings are just one of many elements with differing degrees 
of potential for damage or loss (hence, the structural vulnerability of buildings, bridges, and 
road networks (Wisner, 2001 a)). 
Vulnerability is seen as principally located within clearly defined, and thus identifiable, 
spatial borders and temporal frames of reference. 'Ibis paradigm renders social 
understanding secondary if not impossible, by placing the sources of risk literally outside 
society, 'in nature', or presumed accidental, unscheduled forces that erupt from within. In 
such an instrumentalist view of disaster there is a dangerous tendency to treat people purely 
as helpless 'victims': individual human agency gets lost in the process of conceptualising 
whole systems (such as the vulnerable food systems of Somali pastoralists), Physical 
structures (for example, bridges, or the urban built environment), and administrative 
networks (Wisner, 2001a). The social vulnerability of groups of people is also generally lost 
in the analytical shuffle by technocrats who seek to minimise the vulnerability of systems 
and things. Solutions are devised and implemented within delineated boundaries and a 
mechanical functionalism is visible in technical counter force that confronts and tames 
nature: improved building codes, flood control works and fail-safe mechanisms. 
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Thus, this purview has encouraged an adversarial view of the relations of environment (or 
nature) and society. A clear distinction is drawn between 'disasters caused by natural 
phenomena' (meteorological, tectonic and biological) and 'man-made disasters' (civil 
disturbance, warfare, accidents). Society - at least communities or populations - is made to 
appear a passive victim of natural and technological agents. This asocietal view of disasters 
is exemplified by Kates (1975: 16 quoted in Waddell, 1983) who suggests that "... not only 
the cause of ... [natural] disasters fall within the province of science and technology, but 
also, in some cases their prevention, as well as the organisational arrangements made for 
forecasting them and reducing their impact when they occur. " In the view of Michael Watts 
(1983a: 233) this represents an "... empiricist view of nature as a constellation of physical 
'facts'... " whereby "... disaster is appropriated and severed from its roots in the rest of 
material life" (Hewitt, 1983b: 29). 
The most contentious, although common, element of this hazards paradigm generally, is the 
tacit assumption of an unexamined normality, that is supposedly predictable, managed (and 
manageable), stable and the basis of productive society. This corresponds with the sense that 
disaster involves events (temporary interruptions) that have little or nothing to do with the 
rest of life and the environment. The job of disaster professionals is then one of removing all 
traces of the disaster and restoring the status quo (and 'normal' development (IFRC/RCS, 
1996; Brandt, 1997) - normal life as the polar opposite of disaster - as soon as possible after 
the event has occurred. This discourse accepts development and disaster as antonyms. It 
constructs them as opposites or adversaries: war and peace, farnine and plenty, words that 
need to be examined for what they obscure as much what they explain. The consequence is a 
disjunctural dichotomised 'reality' in which the risks, incidence and phenomena'of disaster 
have been segregated and 'targeted' separately from 'normal life' (Hewitt, 1995b). 
This rather simplistic linear view of disasters is discernible in recent debates surrounding the 
linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development in complex emergencies, and the 
humanitarian crises that they generate (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994; Duffield, 1994; 
Seaman, 1994; European Commission, 1996; Brigaldino, 1996; Macrae et al, 1997; 
ECHO/ODI, 1998) . 22 The concept of linking relief-to-development, which 
first appeared in 
22 Other terms include: relief development strategies; relief-to-developmcnt continuum; and relief-to-development contiguum. 
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the early 1990s and rapidly gained widespread usage, emerged from studies of natural 
disasters, especially drought in Africa, and the conclusion that impacts could be reduced, and 
the recovery rate accelerated, by improvements in, and the integration of, approaches to 
preparedness, response and recovery. Despite its origins in natural hazards policy in 
relatively stable states, the concept has been uncritically transferred to the profoundly 
different context of complex humanitarian emergencies arising from conflict and political 
instability. 
3.2.2 The roots of disaster vulnerability 
For too long the ruling classes have attributed to 'Nature'... the inequalities and 
sufferingsfor which the organisation Of society is responsible (Sebastiano Timpanaro 
(1975), cited in Watts, (1983a)). 
Chronic disturbances such as drought, famine (particularly the Sahel famines of the 1980s), 
hunger, climate or environmental change have invoked a powerful reappraisal of disaster 
and vulnerability. Beginning in the 1960s, although argued a century ago in relation to 
famines of 191h century India (Digby, 1901 cited in Brookfield, 1999), a much broader 
interdisciplinary approach to hazards has developed, strongly influenced by geographers 
(Wisner, 1978; Watts, 1983a, 1983c; Hewitt, 1983b), sociologists (Kreps, 1984; Dynes, 
1975; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977; Bogard, 1988) and anthropologists (Davis, 1992; 
D'Souza, 1979,1981,1985). Informed by more 'radical' interpretations of calamity (Hewitt, 
1983a), and grounded in the relation between nature and society, and in the agency and 
quality of social life, the concept of disasters is broadened by the inclusion of political 
economy and human ecology perspectives (O'Keefe et al, 1976; Wisner et al, 1982; Hewitt, 
1983a; Watts, 1983a; Watts, 1983b; Alexander, 1993; Watts and Bohle, 1993; Bohle et A 
1994; Blaikie el al, 1994; Hewitt, 1997). 
The nature of the hazardous event or condition is usually taken as given, or at the very 
minimum viewed as a social construct not a biophysical condition. This has led to essential 
changes in the way that disasters and vulnerability are viewed, calling into question the 
definition of the former, while the definition of the latter is intimately related to evolving 
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This new awareness of the 'natural' in disasters is mirrored in the growing dissatisfaction 
with the Enlightenment antimony between the 'natural' and 'social' (or nature and society) 
that has been a focus of attention within human geography in recent years (Whatmore, 1999; 
Murdoch, 1997; Gerber, 1997; Demeritt, 1994). " It is now widely recognised that 'natural 
disaster' is a term of convenience that amounts to a misnomer as neither disasters, nor the 
conditions that give rise to them are undeniably natural. As Wisner (2001b: 252) points out, 
"... it takes more than an extreme natural event to produce a disaster. " Pelanda (1981: 69, 
quoted in Hewitt, 1997) notes that "disaster is the actualisation of social vulnerability ... we 
interpret the notion of social vulnerability as an independent factor (predictor) of risk. " 
Hewitt (1983a: 25) stresses that the causes, nature and consequences of natural disaster 
depend not on conditions or behaviours peculiar to calamitous events, "... but on the ongoing 
social order, its everyday relations to the habitat and the larger historical circumstances that 
shape or frustrate these matters. " In other words, the particular contexts in which the hazard 
is embedded. There is an acceptance that the boundaries between the hazard and the social 
are fluid. That is, the boundaries are under perpetual revision, depending on the hazard and 
the ability of people to withstand or cope with the shock or stress. 
In this conceptualisation, an extreme occurrence, such as an earthquake, drought or flood is 
only the trigger. The disaster that follows is the product of political, social and economic 
forces in everyday life (Wisner, 1993; Hewitt, 1995a; Bolin and Stanford, 1998): "disasters 
cannot be divorced from normal life; they are a reflection of it" (Kent, 1987: 27). Pelling's 
(1997) work on floods in Guyana sees vulnerability as an ongoing state rather than a status 
to be identified in relation to a specific hazardous event. In India, at least since 1850, 
"famine ceased to be a natural calamity and was transformed into a social problem of 
poverty and dearth" (Bhatia, 1991: 2 quoted in Hewitt, 1995b). In analysing the human and 
material losses resulting from Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and two severe earthquakes in 
January and February, 2001, Ben Wisner (2001b) describes how the roots of disaster 
vulnerability in El Salvador lie in the long history of 61ite control of land and the wars that 
have resulted from it. "These two fundamental historical factors have shaped the country's 
population distribution and settlement pattern, one which exposes two groups to very high 
risk. the urban poor, especially those living in or near the ravines.... and the rural poor who 
23 However, these two strands of research do not appear to communicate, at least in terms of references cited. 
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live on steep slopes or near rivers, and also others living in drought-prone areas (2001b: 
254). " Continuing vulnerability (or the low degree of capability to cope with the impact of 
hazard and respond to it) rests squarely on the nature and trajectory of 'development'. 
The daily lives of many are filled with violence that escapes the dichotomic tags of 'war' Or 
'conflict' and 'peace' (Lewer, 1999; Wisner, 2002) and that clouds our understanding of 
complex emergencies. Over three decades ago Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1969) coined the 
phrase 'structural violence' to describe any number of situations in which social, economic, 
and political systems can institutionalise harm, imagery that reminds us of the Clausewitzian 
interchange between political processes and warfare (see, also, Preti, 2002). ' War and peace 
are relative rather than absolute conditions, but conditions that both still exhibit degrees of 
violence. Peace can mean the absence of the violence of inter- (or intra)state conflict but an 
acceptance of unbalanced power relationships, inequalities and lack of access to resources 
which may be associated with such a condition. 
In reality, most modem conflicts (however political they appear to be (Slim, 1995)), do not 
exhibit the extremely visible and immediate functions of continuous war - conflicts often 
move in and out of distinct phases, and with actors who change over time. To paraphrase 
Galtung, an adequate understanding of the violence of war and peace is necessary to explore 
the different dimensions of vulnerability that inhabit the apparent vacuum between these two 
extremes in today's discussions of complex protracted emergencies. 
Acute patterns of vulnerability, in evidence as the immediate consequences of the disaster, 
are thus an amplification of chronic, underlying problems. Rather than highlighting the 
vulnerability of event, the vulnerability of process is brought to the fore. History matters. 
This correlation of actions in space over time in turn draws attention to any number of 
circumstances that fall short of being labelled disasters but which nevertheless contribute to 
the soft underbelly of society. Every year there are a large number of small and medium- 
24 The most famous aphorism of the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz(1780-1831), drawn from On War [Howard 
and Paret, 1976], suggests that war is a continuation of political activity by other means. Even though the original German, that 
war is the continuation 'of political intercourse' (des politischen verkehrs) 'with the intermixing of other means' (mit 
einmischung anderer mittel), expresses a more subtle and complex idea than the English words in which it is so frequently 
quoted above (Keegan, 1993), it remains the basis for the study of war as a potentially rational pursuit. 
49 
THE GEOGRAPHIES OF VULNERABILITY 
sized occurrences (including landslides, floods, drought, and civil conflict) that are localised 
and affect small numbers of people. These non-disasters do not make the headlines or elicit 
international relief, but cumulatively they may account for similar or greater levels of social 
and economic loss than less-frequent large-scale, newsworthy, crises (Lavell, 1994). 
While Brookfield (1999: 3) does not question that disasters strike different classes or groups 
of people very unequally, he is keen to insert a cautionary note: "... the whole explanation of 
disaster often does not lie in socially generated vulnerability. Both places and categories of 
people can be described as more or less vulnerable to hazard. Places are liable to greater or 
lesser damage and destruction by virtue of their site, because of high or low natural 
sensitivity or because of protection by human artifice. People are less or more vulnerable by 
virtue of their wealth and social position, and by the degree to which they have taken 
precautions. " In Brookfield's mind, the ecological disaggregation of vulnerability is as 
important as its political and economic deconstruction: the proper approach to the analysis of 
vulnerability, therefore, is to consider the geophysical and human elements of the problem 
equally, without assuming one or the other is dominant. 
In recognising that society matters, there has been a concomitant acceptance that the 
'vulnerable' is not a unitary subject, but a heterogeneous social category deeply divided by 
(among other things) gender (Cutter, 1995; Fordham, 1998,2000; Enarson, 1998,2000; 
Ferguson, 1996). This augmented conceptual view begins with the empirical observation 
that different groups of people suffer differing degrees of death, injury, loss, or disruption to 
the same event, and also experience differing degrees of difficulty, success or failure in the 
process of recovery. From this vulnerability tends to be broken down into different kinds 
(for example, social, political, economic, environmental, and locational vulnerability), that 
function on the basis of empirically developed taxonomies. Such disaster taxonomies (the 
vulnerability of lactating mothers, children under five, the elderly, disabled, ethnic, racial or 
religious minorities, for example) are commonplace throughout the lexicons of relief and 
development agencies (Morrow, 1999; O'Hare, 2001). 
Obviously the categories or components listed above are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
they are likely to be compounded in complex ways that place certain members of the 
community at greater risk than others with similar lifeworlds. As Ben Wisner (2001a: 4) 
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asks, "doesn't it depend on the specific hazard and specific circumstances? Does it also not 
depend on other characteristics of that or those persons, all of which are capable of change? " 
Crudely put, how many persons deserving of attention fall into the cracks between and 
within these categories? This reflects Ley's (1989: 241, quoted in McHugh, 2000) 
cautionary statement, "the suppression of human nature in theory first reflects and then 
justifies the suppression of humans in practice. We become what we model. " The simple 
category 'women' clearly masks enormous heterogeneity (Fordham, 1998; Enarson, 2000). 
While it is pleasing to see that the adjective 'social' is more widely made explicit the 
&social' is still a very large domain. These lists are an obvious improvement on the previous 
undifferentiated amorphous view of vulnerability that mixed physical structures with the 
livelihoods and responses of people to disaster, and while they act in practical terms to hone 
or orient planners and assistance providers to particular 'voiceless' groups, they are still 
rather blunt tools. And they are still externally generated prescriptive devices. 
3.2.3 The vulnerability of place 
To organise and combine both the traditional view of vulnerability (biophysical risk) with 
the more recent ideas on social vulnerability, a vulnerability of place model (see Figure 3-1) 
has emerged (Liverman, 1990b; Palm and Hodgson, 1992; Dcgg, 1993; Young, 1996; Bolin 
and Stanford, 1998; Cutter el al, 2000; O'Hare, 2001; Wisner, 2001b). This model, 
according to Cutter et al (2000: 716) seeks "... to integrate the two aspects of vulnerability 
by tying them both to particular places. The focus on place provides an opportunity to 
examine some of the underlying social and biophysical elements that contribute to 
vulnerability, as well as assess their interaction and intersection. " 11 
25 ne influence of the subdiscipline of political ecology is much in evidence here, notably arising out of the work of Piers 
Blaikie, excmpliricd in The political economy ofsoilerosion in developing countries (1985) and Landdegradation andsocietY 
(with Brookfield, 1987). These two books, describing the disequilibria and instability evident in the interaction between the 
environment and development, were the "... intellectual and theoretical foundation stones for a generation of ecologically 
in formed anthropologists, foresters and geographers... " (Watts, 1997.75) who sought to harness environmcntalism to the tools 
of political economy. 
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Figure 3.1 The vulnerability of place model (adapted from Cutter, 1996). Risk and mitigation 
interact to produce the hazard potential, which is filtered through (1) the social fabric to create social 
vulnerability and (2) the geographic context to produce biophysical vulnerability. The interaction 
between the two creates the vulnerability of place. 
This place-based, or 'situational' (Wisner, 2001a), approach tries to go beyond the laundry 
lists and taxonomies of previous vulnerability models by recognising the complexity of 
overlapping identities present in everyday life. After all, as people have very different types 
of vulnerability, they naturally all have different strategies to deal with threats to their 
livelihoods. The key question becomes not what kind of group a person or family belongs to, 
but the nature of their daily life, their actual situation (including the way it may have 
changed recently or may be changing) (Wisner, 2001a). This is framed within an 
understanding of the daily, seasonal, and yearly circumstances of a person's access to 
resources and position in networks of power. This recognises that social vulnerability is not 
a permanent property of a person or group, but changes in respect to a particular hazard. 
Furthermore, it recognises that vulnerability is not necessarily fixed in geographic space. 
The challenge thus becomes one of creating ways of analysing the vulnerability implicit in 
daily life (Wisner, 1993). This leads us into an emerging fourth theme. 
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3.2.4 The hidden voices of the vulnerability of place 
The problems of simple, populist representations of categories such as the poor (or victim) 
have long been acknowledged in poststructuralist development positions, but have continued 
to be used in the disaster discourse (Bankoff, 2001). Replacing the disempowering 
structuralist interpretations of disaster reality (outlined above), that share much with other 
forms of development discourse, more leading than learning, where communities are urged 
to adopt 'our' recommendations and representational categories as appropriate and where an 
externally derived disaster reality provides the framework for subsequent action, are calls to 
listen to the hitherto hidden voices of the vulnerable (Watts and Bohle, 1993; Hewitt, 
1995b). In this there is an implicit recognition that hazard or disaster perception, and views 
of vulnerability may differ between different actors (Hewitt, 1994; Smith and Belgrave, 
1995; Wisner, 1998; Wong and Zhao, 200 1). 
This requires "... different modus operandi, methodologies and perspectives: a view not 
merely 'from below' but from within rather than outside communities... One requires 
insight rather than oversight; a capacity to listen to, comprehend and interpret experience 
and experiences expressed in local languages and vernacular 'discourse', rather than 
technical ones" (Ilcwitt, 1995b: 125). Not only arc individuals and communities empowered 
through recognition of their capacities and capabilities, but also the main difference is that 
the community defines its own vulnerabilities, and, importantly, defines its own 
4 vulnerable'. In so doing, the more vulnerable have a chance to become less vulnerable with 
greater empowerment (Sen, 1981; Watts and Bohle, 1983). Through analysis of the nature of 
daily life (including the way it may have changed recently or may be changing), and the 
actual vulnerabilities of individuals and communities a deeper understanding is emerging 
"... of what disasters are for those who experience them" (Christoplos et al, 2001: 190). 
3.3 BEYOND MERE LABELLING: A LIVELIHOODS APPROACH TO 
VULNEILABILITY 
The main emerging set of methods for moving beyond the mere labelling of the vulnerability 
of place is the sustainable livelihoods concept being explored currently by several 
development and humanitarian agencies and donors for policy and practice formulation. 
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These include the World Bank (see, for example, Narayan et al, 2000), " the UK Department 
for International Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the World 
Food Programme, non-governmental organisations including Oxfam and CARE (see Carney 
et al, 1999), and independent research institutes including the Institute of Development 
Studies, and the Overseas Development Institute. 27 But to date, livelihoods approaches that 
developed from agricultural system research in the 1980s have been predominantly used in 
academic analysis and NGO practice under the guise of rural development in peaceful 
settings. Their re-packaging for use in situations of chronic political instability, where 
violence and poverty have become entrenched features of the political economy, and where 
people's livelihoods and access to food are persistently or purposefully threatened or 
undermined, is more problematic (Longley, 2002). 
The key element in pursuing a livelihoods approach is its over-riding emphasis on how 
people actually live (Sneddon, 2000), whether this be rural or urban, southern or northern 
hemisphere. It calls for people to be the starting point for analysis of the vulnerability of 
place. And this concept has the potential for bringing together the relatively separate realms 
of humanitarian and development discourses, but "... in a more dynamic manner than 
reiterating vague platitudes about disasters being merely an indication of underdevelopment" 
(Christoplos et al, 2001: 191). An understanding of how households combine survival and 
risk mitigation strategies can reveal the fallacies and limitations of (non)linkages (of, for 
example, staff and budget lines) between humanitarian assistance and development co- 
operation. 
Chambers and Conway (1992: 7-8) give a common understanding of livelihoods: 
a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) 
and activities requiredfor a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can 
cope with and recoverfrom stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities 
and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; 
26 See the World Bank website, http: //www. worldbank. org/poverty/voices/reports. htm 
27 See the Livelihoods Connect website, http: //www. livelihGods. org 
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and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels 
and in the long and short term. 2' 
People endeavour to 'get by' or 'get on' by combining reliance on local and distant sources 
of resource, and by deploying their labour. This 'productive bricolage' (see Croll and Parkin 
(1992), cited in Batterbury, 2001) or diversification (Reardon, 1997; Ellis, 1998; Carswell, 
2000), describes the multitude of ways in which people enter into activities with the hope of 
realising cash income, such as the production of crops or handicrafts for sale or barter, and 
social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve their 
standards of living. 
Diversification should be seen as an active social process, and it raises important analytical 
questions. As Simon Batterbury (2001) reminds us in his village study of Fandou 136ri in 
south-western Niger, in societies dealing with difficult choices to ensure their survival and 
welfare, social, economic, political and environmental forces work together and overlap. 
These activities - their range (in the dual sense of number and scale), scope, importance, 
meaning and persistence - have a major role in shaping the dynamics of livelihoods and 
vulnerability in rural and urban environments. In turn, the daily practices, struggles and 
counter struggles over power and assets shape these same lived spaces. 
From this we can see that a livelihood is not necessarily the same as having a job. It does not 
necessarily even have anything to do with working. Moreover, although obtaining a 
monetary income is an important part of livelihood, it is not the only aspect that matters (de 
Ilaan, L. J., 2000). Access to resources is a constant theme in debates surrounding 
livelihood. "' It is erroneous to conceive of livelihoods as individual ownership of resources. 
This is an important element in livelihood viability, but resources do not necessarily have to 
be held as private property. Land, water, and forests, for example, can be communally 
owned. The important point is access to the resource when it is needed and wanted. 
Chambers and Conway (1992) therefore distinguish between 'tangible' (cattle, equipment, 
stocks) and 'non-tangible' assets, which consist of claims and access. By 'claims' they mean 
29 Farlydefini lions of sustainable livelihoods can be found in the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987). 
29 Me terms asset and resource are often used interchangeably. 
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that people can call upon moral and practical assistance. 'Access' means having or getting 
the opportunity to use the resource in practice. The ability to pursue different livelihood 
strategies is thus dependent on the basic material and social, tangible and intangible assets 
that individuals, and as part of wider institutions such as household, community or kinship 
allegiance, have in their possession, or have access to. 
Table 3.2 Choose yo ur 'capital' the 'capital' base of livelihoods 
Natural capital [lie nalwal resource stocks (,, oil, %%, lie[, ý111, i. 1cliclic lcýoulccý, tol 
environmental services (hydrological cycle, pollution sinks) firom which resource flows 
and services useful for livelihoods are derived. 
Economic capital The capital base (cash, credit/debt, savings. and other assets, including basic 
infrastructure and productive equipment and technologies) which are essential for the 
pursuit ol'any livelihood strategy. 
Human capital The skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health and physical capability 
important for the successful pursuit of different livelihood strategies. 
Social capital The social resources (networks, social claims. social relations, affiliations, 
associations) upon which people draw when pursuing different livelihood strategies 
requiring co-ordinated actions. 
Political capital For instance, this may be the broader political conditions (including the relationship 
between the state and civil society) which allow or constrain the pursuit of different 
livelihood strategies. 
Symbolic capital This may become evident in the embedded historical and cultural setting within which 
livelihoods are pursued. 
Religious capital This may be important in some situations where religious affiliation is strong and 
where it plays an important part as a source of identify or practice in the day to day 
activities of adherents. 
Drawing upon economic metaphors such resources are seen as the 'capital' base from which 
livelihoods are constructed (see Table 3.2). Although this base may vary depending upon the 
particular focus (see, for example, Bourdieu, 1989; Scoones, 1998; Bebbington, 1999; de 
Haan, L. J., 2000; Cannon, 2000) conceptual frameworks attempt to portray the 
complementary resources that people may have access to in the process of composing a 
livelihood system and that can be drawn upon in times of need (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 The DFID livelihood model (adapted from Carney et al, 1999). - 
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3.3.1 The missing spaces of a livelihoods approach 
But something is still missing from these debates. Both vulnerability and livelihood 
approaches start with the premise that the lived experience of place can be described in such 
a way that subsequent action is rendered unproblematic. However, these places are not the 
analytically hermetic and structured social spaces that are evident in current conceptions. It 
is not enough to map vulnerability (for example, with Geographic Information Systems) by 
relying on 'hard' indicators, or by capturing low rainfall areas or earthquake zones. 
Undoubtedly these rather static and spatially myopic approaches have had a profound impact 
upon the ways that these lived spaces are viewed and analytically described and, ultimately, 
how crises are responded to. 
Although there is greater acknowledgement of the multiple trajectories of daily life there is a 
reluctance to recognise and engage in the spatialities and temporalifies of livelihoods. 
Current livelihood approaches are hampered by spatial imaginations that are often rooted in 
the fixed notions of Western settlement patterns, reflected in the sedentaristic assumption 
common in development studies, and that fail to harness the full geographical extent of the 
spatiality of social life. They do not go far enough in taking into account other worlds of 
mobility and movement, such as nomad geographies, or, as Mun Appadurai (1990: 7) 
playfully suggests, "... the woof of human motion... " They do not capture adequately the 
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less visible diverse mobilities of networks, flows and resources that connect people to 
places, people to people, and people to resources. It is as if there is a fear in accepting the 
consequences of the spatial complexity of migration, diversification strategies, and, as 
Chambers and Conway's quote above implies, the interaction of local and global, lacunae 
that are indeed surprising given the importance of social capital in livelihood models. Here I 
do not suggest an artificial separation of these two points, but rather one where we are 
concerned with the diverse mobilities of people, objects, and information and of the complex 
interdependencies between, and consequences of, these diverse elements. 
These are not the organic, fluid and alive spaces of those such as Lefebvre (199 1). These are 
mere cardboard cutouts: they are two-dimensional representations of the real thing with no 
pulse. People are neatly slotted into discrete spatial and social addresses such as household, 
community, rural or urban. While it is human to impose boundaries, material and 
conceptual, around self and worlds, this reification of 'structures' is hardly neutral in 
meaning. Everyone knows what is meant when we speak of hard constructions such as a 
wall in a room, or different rooms (kitchen, bathroom, or bedroom), or an apartment, or 
perhaps a street comer at the meeting point of named streets and buildings. But these softer 
social assemblages are much more difficult to convey (and capture). 
A difficulty with assigning people to discrete spatial addresses concerns the assumption that 
allotting things to people, and people to households, or place accurately reflects the realities 
of life. Livelihoods are never as simple as the models would have us believe. This is not to 
suggest that such constructs as 'household' and 'community' do not exist. We have to 
recognise that there is a qualitative difference between lived spaces - the constitution which 
is highly specific and focused in the geography of its interconnections. But as Massey (1996: 
123) asserts "... the making of such spaces and places is thoroughly 'political', in the widest 
sense of that word. " That includes the gendered experiences of the household and access to 
resources, and the power structures of community interaction and beyond. How else can we 
explain the diverse spaces of the Wall Street broker, the Corsican sheep fanner, or the 
Bangladeshi flood victim? 
Understanding this complex and dynamic web of interactions, of both food and other needs, 
is a difficult but necessary element of understanding people's livelihoods and survival. In 
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addition, these dimensions are likely to change over, and within, geographic area and time 
due to the recurring and differential impact of the geographies of disaster. The impact these 
have on individual households depends on their current asset levels, productive abilities, and 
their access to formal and informal economic and social networks. These interactions, and 
thus specific indicators, can therefore only be identified from a detailed understanding of 
local conditions and local methods of coping with these problems. T'his calls for a new 
approach in which all measures are regarded as complementary building blocks, as parts of a 
whole. 
A fuller comprehension of the spatial complexity of vulnerability and livelihoods can only 
be achieved if we "... stop looking in things in the usual way. And that is difficult" (Thrift, 
1999b: 296). What is needed is an intellectual and practical engagement with the spatial 
dilemmas that are stretching the imaginations of human geographers and others in the social 
sciences to produce new forms of understanding of resource access within culturally and 
socially defined practices. Ultimately, this must start with the invigoration of the 
vulnerability of place and an engagement with the mobile geographies of social space. " 
Building upon the notion of the lived spaces of the vulnerability of place in current and 
livelihood conceptions, I seek a spatial shift. Place is alive (Imft, 1999b) and should not be 
reduced to the inert representations of restricted world-space or a series of bounded isolated 
spaces devoid of human agency and interaction within and between. Confined in such a way, 
the geographical imagination could never hope to capture the myriad complexities of lived 
space (Lefebvre, 1991). Quite the reverse, doors should be opened into realms of the 
unexplored, into a "... world as a space of flows" (Taylor, 2001: 949), of migration, and of 
networks and connection. This points to something that is much more dynamic - an 
unravelling of the multiple networks, multiple social relations and spaces from near and afar 
that should configure the vulnerability of place. 
3.3.2 The incredible expanding world of livelihoods 
Over the years, many academics have discovered that it is astonishingly difficult to 
redescribe lived space in a conceptual sense. When describing the experiential world of daily 
30 John Urry (2000) similarly calls for a 'mobile sociology' to describe these processes. 
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life our metaphors frequently portray a static and entity-based reality. Social spaces, their 
analytic representations, and lived experience jostle uneasily with each other (Crang, 1999). 
The lived experience cannot be considered outside of the spatial realm: "... space is an 
implicit operator which needs to be teased out" (Crang and Thrift, 2000b: 2) if livelihood 
approaches to vulnerability are to be rendered more geographic and representative. This is 
mirrored by Edward Soja (Soja, 1999: 262) who states that "... the social production of 
human spatiality or the 'making of geographies'... " is fundamental to understanding our 
lives and life worlds. 
Here I do not suggest simply 'adding on' space to a particular study, a sort of 'bumper 
sticker' of attachment, but using it in a much more integrated and central manner. "Space 
and place are basic components of the lived world; we take them for granted. When we think 
about them, however, they may assume unexpected meanings and raise questions we have 
not thought to ask" (Tuan, 1977: 3). Illuminating the spatiality of vulnerability has the 
potential to disturb (and perhaps make complex (Lefebvre, 1991)) many of the taken for 
granted assumptions typical of writings on the topic to date. By framing vulnerability in such 
a way, our range of insights increases, but it also reveals limitations that may lead to other 
framings and other questions (Turner 11,1997). 
Thinking about livelihoods is not simply a matter of the easy collapse of spatial categories 
where borders seemingly matter less and less. " The economic, cultural and political rhetoric 
of globalisation talks of a world of 'time-space compression' (Ilarvey, 1989), 'porous 
borders' (Luke, 1994), 'transnationalism' (Mitchell, 1997), 'phantom states' (Thrift and 
Leyshon, 1994), 'glocalisation' (Swyngedouw, 1997), 'ethnoscapcs' and questioned 
identities (Appadurai, 1990), 'explosion of place' (Graham, 1998), 'virtual cities' (Crang, 
2000), 'virtual place' (Adams, 1998), and 'a hyperactive world' (Thrift, 1995). In this 
'incredible shrinking world' (Kirsch, 1995), an increasingly interconnected space, in which 
distances can be transcended at supersonic speeds or at the touch of a button, new 
vocabularies (and metaphors) - of networks, nodes, currents, flows, simultaneity (Thrift and 
Olds, 1996) and hybridity (Whatmore, 1999; Pratt, 1999) - have arisen to describe this 
31 For example, for discussions on territory see, (Taylor, 1995,2001; Newman and Paasi. 1998), on the inviolate spaces of the 
nation-state (Luke, 1994), and on the metageographies of the Three Worlds scheme (Agnew, 2001). 
60 
THE GEOGRAPHIES OF VULNERABILITY 
spatial purview, and the specialised and partially spatialised disciplines of sociology and 
anthropology, to alternative modes of analysis. 
But there has also been a certain asymmetry about these debates. While these new 
homogenising configurations of space, or the 'globalisation from above' (Falk, 1993, cited 
in Mitchell, 1997) caricatured previously, function effectively as hyperbolic devices (Kirsch, 
1995), they also draw attention away from, underplay, or, at worst, ignore some of the 
complex social and political processes of everyday life. While celebrating the unprecedented 
global processes that are shaping the discourses of globalisation, the processes of everyday 
life in place (Escobar, 2001) have dropped out of sight. This discursive erasure of place, 
even if commonsensical views would suggest that such placelessness is nonsensical, has 
profound consequences for our understanding of culture, knowledge, politics, nature and 
economy. 
For Escobar (2001: 140), "... the fact remains that place continues to be important in the 
lives of many people, perhaps most, if we understand by place the experience of a particular 
location with some measure of groundedness (however, unstable), sense of boundaries 
(however, permeable), and connection to everyday 166, even if its identity is constructed, 
traversed by power, and never fixed. " Although much of the recent literature containing 
metaphors of transience suggests constant motion, that does not mean that there are no 
relatively stable elements such as place-based communities and embedded networks, of 
kinship, of friendship and religion, sites of production, as well as of birth, dwelling and other 
filiative forms that should be accounted for (Cloke and Jones, 2001). As we have seen place 
is also the problematic confluence of the policies and practices of development and 
humanitarian agencies and the complex spatial realm of the vulnerable. 
The reconciliation ofplace 
Henri Lcfcbvre's (1991) spatiology, which is in the opinion of Merrifield (1993: 517), 
"... the most fruitful route for broaching, the problematic of place... " offers one waY Of 
achieving a re-framing of this spatial contestation. It provides a germ from which the 
vulnerabilities of place can grow and a means to bridge the policies and practices of 
humanitarian actors and the everyday activities of the disaster affected. 
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It is precisely the constitutive processes of lived space that Henri Lefebvre (1991) seeks to 
illuminate in The production ofspace (POS). " Although not without its critics (see, Unwin, 
2000), at times frustratingly sketched out "... in a preliminary fashion... " (Merrifield, 2000: 
173), and replete with the complex linguistic metaphors and dense prose of a spatial 
explorer, Lefebvre's scrutiny of space is an "... entirely human" project (Stewart, 1995: 617). 
With Lefebvre's dexterity, space is "... organic and fluid and alive; it has a pulse, it 
palpitates, it flows and collides with other spaces. And these interpenetrations ... get 
superimposed upon one another to create a present space" (Merrifield, 2000: 171). It offers, 
through the utility of the conceptual triad of conceived, perceived, and lived spaces, sketched 
out below, a unity theory of space. " 
Representations ofspace refer to conceptualised spaces, the discursively constructed spaces 
of professionals and technocrats. In Lefebvre's urban space, these include planners, 
engineers, developers, architects and others of a scientific bent. This space, which is always 
conceived and abstract since it subsumes ideology and knowledge within its practice, 
'6 ... comprises the various arcane signs, jargon, codifications and objectified representations 
used and produced by these agents and actors" (Merrifield, 2000: 174), and confines the 
human body to quantifiable abstract space. While "drawing boundaries in space is always a 
social act" (Massey, 1995: 61), it is also according to Lefebvre an inherently political act. 
Representational space is directly lived space, the space of everyday life. It is space 
experienced through the complex symbols and images of its "... 'inhabitants' and 'users ...... 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 38). Lived representational space has no need to obey rules of consistency 
or cohesiveness because it is, as Lefebvre (1991: 42) says, alive: 
It speaks. It has an effective kernel or centre. - ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house, or. - 
square, church, graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived 
situations, and thus immediately implies time. Consequently it may be qualified in 
various ways: it may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially 
qualitative, fluid and dynamic. 
32 Originally published in 1974 as La production dellespace. Paris: Anthropos. 
33 Although refigured, this triad is very much in evidence in Ed Soja's later (1996) Thirdspace. Refer, also, to Soja, (1999). 
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Spatial practice are practices that secrete society's space. It embraces production and 
reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social 
formation. For Lefebvre, the spatial practices of any society are revealed by deciphering this 
space. Spatial practices, however, have close affinities to "... the realm of the perceived (the 
practical basis of the perception of the outside world... " (Lefebvre, 1991: 40). In other 
words, people's perceptions condition their daily reality with respect to the usage of space: 
"... the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life and 
leisure" (Lefebvre, 1991: 3 8). 
As Lefebvre (1991: 42) suggests, "[w]e may be sure that representations of space have a 
practical impact, that they intervene in and modify spatial textures which are informed by 
effective knowledge and ideology. " For example, representations of the spaces of disasters 
and of vulnerability, 'captured' by prescriptive policy by development and humanitarian 
actors, and "... embedded with the appearance of logic... " (Lefebvre, 1991: 309) translate 
into actions on the basis of such an understanding. These spatial snapshots, that are 
somehow at once both transparent and hence unproblematic, hark back to the Cartesian 
worldview of space as a neutral medium, a space that is "... separated from practice so that it 
can be inventoried and incorporated into an absolute knowledge" (Lefebvre, 1991: 307)_ 
Social space is treated as though it consists of discrete objects without any sense of relational 
interconnectivity. This abstraction and decorporealisation of space, that evades "... both 
history and practice... " (Lefcbvre, 1991: 7) brings to the fore the powerful pressure to 
homogenise not only spaces but people too: differences are discouraged, marginalised, and 
where possible, demolished. What is -lived and perceived is subsumed under. what is 
conceived. The social space of lived experience is vanquished by what Lefebvre calls an 
abstract conceived space which, in this case, dances to the tune of the bomogenising forces 
of humanitarian practice. 
That space is a product of interrelations, socially constituted (or produced through a process 
of interaction, appears uncontroversial, at least within the domain of human geography 
(Massey, Allen and Sarre, 1999; Crang and Thrift, 2000a). As such, each present space is 
"... the outcome of a process with many different aspects and many contributing currents" 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 110). The emphasis is on a conception of "... space (and space-time) as 
constituted through the social, rather than as dimensions defining an arena within which the 
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social takes place" (Massey, 1999b: 262, emphasis in the original). The problem under the 
pragmatic gaze of development or humanitarian practice is that these social processes are 
lost and space is flattened. The triad is unbalanced: primacy is given to the conceived. 
Tbough difficult to break away from, all reductive procedures are also traps. (Tbis is very 
much in evidence in the creation of the 'Two dimensional victim', see, Chapter 1). This 
spatial reductionism, evident in an established institutional knowledge that serves at the level 
of practice, while endeavouring to render the complexity of lifeworld functional, creates 
problems of interpretation. The spaces of disaster are given literal form, a description - in 
terms of community, village, household, and the various vulnerability labels described from 
above - that speaks of space and, yet, ultimately encloses it. 
We should instead, as Lefebvre implies, listen and look. Geographers are well positioned to 
explore and elucidate the lived experience of place and of the vulnerable. Space and place 
are only two of the many terms geographers - steeped in thinking in terms of space, place 
and connection and the reflexivity of postmodern thought - and others use to answer 
combined 'where' and 'what' questions (Taylor, 1999), questions that are central to concerns 
underlying vulnerability. By listening we should be able to answer a number of questions. 
What is the hazard (or hazards)? Where is the hazard? What are the impacts upon 
individuals and groups of these hazards? And, what do people do in response to this hazard? 
Ultimately, what impacts do disasters have on the spatial realm of the lived world? By 
listening to the voices and spatial tales of the vulnerable the disastrous spaces of place are 
illuminated. This gives us the opportunity of a rapprochement between the mental spaces 
(formal abstractions about space) of the development or humanitarian actor and the multiple 
spaces of the vulnerable. 
In Lefebvre's space the interrelations and interactions of social space are brought to the fore. 
This eclecticism allows him to journey between and beyond the local and the global, the 
concrete and the abstract, the past and the present, and between the individual and society. In 
tracing out the production of space Lefebvre manages to touch upon the complex 
interactions of material and non-material, nature and society, and the powerful and the 
powerless. His work is both inordinately political and human. He looks for the multiple 
networks and connections that constitute the complex lived and porous spaces of place. By 
scanning locally and globally we can reinvent place. 
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The networks of livelihood - reinserting the social ofsocial capital 
Networks as a concept enjoys great favour in a variety of fields and in connection to a 
variety of problems: it has been invoked as the central organising principle of the 
information society (Castells, 1996); as the basis on which society and technoscience are 
structured and function (Callon, 1986; Law, 1991; Latour, 1993; Marsden and Arce, 1995; 
Murdoch, 1995; Lowe and Ward, 1997; Latour, 1998); and, it has been used as an 
explanation for transnational social movement organisations (Escobar, 2000). These are not 
necessarily the overland routes (those of traders and pilgrims), the a priori web of roads, the 
physical and immobile manifestations of connection that link market and farm, dwelling and 
workplace. Rather, in the sense they are employed in this exploration these are the abstract 
and contractual networks of the moral economies of the peasant (Scott, 1976) bound together 
by affection and mutual self-interest in a complex web of support networks that serve to 
spread risk and protect vulnerable members. They are gifts and reciprocal exchanges of 
6primitive' or 'tribal societies' (see, for example, Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1966; Godelier, 
1999; Swift, 1989; Schweitzer, 2000). And in their latest incarnation as social capital they 
are part of the undersocialised concept of man (Loury, 1977 and 1981; Granovetter, 1985; 
Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Rousseau, [1762] 1993; Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, and 1998; 
I larriss and de Renzio, 1997; Portes, 1998; Grootaert, 1998; de Renzio, 2000). ' 
The concept of social capital employed in livelihood models draws attention, rightly, to the 
neglected non-market aspects of social reality. It is still though a rather convenient, fuzzy 
shorthand for, to paraphrase Putnam (1993a), what makes society work. Social capital gets 
stuck: it gets stuck on the doorstep, unable to pass through the imposed impermeable barriers 
of place. Networks never get the chance to 'do their thing'. Its true worth is not as an asset 
that is narrowly defined by positive economic efficiency, a means to reduce complex social 
and spatial phenomena to a series of numbers or quantifiable parameters (Fine, 2000), but 
rather for the attention it should draw to the spatially complex nature of everyday life and the 
nature of social relationships which are not necessarily orientated towards material gain 
(Camey, 1999). " 
34 See the World Bank website (www. worldbank. org/poverty/scapitao on social capital for key readings, and other social 
capital resource matcrials, for example, the useful discussion forum at (www. worldbank. org/povei-ty/scapital/Sctalk/). 
35 For an example of approaches for measuring social capital see, Krishna and Uphoff, (1999); Narayan and Cassidy, (2001). 
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Despite the diversity of definitions available, and its use in a number of different contexts, 
such as water management (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; K5hk6nen, 1999), in facilitating 
rural community development (Flora and Flora, 1993), access to credit (van Bastelaer, 
2000), and the reduction of poverty (Morris, 1998), there are a number of common themes 
and complementary dimensions that help to clarify this concept. 
Social capital is an aspect of social organisation, in the sense that it is concerned with 
relations of affiliation, kinship, ethnicity, and religion that "... exist in the relations among 
persons" (Coleman, 1988: SlOO-SIOl) whether among individuals or groups of people, and 
with the way in which these interactions are structured. It is not the same as the related 
concept 'civil society', the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests they 
hold in common (it includes all organisations and associations between family and state, 
except firms) (see, Edwards, (1999). 
Secondly, they link together the economic, social and political spheres of life and try to look 
at the way in which these influence each other. And, lastly, they refer to two distinct sets of 
issues. On the one hand to the norms (including rules, effective sanctions and obligations), 
values and traditions which promote trust, co-operation and reciprocity, formal or informal. 
And on the other to networks, relationships and organisations that bring people together 
endeavouring to solve common problems and that bind together exchangers (de Renzio, 
2000). 
These networks can be imagined not in terms of permanent lines (or webs) of attachment 
spreading out over social space, but rather networks of potential or opportunity that are 
continuously in the process of becoming and unbecoming, of connection and disconnection 
that transcend analytic scales and geographic distance and that link places with other places 
and networks. They are the networks of interaction of interpersonal contact that ebb and 
flow, locate and relocate with movement of those individuals (that can be viewed as process 
that must be followed over time and space (Radcliffe, 2001)). They are inherently unstable 
and liable to fissure and closure: they are shaped, fractured, and refigured by the politics of 
social interaction, and the social upheaval resulting from disaster. 
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Its value as a component of livelihoods is that it helps us break down the boundaries of 
conceived space and place. In so doing, theories of vulnerability and livelihoods can be 
reconstructed out of, or on the basis of, the concept of network. Understanding the truly 
spatial nature of livelihoods thus becomes critical for the evolution of theory and practice. In 
accepting that viable livelihoods are more than the sum of productive activities of. the 
household the spatial importance of the social in social capital cannot be overlooked. 
In opening up place to the world outside we find, instead of the flattened spaces of 
humanitarian policy and practice, a space that is alive with the movement of people and 
things. This vibrant porosity exposes the soft underbelly of the rather geographically static 
approaches of livelihood vulnerability to date, and the bounded sedentary place based 
lexicon of the development and humanitarian assistance (McDowell and de Haan, A., 1997; 
de Haan, A., 1999,2000). This spatial sedentarianism has fostered misunderstandings about 
the diversity of livelihoods and therefore the potential range of resources available to the 
disaster affected. 
The metaphor of the nomad, the "... geographic metaphor par excellence of postmodemitY" 
(Cresswell, 1997: 360), with its connotations of movement and placelessness, is 
symptomatic of this malaise. Much of the development literature focuses on movements of 
people as a result of crises, as a strategy of last resort in the face of otherwise unresolvable 
problems, and as a primary indicator of non-viability. Historically, mass migration served as 
the main social safety-valve whenever the Irish economy was in the doldrums - indeed, as a 
result of the famine in the mid nineteenth century one million people fled the country 
(Brown, 2001). The multiple wars and famines of recent years (see Chapter 1) have resulted 
in large flows of people within and across continents. More often than not, this movement is 
assigned exceptional status, an avoidance of the problems of place with an implicit 
assumption of the severance of connections. 
This may be the case in some instances but many dynamics are at play here. Migration is 
also a 'normal' element of many societies. Labour migration, between and within urban and 
rural areas is a central element in the livelihoods of many households in developing 
countries, poor as well as rich. It is not simply an expression of economic patterns Of macro 
or micro push and pull or at the behavioural level in terms of stimulus and response, but is 
67 
THE GEOGRAPHIES OF VULNERABILITY 
co-determined by social and cultural institutions, and embedded in local customs and 
ideologies (Lawson, 2000). Rich in meaning for individuals, families, communities and 
social groups, connections and social fields are forged across expanses of space and time. 
Migration in many instances has become constitutive of lives that make claims on more than 
one place (Bebbington, 2000). McHugh (2000: 72) is haunted by "... the panorama of human 
movements - our comings and goings across a spectrum of spatial and temporal scales. " 
Mattingly (2001) describes the importance of networks of caring labour used by both 
imiriigrant domestic workers and their employers that cross international borders. For these 
Hispanic migrants, established social networks shape the "... international connections and 
flows... " (Mattingly, 2001: 370) of movement, destination and return. 
As the functional relationships between countryside and city become ever more entwined it 
is also becoming harder to talk of discrete 'rural' and 'urban' worlds (Cloke, 1985; Iloggart, 
1990; Halfacree, 1993; Murdoch and Pratt 1993). Although, there are attempts to describe 
discreet urban livelihoods in disaster situations (see, Sanderson, 2000, for example), or rural 
and urban food security assessments, rural and urban households are clearly intertwined and 
this distinction is somewhat artificial. Adopting concepts from political economy, and more 
recent spatially informed political ecology studies (Bebbington, 2000 & 2001; Bebbington 
and Batterbury, 2001; Batterbury, 2001; Rocheleau et al, 2001) the lived spaces of the rural, 
in the developed world at least, are inextricably linked to the wider dynamics of the national 
and international spaces (Cloke, 1993). Jonathan Rigg (1998), in his study of changes to 
rural life and livelihood in southeast Asia, notes that the diversification of the household 
economy and the interpenetration of rural and urban have created multiple hybridities where 
individuals and households shift between agricultural and industrial pursuits and cross 
between rural and urban areas. 
Consequently, multiple movement, to-ing and fro-ing, and life commonly played out across 
a range of places establishes attachments and connections within and between multiple 
social sites and explodes the sharp distinction between the local and the global, rural and 
urban. Played out in terms of the transfers of social networks (for example, remittances, the 
gift of food and the sharing of labour between members of a family, community, or between 
friends) the range of resources in livelihood portfolios cannot be confined to the locational 
and productive resources of dwelling. 
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Representations o scale 
This new spatial ecology of networks and the porosity of place questions the analytical and 
scalar representations that are characteristic of the livelihood debate to date. Scale continues 
to be important but too often an analysis is used in ways that obscure the subtle variations 
within, and interconnections between, different scales (Dicken et al, 2001), scales that reflect 
the complex web of fluid social relationships and interactions with a social and material, 
political and cultural world. Typically, these scales of analysis are seen as hierarchical 
constructs: local and global, household and community, and even individual and group, 
constructs that have a 'territorial' dimension but no predetermined borders. These do not 
correspond to a given 'area' in the ordinary sense of the word, but represent a unity and 
coherence that are reflected by identifiable and specific behaviour patterns, and by a culture, 
representing the elaboration, transmission and accumulation of livelihood practices and 
values (Kamann, 1998). 
Individuals, while obviously serving as the foundational stones of humanistic geographical, 
anthropological and cultural analysis must be considered within the wider associations of the 
fluid social spaces of, for example, household, community, and kinship. As Sallie Marston 
(2000: 220,221) suggests, "... scale is not necessarily a preordained hierarchical framework 
for ordering the world - local, regional, national and global. It is instead a contingent 
outcome of the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices of human 
agents... As geographers, then, our goal with respect to scale should be to understand how 
particular scales become constituted and transformed in response to social-spatial 
dynamics. " Traditional Euclidean, Cartesian and Westphalian notions of geographical scale 
as fixed, bounded, self-enclosed and pregiven container are currently being superseded - at 
least within the parameters of critical geographical theory - by a highly productive emphasis 
on process, evolution, dynamism and sociopolitical contestation (Cox, 1996,1998a, 1998b; 
Jones, 1998; Judd, 1998; Howitt, 1998; Marston, 2000; Marston and Smith, 2001; Brenner, 
2001). In understanding how scales become (re)constituted, and the edges blurred by inter- 
scalar interaction, attention must be given to not only modes of production but also social 
reproduction and consumption practices. 
At the heart of Marston's (2000) analysis of scale, drawing upon Marxian and ferninist 
social theory, is the household as a site of social reproduction (including gender relations). 
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"But it is also necessary to recognise this scale as one where capitalist consumption practices 
are also entrained. The household, as the site of micro-level social processes, is an especially 
complex one in that it involves not only relations of social reproduction, biological 
reproduction and consumption, but in some cases it may also include relations of economic 
production, where the home is a paid and unpaid work space and a living space (Marston, 
2000: 233-234). " 
This framing of scale has very tangible and material consequences. In Marston's adept hands 
(see also Marston and Smith, 2001) the household is embedded within wider multiscalar 
processes of production, consumption, and reproduction and is seen as part of a relational, 
rather than a hierarchical, scaffolding. This challenges the bounded scalar labels of 
humanitarian (and developmental) analysis and action: for example, household and 
community. 
In assembling this triumvirate of place, networks and scale a much more spatially nuanced 
vulnerability project is fashioned. What is left are the crucial questions of what these scales 
are and the dynamics of their construction and deconstruction, how to understand multiple 
scales simultaneously (Howitt, 1998), the analytic construction of the dynamics of 
interaction and the overlap within the global and the local and between them (Sassen, 2000). 
At the same time we must be careful not to lose sight of the concept of scale through 
analytical blunting (Brenner, 2001). 
The theoretical and empirical task is then is one of detecting and constructing the social 
thickness of these various dimensions so as to produce a rich and textured understanding of 
the overlaps and interactions between the dynamics of mobility (of migration and resource 
networks) and of fixity (of place-bound resources, for example, farms, water resources, 
houses, food stores) and of the overlapping domains and embeddedness of place. 
The inequalities of space 
However much we talk of network connectedness, and unfettered mobility spatial 
boundaries continue to exist: "... the collapse of spatial barriers does not mean that the 
significance of space is decreasing" (Harvey, 1989: 293). On the contrary, while there is a 
tendency to assume that the collapse of space is a universal element of human existence, this 
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is patently absurd for those of limited lifeworld opportunities. Framed in northern academic 
institutions, and referring to electronically mediated advanced economies, these partial 
spatial stories ignore the inequalities of location and social space found in much of the rest 
of the world. As Doreen Massey (1999b: 264) argues space may be "... open and 
dynamic... " but she is careful not to assume completely an "... unfettered mobility. -. 
" 
(Massey, 1996: 118), an imagination of free or unbounded space that ignores the 
"... inequalities of mobility and connection... " (Massey, 1996: 118), lines of inequality 
between (and perhaps within) both social groups and parts of the world. 
Lived space is a site for a nexus of power relationships: a site of unbridled potential, of 
empowerment, of emancipation, and liberation. But it is also a site of oppression, 
disempowerment and resistance as feminist geographies have sought to expose (Rose, 1993; 
Domosh, 1997; Radcliffe, 2001). While some enjoy the freedoms of open space, the rights 
of movement and of access to new spaces is not open to all, but caught up in the interplay of 
political, economic, social, cultural, and individual agency restrictions that delineate the 
production of space. It is also the site of disaster and of spatial closure, of restricted 
interaction and connection, and of restricted opportunity and inequality. For those trapped in 
the unsafe spaces of the 'safe havens' of Srebrenica, picking over the detritus in the urban 
slums of Mexico city, the floods of Bangladesh or Mozambique, the inner-city ghettos of 
New York, caught in the midst of aerial bombardment in Afghanistan or Iraq, or for refugees 
unable to cross the cartographic borders that define the political space of statehood, space 
matters. In this sense, borders are important and as Katharyne Mitchell (1997: 105) argues, 
"borders are, of course, differentially porous, varying not just by nation or by political 
regime, but by types of flows and by particular narratives... " 
Initial formulations of social capital (see, Coleman, 1988) did not address these, issues of 
social inequality. But more recent scholars have come to agree that social capital is accessed 
differently (Lin, 2000). The same ties that bind also exclude (de Renzio, 2000). Since social 
capital cannot be appropriated by any single, isolated, individual (Harriss and de RenziO, 
1997), norms of trust are only shared by people who arc 'inside' the network. If social 
capital is a resource available through social networks, the resources come at the expense of 
others - social inclusion for some implies social exclusion for others (Portes and Landolt, 
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1996), or those outside of the networks, an important consideration for any discussion or 
analysis of vulnerability. 
Membership of a group may determine attitudes, beliefs, identities and values, as well as 
access to resources and opportunities - and ultimately access to power. Since most societies 
are not homogenous, but are divided by class, caste, religion, ethnicity and tribe or clan, and 
even political affiliation, groups differ in their access to resources and power. There may be 
high cohesion within a group that helps individual members, but they may be excluded from 
other groups. 
Moreover, inherent power asymmetry between social groups can lead to negative as well as 
positive outcomes. These range from social exclusion, corTuption, to conflict and violence. 
Ultimately, these networks rely upon relationships between a limited number of individuals 
who know each other and are bound together by kinship, friendship or propinquity (Rose, 
1998). Powerful networks can restrict access to opportunities for minorities - the caste 
system in India with its rigid social boundaries is an obvious example. Solidarity networks 
can also lead to downward levelling mechanisms. They may also lead to relations of 
subservience and dependence, which are indicators of structural vulnerability for - the 
dependant or a source of entitlement for the 'asset' holder (Devereux, 1999). Whereas social 
capital appears to be a panacea for the ills of modem society (Wall et al, 1998) social capital 
can also place a burden on group members, since a group with strong ties can end up 
imposing heavy particularistic obligations on some individual members, while allowing 
other members to free-ride. 
Ultimately, access to various forms of capital is shaped substantially by inequalities of social 
position, whether these are patterned along lines of race, class, gender, geography or any 
other salient factor (Edwards and Foley, 1998). Therefore, an analysis of the structures of 
power that focuses upon the inclusion of some can also be used to great effect to focus upon 
the structures of discrimination and those excluded -'minority' groups and the vulnerable in 
general. 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Livelihood approaches offer the potential to move away from the simplistic labelling of 
social vulnerability and the static place bound models of vulnerability. Unfortunately, 
humanitarian and development practice persists in projecting a particular conception of the 
lived world onto the tumultuous spaces of disaster. These bad geographies from above 
endeavour to capture all aspects and elements of social practice. This 'localness' of 
humanitarian perception and action (Hyndman, 1997) is challenged by the competing spaces 
and scales of the lived experience, the interconnections that on one hand tie people to the 
locality of place, yet on the other open up a world of porous connections of wider affiliation 
operating at different scales and with different underlying forces. In the process this 
narrative obliterates social relations and idealises lived space. It fails to theorise the links 
between the scales of society and of human experience which Lefebvre, Harvey, Massey and 
others have sought to illuminate. At best the separation is close, at worst far apart as 
diffcrcnt worldviews collidc. 
What I am seeking is a spatial counter-narrative, or an ecology of the vulnerability of place 
(see Thrift, (1999b) and his call for an ecology of place) that celebrates the multiplicity of 
voices in social and disaster space. Vulnerability then becomes one of a series of spatial 
challenges. Although hard to grasp the task is to analyse the dynamic vulnerabilities and 
livelihoods of place and recover bodily experience to construct an understanding of the 
spatial organisation of the vulnerable, how it is constituted, embedded, shaped and 
refashioned. Or, following Anne Buttimer (1976: 278), of bringing "... our ways of knowing 
into closer harmony with our ways of being in the world. " This involves, as Geraldine Pratt 
(Pratt, 1999: 160) suggests, a need to "... relate concepts to circumstances... " And it calls for 
an interest in the combination of people-in-place and people-in-networks (Escobar, 2001). 
We should cndcavour to seek out the networks of connections which cut across taken-for- 
granted blocks of social space (Allen, 1999). -I 
In this organic conception of the vulnerability of place we move away from the a-temporal 
"... analytical schemas... ", rationalised views and "... closed systems... " (Massey, 1999a: 
283) or Kantian logic. We search instead for a "... space that is always in a process of 
becoming. It is always being made. It is always, therefore, also in a sense unfinished. There 
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are always connections yet to be made, juxtapositions yet to flower into interaction (or not), 
potential links which may never be established" (Massey, 1999a: 283-284). "' 
Understanding this organic space also involves careful exploration of the journey between 
the local and the global, and the relationship between the spaces of place. This journey 
uncovers a plethora of 'heterogeneous associations' (Murdoch, 1997), that may involve not 
only corporeal movement but also the less obvious mobilities of social networks including 
the bonds, bridges and glues that an understanding of social capital introduces. But it also 
demands an understanding of the spatial closures or hermetic qualities that disasters (and 
their roots) introduce to this social space. 
Ultimately, the aim must be to bridge the divide between lived, perceived and conceived 
spaces. We need to investigate the spatial perspectives from below as well as a variety of 
perspectives (for example, political economy, political ecology) that converge in problems 
of disaster. In doing so, the two central traditions in human geography - what we call now 
nature-society and space-society - merge. The study of vulnerability, in this sense, reminds 
us of the "... fundamental challenges in making geographic theory: understanding how scale- 
specific or scale-transcending various geographic processes are; understanding how nature 
and society combine to create different scales in the first place; understanding the 
articulation among the individual, groups, and places; retaining, indeed revelling in, the 
tension between the local and the global, between what goes on in particular places and how 
those places are connected to the world, between processes observed in one place and the 
larger-scale processes that also shape places " (Hanson, 1999: 139). 
This insertion of the geographies of space expands our understanding of livelihoods. In turn 
this potentially brings into view a host of networks, connections and resources that are 
central pillars of the survival strategies of the disaster affected. Agency is given back to the 
'two dimensional victim'. 
What I hope I have achieved in this theoretical exploration is that the reader questions the 
lived spaces of disaster vulnerability and is more attuned to the cultural and social 
36 These themes are also explored in Massey, (1999b) and Crang and Thrill, (2000b). 
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dimensions of place. In accepting that spatial constructs are not universal, there is a need for 
softer knowledges rather than the harder discourses of humanitarian and development 
practice. In attempting the dual function of the decryption and coalescence of Lefebvre's 
triad, we may succeed in breaking away from the flattened and uniform spaces of 
development and humanitarian discourse and find (and perhaps celebrate) instead the 
lumpiness and unevenness of lived spaces. Maybe the ultimate paradox here is that in trying 
to understand and explain the production of space, we, as Andy Merrifield suggests, may ". -- 
fall back into our own brand of abstract conceived representations of space" (Merrifield, 
1997: 421). 
Lastly, bringing to the fore a more spatially aware conception of the vulnerability of place 
and livelihoods this chapter raises some serious methodological challenges, especially for 
the collection and analysis of empirical information across these social spaces. These will be 
explored in Chapter 5. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Hidemi Suganami (1997) suggests that to give an account of the origins of conflict or to 
show how it was caused, is to narrate from the beginning, wherever that might be, through 
the middle, whichever route that might take, to the very end, where the war in question 
broke out. This should be done in such a way that the outcome is rendered more intelligible 
than before the explanation was given. 
The ingredients of a narrativist approach to the causes of vulnerability pose similar 
problems. Can a fullness of understanding of a given situation be coterminous with the 
immediate and experiential? Rather, any visible elements of a particular reality are usually 
signals that other more discrete factors could be at work. Commenting on the predicament of 
Somalia, Martin Doornbos and John Markakis (1994: 82) note that "... the past is always 
with us. No 'fresh start' can be divorced from the past. Indeed, if it is to prove a meaningful 
exercise, a fresh start must be linked to the past. In this sense, an understanding of what went 
wrong is indispensable to the search for solutions to the present predicament. " 
Both Suganami and Doornbos and Markakis urge us to look beyond the visible symptoms, to 
move the focus beyond the consequences. This by inference, urges us to reject the notion of, 
in this instance, vulnerability, and the effects of disaster, as discrete events. A problem 
remains though. And it is perhaps, in this context, the key issue - that of determining where 
to start and where to finish the narrative. It is precisely these beginnings and ends that are 
important. Vulnerability does not mysteriously appear overnight (see Chapter 3). How wide 
do we cast the net in our search for the underlying causes of a particular situation when 
generalisation over a number of countries is highly problematic, where each situation yields 
a number of different plausible causal narratives? The wider the narrative net is cast, the 
smaller the mesh, and the more inclusive the blend of ingredients, the more profound are the 
implications for the subsequent analysis of what went wrong and the necessary remedial 
actions. If we follow Robert Cummings (1987), and believe that internal and external factors 
are not isolated from one another the net is, indeed, cast widely. 
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For these reasons this chapter is selective. This chapter gives the reader a sense of the intra- 
and international factors at work that led to the collapse of Somalia and to describe a history 
(however partial) that continues to dominate contemporary discussions of Somalia's fate. 
This history and its associated political economies 
, 
broaden our horizon and provide the 
processual link between environmental factors, politics, the economy and the economies of 
war, and the sociocultural system as a whole. In effect it becomes a contextualisation of 
vulnerability, livelihoods and humanitarian involvement in Somalia that will be discussed in 
later chapters. 
Somalia is defined by contradictions: contradictions between the impoverishment of people 
caught in the midst of disaster that exists side by side with the immense prof-its of business 
elites manipulating the economies of war or profiting from the vacuum left by the collapse 
of the State. But this chapter is much more than a litany of destruction and death. Rural and 
urban communities are far from enfeebled. Traditional non-market exchange mechanisms, 
family and village solidarity and Islamic norms of alms giving still play a vibrant role at the 
community level. It is also the case that the years of conflict have done much in many 
locations, although not necessarily all, to strengthen local identity in order to escape the 
predations of illegitimate authority structures. 
In describing the last decade in Somalia, and even several decades prior to this largely 
disruptive and destructive period, I chart the rise of a parallel informal economy and the 
importance of kinship and familial networks. In so doing I cast a net over the rise and fall of 
Siyaad Barre, the Cold War geopolitics of foreign aid and the international engagement with 
Somalia, and the war and famine in the regions of Bay and Bakool. This chapter illustrates 
also how current attitudes to external assistance in Somalia have been shaped, attitudes that 
cannot be ignored in today's aid arena. 
Lastly, this chapter serves as a reminder of the very real problems facing many Somalis 
today. The experience of Ilawa Mahi Mohamoud's plight during the last decade is a stark 
witness to the deprivations of war. 
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4.2 MUCH MORE THAN A DECADE OF PROBLEMS 
The importance of social networks is not a new phenomenon but an institution ingrained 
within Somali society. The pre-colonial household and network-based economic order was 
an integral part of a larger political and moral order (Samatar, 1999). This system was 
bounded by the rules of Islam and the tenets of kinship, where kinship had two constituent 
elements. These were the rules of the xeer or heer, a Somali-wide social contract that 
governed communal and individual codes of conduct, and the ties that were either a product 
of genealogy (too or marriage (xidid). The heer and the teachings of Islam superseded the 
potential divisiveness of genealogy. Furthermore, the web of relationships created by 
intermarriage reinforced the community-wide spirit of heer and Islam, and blunted the 
genealogical basis of difference. These did not prevent conflict between communities, but 
certainly precluded prolonged hostilities driven by genealogical differences (Samatar, 1999). 
However, it was the events during and after the administration of Siyaad Barre that were to 
have the most profound ramifications on the nature of the clan and the role of informal 
traditional mechanisms and the growth of a parallel informal economy. Furthermore, it is 
this period that has largely shaped the perceptions of external assistance and the operations 
of the United Nations and non-governmental organisations within Somalia. These 
perceptions are an important but often neglected element that partly dictates the operational 
strategies of humanitarian organisations to this day. 
4.2.1 A new regime (1969) and its decline 
When on the 21 October 1969, a group of military officers, led by General Mohamed Siyaad 
Barre, overthrew the Government the Somali people appeared happy. The new military 
Government under Siyaad Barre implemented a popular political programme, whereby a 
highly centralised state along socialist totalitarian lines aimed to eliminate any clanism and 
corruption (Bongartz, 1991). Clans and clanistic behaviour were officially abolished, 
replaced by stem ties of comradeship under the banner of (Somali-style) scientific socialism. 
In addition, an emphasis was put on general education and welfare, and the promotion of 
women's rights. "The regime presented socialism as an alternative to tribalism, claiming that 
it fits naturally with the tradition of sharing material possessions" (African Contemporary 
Record, 111,1970/1971, B161, cited in Bongartz, 1991). Even before the rise to power of 
Barre, the political elite had long debated the problem of clanism, and in Somalia before 
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independence, legislation had been passed banning the use of clan names by political parties 
(Lewis, 1995). 
The country's leadership confirmed that there was no contradiction between scientific 
socialism and Islamic religion. Socialism in its classic form was never considered as a future 
goal for the Somali society. It was meant to be a pragmatic instrument for the realisation of a 
centrally planned, entire modernisation of the country. Inherent to this modernisation was 
the desire to overcome the traditional clan system that had influenced the political and socio- 
economic make-up of the country. 
However, loyalty to the clan did not disappear, but was transformed into a function of 
Barre's political whim. Mistrust and conspiracies amongst opposing clans were used to 
enhance divisions and curtail any opposition. What had started as a perhaps genuine aim to 
eliminate clanism turned upon itself and in fact widened the fissures that had already started 
to appear. The ordinary genealogical divisions in Somali society became "... social 
poison... " (Samatar, 1999: 197) as misdeeds and misrule led to intemecine strife (Ghalib, 
1995). Clanism was now a destructive and counter-inclusive phenomenon. While Siyaad 
ruled through a revolutionary council, which, as in previous cabinets, included figures from 
most of the main clans, there was now a pronounced Darood bias. Indeed, contrary to the 
official rhetoric, power was actually concentrated in the hands of three Darood clans - 
Siyaad's ownkfarehan clan, his mother's clan (the Ogaden) and the clan of his son-in-law 
(Dulbahante) who ran the national security service. This did not, however, preclude the 
marginalisation of certain Darood clans as political cronyism dominated. The top ranks of 
the military became the exclusive domain of the Marehan and an increasingly narrow band 
of allied clans, reflecting the political exclusion of most of Somali society. Siyaad was also 
adcpt at manipulating clan and intra-clan rivalries in his selection of ministers and senior 
officials. Anyone who showed defiance to the Government was jailed, regardless of clan 
origin or support. Family ties became even more important as the 'family' was seen as the 
only safe retreat. 
Somalia had never been more tightly administered and the economy, similarly, was 
controlled through a host of inefficient (and corrupt) state agencies. The main exports 
remained bananas from the southern plantations (abandoned by most of the Italian settlers 
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and taken over by Siyaad's close associates), and livestock and livestock produce from the 
pastoral economy (Lewis, 1995). 
Barre's policies soon further widened the gap between the state and the private economies. 
The private sector's full participation in economic activity was impeded by the government's 
socialist policies that sought a commanding role for the public sector. The banana trade soon 
nosed-dived, whereas the pastoral economy - which remained outside of state control - 
flourished. 
The oil boom in the Gulf states also attracted an influx of Somali labour and hard currency 
thus earned (as well as much of that from livestock exports) remained outside the official 
banking system which gradually atrophied. " Trade and business began to rely on self- 
financing. 
Despite the influx of massive injections of foreign assistance, particularly after the drought 
of 1973/4, there was little to show in terms of large-scale developments. Somalia became 
bloated on extremely high levels of Cold War-inspircd economic and military assistance 
(Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 1999). The major Ogaden conflict with Ethiopia in 1977-78 
plunged Somalia into a serious and economic crisis and thousands of ethnic Somalis poured 
out of the Ogaden region into Somalia seeking refuge (World Bank, 1985). During this 
period, poor agricultural performance contributed directly to much of Somalia's US$ 1.5 
billion in external debt, about equal to total GDP. The country's dependence upon imported 
grain and cereals rose to about 390,000 tons in 1981 compared with domestic grain 
production of about 450,000 tons. This owed partly to the heavy demand imposed by 
population growth and the influx of about 760,000 refugees (according to questionable 
government estimates) from the recent conflict (World Bank, 1987). During the 1980s, there 
were continual discrepancies between the Government and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees over the numbers of Ethiopian refugees present in Somalia as a 
result of the Ogaden war, with the figures determining the amount of this important source 
of external assistance. The refugee population, reached about 1.2 million in 1980-81. 
37 The first remittance brokers started to appear in the informal financial markets between 1975 and 1980 when a large number 
of Somalis migrated to the Gulf States and Europe, particularly to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Italy (Ali, 1997). 
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According to the World Bank in 1985 the figure was probably about half a million, or about 
10% of the national population whilst the official (government) figure for refugees in camps 
was 700,000 (World Bank, 1985). By the mid-1980s, 100% of Somalia's development 
budget was externally funded, and 50% of its recurrent budget was dependent on 
international loans and grants. 
Donors provided military assistance of over US$ 5 billion and military aid estimated at US$ 
2.4 billion between 1960 and 1988, making it one of the highest per capita recipients of 
foreign aid in the world. It has been calculated that at the height of foreign aid dependence, 
total development assistance constituted 57% of Somalia's GNP. This funded a vastly 
oversized civil service and one of the largest standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Between 1981 and 1990,80% of all US aid to Somalia was of the military kind (Bradbury, 
1994). This militarisation was to have profound and devastating consequences not only 
during the civil war, but also for the subsequent attempts at conflict resolution and 
rehabilitation. Robert Weil (1993: 105) criticises the US administration because ".. -by 
propping up [for example, by supplying weapons] the dictatorial regime of Siyaad Barre for 
years, it laid the basis for the present chaos. " The US, as part of Operation Restore Hope (see 
Section 4.2.3), was forced "... to disarm the very same 'thugs' that it had been massively 
arming and employing as 'assets' only a year or two earlier (104). " 
For Somalis, ideas of international aid were shaped particularly by the experience of the 
1980s when aid poured unabated into Somalia, right into the pockets of government officials 
and 'briefcase' non-governmental organisations (Omar, 1999b). Association to aid became 
an income generating activity. This included, in 1987, nearly US$ 39-40 million in food aid, 
excluding that to the refugees. During the period 1970 to 1984 cereal imports grew from 
28,000 to 150,000 tons, and food aid from 12,000 to 200,000 tons between 1974 and 1984 
(World Bank, 1987). Somalia thus earned the reputation of being an aid graveyard. 
The Somali state was a castle built on sand. Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden w4r seriously 
dcstabilised the regime, and set in train forces that ultimately destroyed the state itself, Since 
the Soviets had abandoned Somalia in 1978 for the greater prize of Ethiopia, Barre 
desperately turned to the West for humanitarian assistance, 'claiming ihat he was (now) 
righting communism. By 1980, Barre had found a new backer, the US. 
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Gross human rights violations by the Barre regime prompted the west to freeze most aid in 
1988 and 1989. With the end of the Cold War, an international system that had politically, 
economically, and strategically propped up an ailing Somalia disappeared overnight. 
Somalia was almost entirely cut off from outside foreign assistance. The Cold war political 
game left Somalia rich in armaments but poor in everything else. 
As aid grew in volume, other sectors of the national economy atrophied or collapsed, and 
Somalia became increasingly dependent on foreign support for basic survival. Public 
confidence in national financial institutions declined further, and the various parallel 
economies of migration, livestock exports, and contraband trade grew in volume and 
importance. This informal market advanced the private sector's economic activities in very 
hostile economic and political conditions. 
During this period, bureaucrats, army officers and merchants with connections to the 
government appropriated much of the best agricultural land. Rather than promoting food 
production for the domestic market, the best-irrigated land was developed to produce high 
value crops (fruits, vegetables, oilseeds and cotton) for export and the benefit of a privileged 
few. 
As the urban public sector institutions decayed during the 1980s, and their provision of 
goods and services deteriorated, the informal sector expanded quickly and filled the gap. By 
the mid-1980s the informal sector became the largest employer of labour. It provided health, 
educational, and financial services, including the provision of credit and investment 
financing and the facilitation of remittances by Somalis living abroad. Because of this 
liberalism, private traders were able to respond to local demand and import necessary 
consumption goods without help from state institutions (Mubarak, 1997). According to 
World Bank estimates, by 1989 real public sector wages had declined by 90% in relation to 
the mid- I 970s. 
A similar pattern occurred in the rural economy - in both the livestock and crop sectors - 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Expenditure in these sectors declined. New policies 
discriminated against rural areas and producers: private lands and facilities were confiscated 
for unproductive state farms, a law which forced farmers to sell all their harvest was 
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introduced, and the marketing of agricultural products was put in the hands of the 
Agricultural Development Corporation. In the late 1980s, this rural instability and 
compounded by increasing banditry, led to a rate of urbanisation that exceeded those of 
Kenya and Ethiopia (Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1995). 
Activities, such as trade smuggling, black-marketeering of foreign exchange and other goods 
and services became entrenched. By the mid-1980s, the crises intensified to the extent that 
the government lost control over managing or solving the economic woes. Public trust in the 
country's banking was lost. Currency was instead hoarded in private safes or hiding places 
(Ghalib, 1995). By the fall of the regime, most of the countryside had already been without 
even the pretence of state governance for a year or even longer, as the regime withdrew to 
major towns and the capital, Mogadishu (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 1999). 
Hence, the collapse of economic institutions and the private sector's efforts to cope with the 
harsh environment and to fend for itself was a process that started long before the Somali 
state's ultimate demise in 1991. International pressure and dwindling economic aid only 
further exacerbated this decline. 
The high level of political repression employed by the Barre regime had additional fallout - 
it came to reinforce in the minds of Somalis the perception of the state not as an instrument 
of governance, but as a tool for domination and expropriation by one group over others. 
State control was seen in increasingly stark zero-sum terms by Somalis (Menkhaus and 
Ortmayer, 1999), and reliance upon the reassuring embrace of clan and family became more 
important. 
4.2.2 The end of Siyaad Barre 
After many years of worsening political and economic decay, the Somali state 
disintegrated. " When President Mohammed Siyaad Barre fled Mogadishu on 26 January 
1991 and government rule came to an end, one of Africa's longest uninterrupted (21 years) 
military dictatorships ended. In June 1992, the pictures the world saw, and the stories it read, 
38 Explanations of what went wrong in Somalia vary widely but see, for example, Menkhaus and Ortmayer, (1999), and 
Bradbury, (1994) for very good interpretations of this period. 
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revealed a country that had fallen from purgatory into hell. Those who overthrew Barre had 
no coherent political platform or agenda. Thus, Barre left the capital and much of Somalia in 
the hands of competing armed militias who rapidly established clan fiefdoms in areas 
dominated by their social groups. Unprecedented levels of violence rendered impotent the 
traditional wartime code of conduct (ICRC, 1999). Crime, coercion and violence became 
routine strategies for the pursuit of individual and group interest. Somalia presented to the 
international community the challenge of a 'failed state' in the throes of anarchy. " And yet 
this country was previously hailed as the most 'unified' state in Africa, supposedly free form 
ethnic divisions that plague many others, with a single culture, and religion. 
Somalia is no stranger to famines (Durrill, 1986). The nomadic proverb, Nabad iyo caano, 
dagaal iyo abaar, which can be interpreted as 'peace and milk, war and famine', is 
testimony to the basic needs yet interconnectedness of security and food. In the fanning 
communities of southern Somalia, drought (abaar) and hunger are synonymous. This time, 
drought also played a role. Used to the hunger stress of regularly occurring droughts the 
famine that swept through the country was radically different in origin and impact. Between 
1991 and 1992, war, and to a much lesser extent drought, the collapse of national and local 
health centres, and international and inter-regional trade constrained by fighting and looting 
combined to devastating effect. There were frequent roadblocks along all the major routes, at 
which traders were required to pay a 'tax' in order to pass. Insecurity demanded that 
merchants hired armed guards, and often they were forced to travel in convoy. 
Thousands starved, and many more were driven from their homes by advancing and warring 
militia groups fighting for political influence and over the resource rich inter-riverine area of 
Bay and Bakool. Most of the agricultural land of the most fertile and productive regions, 
which prior to the crisis accounted for 70% of the sorghum produced in Somalia, became 
idle or farmers planted smaller areas, and often consumed their harvests before the crop 
ripened, to pre-empt looters and due to sheer hunger. Rural people fled to urban areas, only 
to find more violence. Measured by the number of lives lost in a relatively small geographic 
area in a relatively short period of time, Somalia was the worst humanitarian tragedy since 
the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 (Natsios, 1995b and 1997). 
39 In fact, the expression 'failed state' was first heard in connection with Somalia (Thurrjell, 1999). 
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Food prices rose 800-1200% in some cities during the spring and summer of 1992 (Natsios, 
1996b). In Bakool region in mid-1992, a kilo of sorghum cost as much as 25,000 shillings 
compared to the pre-war price of 1,000 shillings (Rogge, 1992). Famine was, perhapst 
inevitable and made worse by drought in the south and central areas of the country. The 
outbreak of infectious diseases, including cholera and tuberculosis, and serious malnutrition, 
accompanied the famine. In 1992, the monthly death rate in August in Baidoa, which 
became known as 'the city of the walking dead', was 3,224, or 104 a day. In September, the 
figure rose to 5,979 people a month, or nearly 200 a day (Mukhtar, 1996b). Death tolls in 
Bardera, in October were 385 per day (Prendergast, 1994). According to Hansch et aL 
(1994), famine claimed the lives of between 240,000 and 280,000 Somalis. These events led 
one United States diplomat to describe the situation in Somalia as the worst humanitarian 
crisis faced by any people in the world (Bradbury, 1998). Abdi Ismail Samatar believes that 
this calamity surpassed all previous ones in the recorded history of Somalia and can be 
appropriately called 'Dad cunkii', the era of cannibalism (Samatar, 1992). The crisis was 
deemed so serious by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that in 1992 it 
allocated 20% of its entire worldwide budget on assistance to Somalia (Africa Watch- 
Physicians for Human Rights, 1992). This was a famine unequalled in Somalia's modem 
history. 
The sheer length and geographical breadth of the fighting left few untouched by the conflict. 
By the end of 1992, all public sector institutions had collapsed and their economic and social 
goods and services had completely disappeared. Property that was associated with the state 
or Barre was seen as a free-for-all. Therefore, most state establishments, including agencies, 
parastatals, and small industries, were either destroyed in the fighting, or were ransacked of 
anything of value. Many agro-industrics were dismantled and partly sold abroad. There were 
no formal financial institutions, and the domestic currency no longer had a central bank to 
back it up with reserves. Public utilities, such as electricity, running water, and telephone 
lines were badly damaged and stripped of anything valuable. The electricity system in 
Mogadishu, which benefited from an extensive foreign financed rehabilitation program in 
1990, was completely destroyed. Somalia's limited road system, the most important means 
of transportation, was totally wom out - either because of the war or many years of lack of 
maintcnance during the former government. Airports and seaports were also damaged. 
Public services in social infrastructure, including health and education, also disappeared. 
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Many of the most highly skilled civil servants, administrators and managers, who operated 
these services fled the country either during Siyaad Barre's repressive regime, or 
immediately after the outbreak of the civil war (Mubarak, 1997). Private businesses were 
looted, and the political elite and the rich fled with their resources. 
Even after civil conflict was reduced in late 1992 to lower-intensity skirmishes, principally 
in Kismayo and Mogadishu, the threat to farmers transporting their food to market remained. 
As agriculturalist Somalis have little tradition working in co-operatives, small farmers had to 
incur individual risks in transport of foods they produced for sale. The dangers associated 
with transporting and selling foods, and the continuing physical threats to fan-ncrs by 
occupying clan and freelance militia, thus continued to act as a drain on regional food 
availability. 
The conflict produced social dislocation on a large scale, spawning refugees and IDPs as 
people tried to flee the areas of conflict and/or drought to seek the security of traditional clan 
areas or safe spaces outside of these areas. An estimated one to two million Somalis were 
displaced either internally or across international borders (Refugee Policy Group, 1994). 
There was though a problem of distinguishing between the 'visible' and the 'invisible' 
displacees - those who were living in camps or in the shells of buildings and those who were 
displaced but integrated into the urban population among kinfolk in their home clan regions: 
the actual numbers were nearly always inflated (Rogge, 1992) for obvious reasons: more 
people meant more aid. 
The delivery of humanitarian relief, including high value food commodities, was made 
exceedingly difficult by the prevailing general insecurity, the increased incidence of banditry 
and theft and the extortionist practices of the faction militias whose support was required to 
guarantee safe access by the humanitarian community to the suffering populations. Food aid 
shipments were attacked and prevented form discharging at ports; warehouses were looted 
and food aid supplies hijacked by armed gangs or at the instigation of local authorities 
(United Nations, 1992). 
According to one observer, much of the fighting in 1992 resulted from attempts by different 
factions to obtain or maintain control over the posts and distribution routes through which 
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food and other supplies passed (Lewis, undated). Control of relief food was very lucrative 
for the warlords and their merchant allies. One faction, who controlled a port in Mogadishu, 
levied exorbitant taxes on cargoes, as well as taking direct cuts of 10% or 20% of the 
incoming food aid (some of which was sold outside Somalia) (Lewis, undated). They also 
provided trucks with machine guns (the Somali 'technicals', which led also to the term the 
'road warrior culture') to 'protect' food deliveries. To add insult to injury, convoys were 
frequently robbed by those hired to defend them. International humanitarian organisations, 
despite the support of local Somali NGOs, thus found themselves inadvertently caught up in 
a web of clan protection rackets and became part of the criminal economy (Cholmondeley, 
1995). 
The level of looting and organised pilfering was such that a report for the UN Security 
Council meeting of 25 November 1992, written by the United Nations Special Envoy to 
Somalia, Ismat Kittani, claimed that 70-80% of relief food did not reach its destination. One 
Somali Red Crescent worker estimated that, from 200 bags of food on a truck destined for 
the relief kitchens in an unnamed displaced camp, ! he guards would on average take 100, the 
drivers ten, and the elders and kitchen supervisors 50, leaving 40 for general distribution 
(African Rights, 1993b). In a news conference in August 1992 the Executive Director of 
WFP, Catherine Bertini, stated that "... at least half of what is sent actually gets to hungry 
people in need and given the circumstances, given the security circumstances that the 
ambassador [Mohamed Sahnoun] described, that is very good" (WFP, 1992). By inference, 
50% never reached its intended destination. Furthermore, in the process of trying to deliver 
food supplies to those in urgent need in increasingly difficult circumstances, a number of 
relief workers were killed or injured. 
In view of the pervasive conflict and the risks involved in delivering humanitarian 
assistance, foreign embassies were withdrawn (or fled). Expatriate relief staff were reduced 
to a minimum and most relief organisations were no longer prepared to handle food aid 
assistance. Several United Nation agencies withdrew altogether from Somalia during 1991, 
including the United Nations Development Programme which functioned as Resident Co- 
ordinator of all United Nations agencies in the country. Thus the international community 
virtually abandoned Somalia to its fate. By early 1992, the International Commission for the 
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Red Cross (ICRC) was the only relief agency involved in food aid delivery. For the first time 
in its history, the ICRC found it necessary to hire armed escorts for its vehicles. 
At the same time, the UN Secretariat and the Security Council, as well as the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), began to take an increasing interest in the developing situation, 
dispatching delegations to Somalia to meet with the faction leaders to broker a cease-fire and 
seek political resolution to the growing crisis. 
4.2.3 The era of intervention 
Against this background, especially that of food aid losses and the threat to relief personnel, 
in January 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 733 under Chapter 
VII of the charter, imposing a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia. This was 
followed, on 24 April 1992, by Security Council resolution 751(1992), establishing a United 
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1), under the leadership of Algerian diplomat 
Mohamed Salmoun, to provide food and non-food supplies to those people immediately at 
risk. Meanwhile, conditions within Somalia continued to deteriorate for the great majority of 
its people. The Secretary-General stated that the desperate and complex situation in Somalia 
required energetic and sustained efforts on the part of the international community to break 
the cycle of violence and hunger. Ultimately, as implementation of UNOSOMs mandate 
became increasingly difficult, as relief organisations experienced increasing hijacking of 
vehicles, looting of convoys and warehouses, and detention of expatriate staff, resolution 
794(1992) was adopted on 3 December, 1992 to help create a secure environment for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. George Bush, then President of the United States, responded to 
the resolution with a decision on 4 December to initiate Operation Restore Hope, under 
which the US would assume the unified command of the new operation. Operations were led 
by Mr Robert Oakley, a retired US ambassador to Somalia. Thus came into being the first 
instance of unilateral UN military intervention in a (theoretically) sovereign state. 
The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) came ashore on the beaches of 
Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. The number of United States forces was expected to build 
to approximately 28,000 personnel, to be augmented by some 17,000 UNITAF troops from 
over 20 countries. In addition to United States forces, UNITAF included military units from 
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Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, 
Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. 
Initially, undoubtedly, the presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the 
security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian as extortion 
rackets and looting of food convoys dramatically declined (United Nations, 1996; African 
Rights, 1993b). 
I lowever, despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been established, and 
incidents of violence continued. There was still no effective functioning government in the 
country and no organised civilian police. The security threat to personnel of the United 
Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs, was still high in some areas of 
Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or 
UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, 
where security continued to be a matter of grave concern. 
In March 1993, UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in resolution 
814(1993) on 26 March 1993, to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task 
begun by UNITAF. The UN thus found itself in the unexpected position of administering 
what was virtually an undeclared trusteeship, bizarrely retracing Somalia's history as a UN 
trusteeship from 1950 to 1960 (Lewis, undated). 
Attempts by UNOSOM 11 to implement the disarmament led to increasing tensions and, on 5 
June, to violencq. In a series of anned attacks against UNOSOM 11 troops throughout south 
Mogadishu by Somali militia, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were reported missing 
and 54 wounded. The Security Council adopted resolution 837(1993) on 6 June, strongly 
condemning the unprovoked armed attacks against UNO'SOM IL To implement resolution 
837(1993), UNOSOM Il initiated military action on 12 June 1993, conducting a series of air 
and ground operations in south Mogadishu. UNOSOM II removed Radio Mogadishu from 
the control of the United Somali Congress/the Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) 
(Gcncral Aydiid's faction), and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a 
number of storage sites and clandestine military facilities. After an investigation of the 5 
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June incident, citing mounting evidence implicating the SNA militia in the attack, the 
Special Representative Admiral Jonathan Howe (Ret. ) called, on 17 June, on General Aydiid 
to surrender peacefully to UNOSOM II and to urge his followers to surrender their arms. lie 
directed the UNOSOM Force Commander to detain General Aydiid for investigation of the 
5 June attack and of the public incitement of such attacks. ' However, efforts to capture 
General Aydiid proved unsuccessful and attacks on UNOSOM 11 by his militia continued. 
Afler the June 1993 events, UNOSOM Il pursued a coercive disarmament programme in 
south Mogadishu. Active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations were directed at 
the militia and depots of General Aydiid's faction (USC/SNA). In support of the UNOSOM 
H mandate, United States forces, comprising United States Rangers and the Quick Reaction 
Force, who were not under United Nations command and control, were deployed in 
Mogadishu. As part of the coercive programme, the Rangers launched an operation in south 
Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aydiid 
who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack and subsequent attacks on United 
Nations personnel and facilities. The operation succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, 
including two key aides to General Aydiid. However, during the operation, two United 
States Special Forces helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen, eighteen United 
States soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. An estimated 700 to 1,000 Somalis 
were also killed in the Mogadishu street encounter that followed (Adam and Ford, 1998). 
The bodies of the United States soldiers were subjected to public acts of outrage, and the 
scenes were broadcast by television stations around the world. 
Following these events, US President Clinton announced the intention of the United States 
to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA 
declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM 11 forces. After this 
declaration the situation was generally quiet, but Mogadishu remained tense and, in the 
capital and elsewhere, major factions were reportedly rearming, in apparent anticipation of 
renewed fighting. 
40 Admiral Jonathan Howe (Ret. ) replaced Special Representative Mr. Ismat Kittani (Iraq) who, in turn, had replaced Mr. 
Mohammed Sahnoun (Algeria). 
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4.2.4 The withdrawal and legacy of UNOSOM 
By 2 February 1995, the UNOSOM 11 troop strength was reduced to 7,956. As the 
withdrawal accelerated, military support provided by UNOSOM troops to United Nations 
agencies, human rights organisations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was 
greatly reduced. With the major reductions starting in mid-February, it was no longer 
possible for UNOSOM II troops to extend the necessary protection even within Mogadishu. 
Agencies were then advised to evacuate their international staff to Nairobi by 14 February 
1995. The mission's withdrawal was completed by 28 March 1995, leaving Somalia With 
neither a national peace nor a revived state: it was a period of high expectations but, 
ultimately, deep disappointments. Of all the humanitarian interventions undertaken since the 
end of the Cold War, Somalia was one of the most visible, expensive, and debated. A good 
deal of the Clinton Administration's reluctant response to complex emergencies generally 
issued from its unhappy experience with Somalia (Natsios, 1995b and 1997). Walter Clarke 
(1997) asserts that the spectre of Somalia has loomed above every world crisis since mid- 
1993, inhibiting debate and limiting options. 
The legacy of the UNOSOM era is complex (Jan, 1996), and has had a profound impact 
upon the perception of aid agencies, and of aid resources, within Somalia over the second 
half of the decade and into the new millennium. Prior to the disembarkation of American 
troops on the beaches of Mogadishu, the world community had agonised, balancing the 
traditional notion of sovereignty with the responsibility towards failed states. Although it is 
always easy to criticise, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to forget that the UN 
intervention in Somalia was the first of its kind. Yet, according to Alex de Waal the 
humanitarian intervention in Somalia was misconceived and badly implemented - in the 
extended hierarchical command system the opportunities for mistakes proliferated (de Waal, 
1999). What began as a noble concept and operation could have led to a stronger affirmation 
of the values embodied in the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions - unfortunately, 
UNOSOM failed (Petrie, 1995; Clarke, 1995). The spectre of the UNOSOM era and the 
impact of this legacy cannot be underestimated within today's assistance arena. 
According to African Rights, human rights violations were not only committed by Somalis - 
UNOSOM troops were implicated in "... grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions" 
(African Rights, 1993c: i). Cases reported against Belgian UNOSOM forces, for example, 
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include the killing of unarmed people, throwing children into the Jubba river, beating, 
harassment, theft and humiliation. The same report believes that the procedures for Somalis 
to make complaints against UNOSOM forces, and for inquiries into alleged abuses, were 
woefully inadequate - recourse for Somalis was a major problem. In addition, the abusive 
behaviour undermined the avowedly humanitarian mission of UNOSOM, and rapidly 
alienated "... the majority of the ordinary Somali population. Even Somalis who [were] 
generally supportive of UNOSOM [were] consumed by a growing sense of outrage at the 
behaviour of the troops', who displayed unacceptable levels of racism towards Somalis" 
(African Rights, 1993c: ii). Although there was no doubt that the SNA militia headed by 
General Aydiid was contemptuous of basic human rights this did not justify abuses of rights 
in response. UNOSOM thus lost the moral high ground and, increasingly, Somalis came to 
regard UNOSOM as another faction and Admiral Howe as just another warlord. 
Similarly, critics have argued that inappropriate management of the military intervention 
made the UN a player rather than an honest broker in the country's unruly political life and 
thus set the stage for confrontation (Farer, 1993; Drysdale, 1994; Jan, 1996). The extortion 
of relief goods, and income derived from a monopoly of the import of certain goods needed 
by relief agencies, further strengthened the war-effort of heavily armed and power-crazed 
warlords in the south (Farah and Lewis, 1997). 
Mohamed Sahnoun believes that the first impact was an erosion of trust between the local 
population and the UN as a result of the late response to the developing situation by the UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (Sahnoun, 1998). Out of their 
terrible frustration, Somalis asked why didn't you come to help us earlier? Late intervention 
created an atmosphere of suspicion in the country. This erosion of trust, and, it has to be 
said, mutual suspicion, lasts to this day. 
Respect for and the ability to work closely and effectively with the people of an aid- 
receiving country clearly lie at the moral core of humanitarian assistance. Help from the 
outside will not be effective without an understanding of the traditional consultation and 
decision-making processes. Too often the various engagements of outside parties in Somalia 
failed to make use of local networks, good channels for assistance, which led to a top-down 
process rather than a grassroots approach. This was symptomatic generally of a low priority 
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placed on local participation (Sahnoun, 1998), a theme that repeats itself in assessment and' 
evaluation reports throughout the decade. 
At a more structural level, the massive foreign presence that began with UNISOM I and 
ended with UNOSOM Il resulted in the creation of an artificial, externally driven economy 
centred in Mogadishu. Vast amounts of foreign currency were suddenly injected into the 
Somali economy - estimates put the total cost of intervention in the order of US$ 
3 billion. - 
(Helander, 1995; Maren, 1997; Stephen, 1999). One estimate put the cost in 1994 at US$ 2.5 
million per day (UNDP, 1994). Most significantly, UNOSOM II's presence, primarily in 
south Mogadishu where it was headquartered, fuelled the local economy with its rental of 
houses and vehicles. Rather than helping to create conditions that would generate sustainable 
employment in Somalia, which would contribute significantly to long-term peace-building,, 
UNOSOM II itself became the largest single employer, engaging approximately 3000 
Somalis, mostly in Mogadishu. Huge extended families survived off each workers salary - 
sometimes up to eighty people fed from one monthly paycheque (Menkhaus and 
Prendergast, 1995). Salaries for these employees were exceedingly high, particularly for 
security guards, many of whom were also militia members. These high salaries made 
continued insecurity lucrative for the factions that provided security guards. 
Thus, some Somalis became enriched by their employment. Some even were able to 
construct new houses that came to be known as TJNOSOM houses'. This led to considerable, 
resentment among rival clans whose members were not UNOSOM II employees. Not 
surprisingly, UNOSOM 11 became embroiled in labour issues, including which clan it hired 
from and whom it fired. In more than one case, UNOSOM 11 or its subcontracting agents 
received death threats, and several international staff were killed for employment related 
reasons. Thus, significant distortions in the local economy arose as a result of UNOSOM 11 
disruptive presence. Indigenous and sustainable Somali employment declined, while a 
service sector grew to provide such things as spare parts for vehicles. Thus, when UNOSOM 
withdrew there was a sudden and dramatic loss of income that had previously become 
available as a result of the international presence in Mogadishu. 
These themes continue to be repeated as individuals vie for lucrative contracts for the rental 
of premises to UN and other agencies, the rental of vehicles, the provision of securitY 
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guards, and the transportation of food aid commodities. Clan and political affiliation 
continues to be important in the selection of national staff. This legacy, particularly in 
southern Somalia, continues to hamper efforts by UN agencies, including YVTP, to deliver 
humanitarian resources. 
4.2.5 The war in Bay and Bakool 
The Somali civil war of 1991-92 was, despite its many local complexities, essentially a 
running battle between Somalia's two largest clan families - the Hawiye clan-militias 
sweeping in from the central and south-central regions, and the southern Darood clan 
militias of the trans-Jubba regions. After the ousting of Siyaad Barre in January 1991, the 
war was waged for the control of the territory between them, from the Jubba valley through 
the Bay region and lower Shabelle to Mogadishu, an area rich in resources and strategic 
importance, but inhabited by weak, generally unarmed agricultural and agro-pastoral 
populations. Towns such as Baidoa became the staging grounds for a war featuring sweeping 
advances and retreats by the two sides over a two-year period. Every time towns and villages 
changed hands, both retreating and incoming militias looted, burned (see Figure 4.1), 
pillaged, and raped. Anything of value was disassembled and hauled away. Anything of 
'public' ownership, which invariably meant government owned, was destroyed. Villagers 
lost assets as their grain stores (see Figure 4.2) and livestock were repeatedly looted. Not 
only were the 'invading' forces responsible for these atrocities but villagers were often 
subjected to the same attacks by their own clan militia. Violent events have become part of 
the social memory and have become defining moments alongside the drought chronologies 
described in Chapter 4 in the life history of villages. Bitterness toward both Darood and 
Hawiye clans continues to be openly expressed, constituting an unhealed wound. 
In 1994 and 1995, the regions of Bay and Bakool became the target of efforts by general 
Aydiid's Somali National Alliance (SNA), attempting to take advantage of divisions with 
the Reewin political organisation, the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), and establish 
Hawi e authority. "' Unlike most of the other anti-Barre movements at that time, it was non- Y 
violent, and had no militia. It was not until 1991 that the SDM began to raise a militia 
(Wiebe, Meshack, and Warfa, 1995). 
41 The SDM originated in a meeting of intellectuals from the Dighil-Mirij7e group of clans, held in Saudi Arabia in 1987. 
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When the Reewin set up its own Supreme Governing Council (SGC) as UNOSOM 
withdrew, General Aydiid quickly advanced to seize control of Hudur and Baidoa. 
Ultimately, efforts to consolidate this position failed. Both regions have been subject to high 
levels of insecurity as resistance to the SNA occupation built up. A Reewin Resistance Army 
(RRA) was organised, though not without considerable difficulty. Initial efforts were 
hamstrung by internal disputes between the Mirifle and Dighil confederacies of the Reewin 
and it was not until Ethiopia took the initiative to help organise it properly after the Sodere 
conference ended in January 1997 that the RRA became a serious threat. From late 1998, the 
Reewin Resistance Army militia forces started recapturing areas in the region, culminating in 
the reoccupation of Baidoa town on June 6,1999 and the retreat of the United Somali 
Congress / Somalia National Alliance militias. Within weeks the population of Baidoa 
increased substantially. Within several months food aid shipments were arriving. The 
general impact of the conflict upon the region has been an extraordinary destruction of 
infrastructure and little opportunity for economic development in rural areas. 
As a result of the war and starvation that devastated the inter-riverine area of Somalia, the 
Dighil and Mirifle clan families have become more cognisant of being a distinct and 
cohesive community. In recent years, the successes of the RRA, with the support of their 
Ethiopian backers, against the SNA have though tended to disguise the almost chronic 
disunity of the Reeivin. " The role of maligned victim against external aggression is at times 
misleading and disingenuous. Despite repeated assertions of unity not only did armed 
Reewin militia attempt to counter the threat posed by the invading clans but also there were 
divisions within and between Reewin clans. Geelidle and Luwaay clans fought each other in 
Bay region during 1995, in Bakool region in July Hadaina and Jiroon clans fought, Hariin 
and Leysan fought in Bay region (July 1995), and in September 1995 Leysan and Eelaay 
clans fought each other. The political geography of security and insecurity is therefore 
extremely complex and dynamic. 
42 The Ethiopians strongly refute this allegation but eyewitness evidence would suggest otherwise. 
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4.3 SOMALIA TODAY 
The problems that face many Somalis are all too evident. To many people the very name, 
Somalia still conjures images of warlords, anarchy, chaos and destruction. Its name has' 
become almost synonymous with conflict, poverty and hunger. 
Most indicators suggest that Somalia is among the poorest countries in the world. A number 
of determining factors indicate Somalia's extremely high level of vulnerability. The United 
Nations Development Report for Somalia (2001) using the latest available data estimates life 
expectancy at birth at 47 years, reflecting very high child and maternal mortality rates. 
Mortality of children under five is nearly 25%, and maternal mortality, at about 1,600 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, is amongst the highest in the world. The practice of 
female genital mutilation and the lack of widely available reproductive health, family 
planning and obstetric services all exacerbate the high death rate of women in childbirth- 
The adult literacy rate is 17% with great disparities between male and female, and rural and 
urban residents. Primary school enrolment is generally under 14%. Access to safe drinking 
water has declined since before the war to less than 30%, with better access in the north of 
the country than the south. Despite a resurgence of the private sector in a few areas, per 
capita income is estimated to be US$ 200. 
It would be unfair (and wrong) to suggest that Somalia is just the sum of a set of aggregated 
data. Vulnerability cannot be represented by statistical pictures alone: Vulnerability is a 
phenomenon that varies over time and space. Accordingly, humanitarian conditions and 
needs vary widely from year to year, and these figures hide significant disparities between 
and within regions, between livelihood groups and between households. The country still 
has a wide range of pressing needs, of both an immediate as well as a longer-term nature. In 
some areas of Somalia global acute malnutrition rates and communicable diseases remain 
alarmingly high. " While humanitarian needs require urgent address, there are also a number 
of major structural challenges. 
Although Somalia has not recovered from the devastation wreaked by nearly a decade of 
problems, the post intervention period (post- 1995) has been one of scaled-down international 
43 Refer to the FSAU Nutrition Updates for May and June 2002 (http: //unsomalia. oT&TSAU/nutjition_updates. htm)- 
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assistance - the so called 'years of agony' - due to a combination of insecurity and donor 
fatigue (UNDP, 1998). These problems include huge national debts, the widespread 
violation of the arms embargo and the availability of arms, the need for the re-establishment 
of justice systems and land rights, economic diversification, widespread environmental 
degradation, the flight of Somali professionals, and the meeting of educational needs. " In 
2000 as many as a quarter of a million (256,000) Somali refugees remained in camps in 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and other neighbouring countries (Menkhaus, 2000). 
Many more reside in these countries illegally and hence elude documentation, and there are 
Somali diaspora in North America, the Middle East, Australia, and Europe. And it is 
estimated that as many as 350,000 inhabitants are internally displaced (UNCU/UN-OCIIA, 
2002) (see Figure 4.3). 
No country was without a central authority for so long. After years of failed national peace 
conferences, a Somali National Peace conference officially opened on May 2,2000, at Arta, 
Djibouti. On August 13, conference delegates selected a 245-mem er Par lament, 
apportioned along clan lines. The Parliament in exile then elected a president, Abdiqassirn 
Salad Hassan. In October, the President and Parliament, under the interim premier, Ali 
Khalif Galaydh, returned to Mogadishu to prepare and establish a national government. 
Galaydh's 84-member cabinet was to last only 13 months as it was toppled in a vote of no 
confidence on 28 October 2001. Following this, President Abdiqassim began with the 
formation of a new government, trying to include factions that had hitherto remained 
unrepresented. 
What had appeared at the time to be a significant development has largely faltered and 
optimism has evaporated. Somalia remains without a regionally functional and widely 
accepted governmental structure and internal political unrest continues (ICG, 2002). 
44 The export of charcoal is causing concern over the sustainability of resources upon which the trade relics. One estimate 
suggests that in the year2000,100,000 MTof charcoal passed through Mogadishu alone (Osman, 2001). 
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Figure 4.3 IDI's in Baidoa town. The war-scarred remains of government buildings can be seen in 
the background (Source, Author, 1999). 
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While the Transitional National Government has endeavoured to expand its influence, it has 
failed to widen its support or deliver public services in its limited areas of control and 
various defacto authorities continue to control most parts of the country, as well as sections 
of Mogadishu. Following the establishment of the regional autonomous administrations of 
Somaliland (northwestern Somalia) and Puntland (in the northeast), the State of 
Southwestern Somalia (which includes Bay and Bakool) was announced in April 2002. 
However, divisions within the Leadership of the RRA between chairman Hasan Muhammed 
Nur Shatigaduud and his two deputies Shaykh Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim 
Habsade have led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting in Baidoa and the surroundings areas. 
But while there may be no fully functioning, recognised central government that does not 
mean Somalia is nowhere governed. And in the shadows of political discord and continuing 
insecurity in some regions, the Somali economy muddles though with no one at the helm to 
manage it. Basic law and order is the norm in most locations, even if there are shifting zones 
of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the Lower Jubba valley 
(notoriously Kismayo), and parts of Mogadishu (Menkhaus, 2000). Once relatively cohesive 
factions have splintered into quarrelling sub-clan militias, so that most armed conflict since 
1995 and the withdrawal of UNOSOM has been within, rather than between, major clans, 
notably in strategic areas like Mogadishu and Kismayo. This has meant that the country is 
less vulnerable to major armed clashes, but more prone to smaller, localised, less bloody and 
less predictable armed hostilities. 
Yet, an overly simplistic analysis poses problems. The violence of crime (the violence of 
roadblocks, taxation and competition for resources) promulgated by freelance militias or 
under the general banner of 'warlordism' can be obscured if we use the term war. In these 
contexts, the boundaries between war and crime are increasingly unclear. These criminal, 
and often violent activities link 'combatants' with non-'combatants' - for the politically and 
militarily weak of southern Somalia this means further impoverishment and increased 
vulnerability and inequality as the benefits of the income generated are not captured for the 
public good. 
For these criminal groups the benefits of violence greatly outweigh those of peace. The 
presence of this violence creates uncertainty and instability, and a general unwillingness to 
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take risks in the (re)establishment of business and farming activities. Perversely, with 
employment opportunities limited the functionality of the gun is carried into the- 
humanitarian arena with the provision of 'security' services for UN and NGO operations. -, 
In the absence of governmental judicial authority at regional and district level, Public law 
and order, rule of law, and personal security throughout the country continue to be based on 
a combination of traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations with 
blood-payment groups (diiya); clan-based customary law and mediation structures provided' 
by elders and respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the practice of 
adoption into a stronger clan (see Chapter 6). In practice, the strength of these mechanisms 
varies from location to location and according to the social standing of the individual and the 
clan (Menkhaus, 2000). Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing in the home 
areas of their clan, where they are assured full status and protection within their kin group. 
The most dynamic and visible adaptation to statelessness at the grassroots level has come, 
from merchants, taking advantage of the largely duty-free entrep6t economy. Although the 
war is mostly seen as a period of destruction, killings, and economic collapse new 
opportunities have arisen for some (Marchal, 1996). Politics may be 'radically localised' in 
Somalia (Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1995; Bryden, 1999), and their nature is not easily 
amenable to the needs of the international community who seek fixed and constant authority 
structures, but business networks are more regional and international than ever. In Somalia's 
south, there exists an economy in which short-term and uncontrolled interests of a few 
dominate (Sabrie, 1997; Mubarak, 1997). Although business is working in some areas there 
is no single authority able to impose systematic taxes and attempts to impose taxation lead to 
renewed fighting in the capital. The Teal price being paid for these trading economies is a 
total absence of public services and a continuing degradation of public infrastructure. 
There is question mark on the relationships and connections between the faction leaders and 
the business communities that further complicate, and sustain, the jigsaw of war and 
intensifies the divisions between a wealthy urban minority and an increasingly marginalised 
rural poor majority. Where there are members of the business community who contribute 
financial assistance and lobby for peace and reconciliation, there are those, albeit a minority, 
who have made fortunes from the economies of plunder. These have a vested interest in the 
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continuation of civil strife (Sabrie, 1997) and, by implication, the marginalisation of an 
already poor Somali rural majority. 
Livestock traders must move cattle, camels, and goats from the interior to the ports; traders 
in dry rations, cloth, and other essentials must move their goods from the ports to the 
interior. The result has been the evolution of a sophisticated trade network that cuts across 
clan and conflict lines, creative credit schemes, and extensive use of telecommunications 
from the Somali interior to Abu Dhabi and London. International trade has been important, 
and now has become even more critical to post-1991 Somalia, to compensate for the decline 
in domestic production. In regional terms, Somalis, whose ethnic boundaries overlap the 
borders of all their neighbours; (Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti), are in a unique position to 
exploit the porous borders left by the collapse of the state. 
There are remarkable examples of private enterprise that demonstrate the ability and 
willingness of Somalis to rebuild their shattered lives. In Baidoa remittances are funding the 
reconstruction of private property, private clinics and refurbished private schools cater for 
those with adequate income, three telephone lines provide local, national and international 
calls, a computer training centre displays the latest hardware and software, and electricity is 
available for those with the resources to purchase generators or who can afford to purchase it 
from power generating businesses. 
In stark contrast to this entrepreneurial zeal advances in livelihood conditions for the 
majority often prove short-lived. This privatised economy is thin and often destabilised by 
the effects of recurrent drought and poor harvest, occasional floods, livestock export bans, 
the closure of remittance companies (see Chapter 6), and unilateral injections of competing 
currencies of limited acceptability. 
In Bay and Bakool, the 1998 gu crop harvest, which usually accounts for approximately 
75% of annual cereal production, was the lowest in the last ten years. Generally, although 
while the trend has been one of relatively stable grain production, average production has 
consistently been below 60% of the pre-war average (UNDP, 200 1). Adding to the economic 
and political woes of southern Somalia were the devastating floods of late 1997 and 1998. 
Tliroughout October, November and December of 1997, southern and central Somalia were 
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hit by unprecedented floods, caused by weather and tidal patterns that were associated with 
the El Nino phenomenon. These floods directly affected the lives and livelihoods of an 
estimated I million people and killed over 2,000 people in the acute phase of the emergency' 
and led to the loss of stored crops and livestock. 
Following the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 112001 and a reported connection - 
to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, the offices of the Al-Barakat remittance company were 
closed and their assets seized worldwide on 7 November last year. With no formal banking 
sector, and few alternatives, the closure of Al-Barakat has had a marked impact on the! 
money transfer pipeline upon which so many Somalis depend. ý; 
The Somali shilling, which, perhaps surprisingly, has remained relatively strong since 1993, - 
after the UN intervention in Somalia, has been weakened recently as a consequence of the 
arrival in Somalia of billions of new Somali bank notes. The trend was started by the late 
Somali faction leader General Mohammed Farah Aydiid when he brokered a deal with a,,, -, 
Malaysian company, Adorna, to print new Somali bank notes. In April 1999 a group of 
businessmen allied to Aydiid's son, Hussein, imported 30 billion Somali shillings (about 
US$ 4 million), dragging the value of the currency down from 8,500 to the US dollar to-, ý' 
9,000. At the end of May 1999 it was reported that Aydiid himself was directly importing 
newly printed notes through Baidoa which, once again lowered the value of the shilling. " 
An importation of 'fake' currency notes arriving in Mogadishu on 7 and II February 2001 
caused serious fluctuations in the exchange market, and led to the price of food and essential 
goods to almost double in price. Before the arrival of the new notes, estimated at 90 billion 
Somali shillings, or about US$ 6 million, the Somali shilling had been trading at 12,000 to 
the US$ 1, but rose to 15,200.1 
The short- and long-term consequences are worrying. The value of the Somali shilling has 
declined sharply, from around SShs 1,055 per US$ immediately before the collapse to 
around SShs 20,000 in April 2002 - 5% of its pre-war value. As a result, the purchasing 
411 United Nations Political Office for Somalia briefing 5 July, 1999. 
46 IRIN-1 IOA Update (Tuesday, 13 February, 2001). 
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power of money, or rather the value of money balances, has collapsed (del Buono and 
Mubarak, 1999). Regardless of where the currency was injected, the impact is transmitted 
everywhere where the old Somali notes are used. 
There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia. As a result there has 
been a 'dollarisation' of the economy - the big traders in Mogadishu and Bosasso, and even 
market traders in rural areas, are prefer to trade in US dollars only (Mubarak, 1999; del 
Buono and Mubarak, 1999). The prices of commercial imports (such as sugar, petrol, and 
medicines) are affected by external factors that affect the supply of dollars or the movements 
of exchange rate, such as the livestock ban, international prices of imports, or the inflow of 
remittances. This inflation has also been a considerable factor in the decreased economic 
access of the rural and urban poor to meet their food and non-food needs. At times, big 
traders fix their prices to the dollar, but small and medium traders stop trading completely. 
The hardest hit are low income families, and this exchange rate fluctuation will result in 
more and more people falling deeper into poverty. 
Exports of agricultural products, such as bananas (Somalia's second most important export 
commodity), have plummeted. In February 1998, following a regional outbreak of Rift 
Valley fever, Saudi Arabia banned imports of livestock from Somalia. Exports were 
seriously affected and during the peak period of the outbreak declined by about 70% in the 
north-west, and by more than 25% in the north-east, compared to the same period in 1997. " 
While the ban remained in force, it caused economic hardship, deprived local 
administrations in the north of much-needed export tax income and led, through over- 
grazing, to serious environmental damage (see, FSAU, 1998; SCF-UK/FSAU, 1998). Saudi 
Arabia subsequently lifted this ban on 25 May 1999, but on 18 September 2000 the Gulf 
States imposed a second ban. It is thought that this restriction on exports will have a much 
more negative impact on Somalia and surrounding countries due to a lack of alternative 
markets, general poor condition of livestock, and the fact that the ban came into effect before 
47 Pastoralism is central to economic and cultural life in the northern and central regions of Somalia. I listorical records indicate 
that two-thirds of gross domestic product is based on livestock production and trade. An estimated 70 - 80% of foreign 
exchange earned from livestock exports is used to import basic food staples, such as sugar, rice, wheat flour, pasta, and 
vegetable oil and an estimated 60 - 70% of employment in Somalia is related to the livestock trade. Between 1996 and early 
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the peak period of Ramadan livestock sales (VVTP, 2000a). The continuation of this ban has 
far reaching implications within Somalia and the region in general for pastoral livelihoods 
and all those relying upon this sector. Although northern Somalia is more dependent on the 
livestock trade than the mainly agro-pastoral inter-riverine areas the knock-on effects will 
undoubtedly be felt in the southern regions. 
4.3.1 Hawa Mahi Moharnoud's story 
In descriptions of clan, or the statistics of vulnerability or inflation, it is easy to lose sight%-' 
that for most Somalis the past decade has had an all too human face. Hawa's story, which 
she narrated to a Women's Vigilfor Peace meeting held in Nairobi on 16 August 1999 and 
which is retold here in full, reminds us of her plight. " 
"My name is Ilawa Mahi Mohamoud. I am from Mogadishu, Somalia. I live in North 
Mogadishu. 
On 14 December 199 1, an artillery shell fell on our house. At the time I was three months 
pregnant. I was with my son and the son of my sister. There were eleven persons sitting in a 
group when the artillery shell fell into our house. I was distributing food to people because at 
that time, when the civil war started on 17 November, all the women did not have much 
food. I had been working with an Italian NGO and they had some rice so I was distributing 
the rice. 
When the artillery shell hit the house, I immediately became unconscious. I didn't know 
what happened. I could hear sounds. I could hear people talking, 'Oh pay attention, she's 
in 
a coma. ' I could hear them but I couldn't respond. I didn't know where I was. 
1998, over 6.4 million head of livestock were exported to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Gulf States through the northern 
Somali ports of Berbera and Bossaso. 
41 The Women's Vigil for Peace was founded by Safla Giama who was so shocked by the murder of her peace-loving uncle, 
Abdirizak I lirsi Dhecre, on 16' January 1999, that she decided that his murder should not pass unnoticed and unreported as yet 
another faceless death. Safia Giama met with a group of women in Nairobi and urged them to join her in starting a vigil against 
war to stop the killing of more innocent men, women and children. On the 16'h of each month a one hour monthly vigil 
is held 
to remember the effects of war on people. 
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I heard people say 'Your son died. The son of your sister died. Eleven people were 
wounded. ' But I couldn't respond. I was looking at myself, wondering what happened to me. 
I was not thinking that I was still alive. I still have fragments of the shell and scars on my 
breast, hip and leg on the right side. 
Today when I called my home in Mogadishu, people told me that there's fighting. Some 
people were defeated by one group, they came to our area. 'Don't you hear the bullets? Our 
house is in the crossfire. ' I'm on the telephone calling them from Bosasso telling them to 
take the children away to another place, a safer place. 
How did I come back to life? Everyone was hunting for me. I was the most active person in 
the family, the centre of family life. Without me, maybe they will suffer. They were crying 
for me, 'maa woo. ' 
After a few days and many antibiotics, I came back to life. The shell fragments had pierced 
my flesh to the bone. Everyone started crying when the doctor was examining me but I 
couldn't see. I was not able to even sit up. For many days, I could hear them, but I couldn't 
speak. I don't know what they felt but they were looking at me as if I was going to die. 
I was working for the family. At the time I was doing humanitarian work. I was distributing 
food left behind by an Italian NGO. From 5 a. m. in the morning, everyone was coming. 
There was no place to get food. People had no money. People depended on me. They could 
not believe that I had been injured and almost killed. They said 'Oh we are not good 
Muslims, if the one that is helping all of us is injured. She was doing good work. How could 
she be injuredT 
I was pregnant with my daughter, Asha. She's seven now. I prayed. Thanks to Allah because 
I have not the authority to save myself. It's thanks to Allah. 
After I was better, our family escaped to the bush. I couldn't stand to stay in Mogadishu and 
hear the artillery. More than fifty people left together. We took some rice with us and made 
tents. We were living in the bush for about three months, drinking dirty water. I was 
wounded and pregnant. Then we went back to Mogadishu. 
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The fighting continued between clans, between sub clans, between sub sub clans. The main 
problem was shortage of food. Everyone was looking for or looting for food. There was no 
work, no money. People were begging Allah to end the f ighting. But I don't think this war 
will stop, because these two clans arc brothers, are neighbours. If I defeat you today You are 
trying your best to defeat me tomorrow. You don't like to stay at the point of defeat. 
Everyone likes to win. 
Where can we go? We don't have even a penny. We have a house, a well and electricity in 
Mogadishu. Others don't have anything. Most people can't even borrow money. ý There's 
nothing they can do, just cry. No solution, just crying and cursing. That's it. Those that are 
flghting are like elephants. They are looking only at their hugeness but not at what they are 
destroying. 
Allah has given me this fate. I don't want revenge. But some people have lost all their 
family. One man I know, lost all of his family, his wife, his daughter, his son. Can he be 
satisfied without revenge? Some people want revenge. These warlords they should look back - 
and see what they have done, what they have destroyed. The warlords are not Muslims. They 
are not human beings. If they can kill, they are not human. 
If the warlords stop, then there is the question of revenge. Will some people want revenge? 
The warlords came by force. They are leading us by force, so why don't they agree to stop? 
If they are agreed, although we have not elected them, if they do something positive, we 
would accept them even though they are not leaders. 
The warlords don't want to have a government. I believe they are collecting money. Picture 
plenty of money falling down, covered in blood. They have lost the trust of Allah. They have 
lost all trust. They are nothing, nothing, nothing. 
I see no future for my children. There is a future only for those Somalis who escaped, those 
who have money and who left Somalia. Even though those who left do now have a good life, 
they arc still Somalis. Somalis are not respected outside. 
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If they can get peace in their country, I don't think Somalis would stay outside. An old 
woman of eighty years was interviewed in Holland by the BBC. 'I'm on the 15'h floor. I 
can't get down. No one is with me. In Somalia, in the morning I was going to the 
neighbours, greeting them, having coffee with them. I don't really care whether there is 
artillery shelling or not. I like my country. It's better for me to be in my country instead of 
staying here. ' 
A mother ran away from the war with her two daughters. We met them in the bush. They 
came to live with us. We welcomed her and her children. They are staying with me for seven 
years now. Her daughter comes to me to talk about getting married. 
We have another son from Baidoa. They were our neighbours before, in the time of Siyaad 
Barre. His mother sold tomatoes. We bought tomatoes from her. The other children and the 
mother died. The boy and his sister were left alone. He came at night when he was only ten 
years old. People in the house said 'Oh don't open. Look before you open the door. No, no, 
we don't want him. How thin he is. His eyes are outside of his body. ' The lady who works 
for me is called Asha. The boy was calling out 'Asha. ' But Asha said, 'No, no, no, I don't 
know him. He's Bantu. I don't know him. ' 
I asked him to come inside. When I looked, I thought he was the son of Ilawa. She always 
said 'aiyo' so we called her Aiyo. Isn't this the son of Aiyo? Come inside. Where is Your 
mother? She died. Where are your brothers? Dead. Where is your sister Saido? I don 7 know. 
I left Saido in the bush. Do you want to stay with us? Yes. 
His stomach was distended. He was very thin. We gave him food but he couldn't cat it. if I 
show you now, how he is, you wouldn't believe that once he almost starved to death. lie's 
called Mohamed. He calls me Momma. He has the ability to fix everything in the house. Ile 
went to Koranic and intermediate school. You can't imagine how elegant he is now. Ile's 
my son. " 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Conflict and drought undoubtedly have had a major impact on the livelihoods of Somalis. As 
this chapter suggests, few have been left untouched by the problems of the last decade. For 
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some, the transformations that have occurred have been positive. Civil war and the porous 
borders of a collapsed State have altered regional and global trading networks. A 6new rich' 
has emerged profiting from the economies of war, a lack of a strong legal and regulatory 
environment and the opportunities created by international aid. "' 
At the same time, many have 'lost' as a consequence of conflict, recurrent drought, and the 
vicissitudes of a 'thin' and unstable privatised economy, caught in the downward spiral of 
poverty, asset depletion, a lack of basic welfare services, and the deterioration of Public 
infrastructure. Large inequalities exist between these winners and losers and it appears that 
this discrepancy is growing. While confidence in the future may be high for some, these; 
problems have left others unable (or unwilling) to look beyond the immediate needs of 
today. 
I lowever, these crude generalisations should be treated with caution. There is a great deal of 
variability in livelihood conditions within and between regions. This depends on the specific 
geographies of place and the confluence of the political, economic, social, and 
environmental components of vulnerability at any given time. Chapter 3 illustrated the 
importance of the geographies of space and the networks of place in our understanding of 
vulnerability. This chapter contextualises these elements for those that follow. 
This chapter has revealed the multiple dimensions of vulnerability. It has described in broad 
terms the changing socio-political and economic situation. This turbulent period has 
undoubtedly shaped the way people live, get on and get by. But this chapter has not provided 
a view of the livelihood networks at the micro-level that have been shaped by these 
processes. 
Fieldwork must crideavour to go beyond these broad level descriptions: it must capture and 
describe these dynamic scales and networks that stretch between the macro and the micro, 
the local and the global. Chapter 5, The multiple sites of doing vulnerability links the ideas 
of flexible and porous spaces discussed in the previous chapter, the dimensions of 
vulnerability introduced in this chapter, and describes the processes of empirical 
0 
49 rot a general discussion on the political economy of the 'winners' and 'losers' of war see Keen (1994,1998). 
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investigation that link the macro and the micro and an engagement with how people actually 
live. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE MULTIPLE SITES OF 'DOING" 
VULNERABILITY: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN SOMALIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
'Field-work' is a familiar term to geographers. While the methodological and ethical 
dimensions of field research have preoccupied human geographers of late, reflecting broader 
concerns across the social sciences, surprisingly little attention has been given to the 
specifically spatial dimensions of field work. However it is defined, the 'field' is a more 
open and diffuse space than that inhabited by the theoretical explorations of 'armchair' 
geographers (Driver, 2000). 
Chapter 3 challenges not only the theories of vulnerability and livelihoods but also questions 
the geographic situatedness of the field site. Once I had decided to follow a qualitative 
methodological framework as the best way to engage with the complexity (Dwyer and Limb, 
2001) and hitherto hidden voices, networks, connections, and lived and unknown spaces of 
vulnerability it became obvious quickly that I was taking a step into the unknown. MY Own 
'field' stretched across two continents, Europe and Africa, and between two countries in 
particular, Kenya and Somalia. 
As anthropologists continue to point out, the fieldwork experience contributes to 
appreciating multiple perspectives. This should be an antidote to the donor- or poliCY-driven 
blueprints and models that drive the development or humanitarian agenda (Eyben, 2000). 
Policy and practice, and practice and the complexity of lifeworlds are intimately connected. 
To understand these connections I had first to gain entry to the world of one (WFP Somalia). 
And then to illuminate the lived spaces of the other (the pastoral and agro-pastoral Rcewin 
of southern Somalia) I had to give up the representational spaces (Lefebvre, 1991) of this 
humanitarian actor and shed the intellectual burden of my own deeply ingrained 
conccptualisations of time and of space. 
This chapter describes the processes of investigation, a sort of search and discovery mission 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 2002), that, however fleetingly,, teases out these diffuse spaces of 
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vulnerability and my own efforts to overcome the stretch between the global and the local 
that have been described in Chapter 3. This presents two methodological challenges. 
The first of these, described in the following section, is to discern, as participant-observer, 
the spatial imaginaries at work within an active aid organisation and how these are 
propagated beyond its 'borders'. The theoretical and practical issues of this are reasonably 
well covered in the literatures of the social sciences (Gold, 1969; Burgess, 1984; May, 1997; 
Cook, 1997). 
The second challenge, however, is very much uncharted territory: uncovering the spatial 
complexity of vulnerability amongst the Reewin of southern Somalia. The remaining 
substantive part of the chapter questions the logic of single contained site approaches for 
exploring the multiple spaces of vulnerability. It draws upon the multiple site approaches, 
and describes the spatial issues of multiple site selection and the largely participative 
methods of the bricolage of place. 
If this could be achieved it should be possible to compare and contrast the spatiality of one, 
WFP Somalia, with the livelihood practices of the other. In other words to suggest ways of 
bridging the divide between the conceived, perceived and lived spaces of vulnerability and 
to illuminate the contestation of place. 
The previous chapter provided a narration of vulnerability in Somalia. But generalised 
discussions do not illuminate the micro-level processes of livelihood patterns. What is 
needed is a 'view from the doorstep', an explicit recognition of complexity and diversity of 
the vulnerable themselves. Explanations of associations within and between households arc 
to be found in space-sensitive accounts of place. 
To complicate matters further, this spatial contestation is played out in the unfamiliar culture 
and conflict environment of southern Somalia. While the practical and very real problems of 
conducting fieldwork even in peaceful conditions are rarely discussed in instructional texts 
or are not evident in the neatly packaged articles that appear in geographic journals (an 
exception to this is the collection of illuminating articles in special issue of the Geographical 
Review (2001), 91(1-2)) for those undertaking research in these more troublesome settings 
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there is even less guidance. Although there are a number of texts describing the nature of 
violence and war and the suffering it engenders (see, for example, Lutz, 1999; Bourgois, 
2001) the problems faced in generating reliable and relevant information and analyses under 
conditions of conflict are rarely discussed. Notable exceptions to this can be found in Araujo 
(1993), Nordstrom and Robben (1995), Barakat and Ellis (1996), Silkin and Hendrie (1997), 
Nordstrom (1999), Finnstr6m (2001), Schafer (2001a), and, Dowler (2001a and 2001b). 
In these situations, the problem goes beyond "How do I collect data? " to more pragmatic 
issues of access to the field and "What types of data can I collect? " As Hugo Slim (1995) 
remarks, today's relief worker must be part political scientist, part economist, part 
anthropologist, part military analyst, part historian, part peace negotiator, part logistician, 
and part humanitarian. This same chameleon-like resourcefulness is demanded of 
researchers in these difficult environments (see, also, Katz, 1994). These conditions, that 
affected my role with WFP and shaped the methodologies that I employed to uncover the 
multiple sites of vulnerability, are also discussed. 
5.2 , UNCOVERING THE SPACES OF VULNERABILITY AND THE 
CONTESTATION OF PLACE 
5.2.1 Somalia, isn't that the place they had a war and lots of people died? 
As with other forms of fieldwork I needed a place and a working role (Bell, 1999). As the 
United Nations frontline agency mandated to combat global hunger, the World Food 
Programme is mandated to use its food aid to meet emergency needs, support economic and 
social development, and provide the logistics support necessary to deliver food. It also works 
to put hunger at the centre of the international agenda, promoting policies, strategies and 
operations that directly benefit the poor and hungry. Present throughout the world's food 
insecure areas, in 2000 WFP fed 83 million people in 83 countries, including most of the 
world's refugees and internally displaced persons. 'O After initial consultations with senior 
policy staff at WFP headquarters in Rome and enquiries made to a number of WFP Country 
" Sce http: //www. wrp. org. 
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Representatives I eventually gained a position within the programming unit of WTP Somalia 
based in Nairobi. " 
Until then my knowledge of Somalia (see Figure 1.1, Chapter 1), like many other countries 
in a similar situation, had been informed by the disasterscapcs framed by the international 
media. I saw it as a land of desert, camels, 'technicals' and young qat-chewing, gun-carrying 
teenagers that had become the symbol of Somalia's lawlessness. " In 1991 Somalia, already 
amongst the very poorest countries, and arguably one of the most aid dependent in the 
world, disintegrated violently into a brutal civil war which raged between disaffected 
factions of Somali society and the followers of Siyad Barre. Barre himself attained power 
after a successful coup detat in 1969. To those on the outside looking in, Somalia became 
an exemplar of anarchy, and in some minds chaos, a country tom apart by fragmentation and 
strife, a situation which, perhaps inevitably in this country prone to periodic drought, led to 
starvation and famine. In 1992, reportedly 300,000 to 500,000 people died as a combination 
of protracted conflict and drought caused widespread famine and suffering in the inter- 
riverine areas of central and Southern Somalia. The subsequent failure of the international 
community in Somalia (now partially retold in the recently released film Black Hawk Down) 
has not only shaped subsequent interventions in Somalia but also reflects the attitudes and 
actions of international actors in other humanitarian emergencies. For many the Somali 
proverb Colaad iyo abaar, nabad iyo caano (War and famine, peace and milk) epitomises 
this troubled country. Yet these prosaic extremes also mask more subtle shades of conflict 
and hunger that so challenge the international community. 
Organisations (however problematic this label (Del Casino, 2000)) stamp their ideological 
and material imprint on regions and communities through their spatial practices. These 
practices include the analysis of vulnerability and the distribution of resources to those 
labelled vulnerable (see Chapters 2 and 3). 1 chose not to study the organisation, WFP 
51 This process took several months, including a trip to Rome (16 to 21 August, 1998) (paid from the departmental Contingency 
Fund), and numerous telephone calls to Rome and Nairobi. 
52 Many of these teenagers were addicted to qat (Catha edulis), a herbal amphetamine (Stevenson, 1993). The supply of qat 
formed part of a major cross-boi-der trade which airlifted cargoes of the Kenyan and Ethiopian grown drug to the militia 
fighters (and other consumers), who chewed it to keep alert (Lewis, 1993a). One irony of this cross-border trade was that qat 
flights regularly landed in Somalia when it was impossible to get food relief in. 
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Somalia, per se, but rather the spatial forms and patterns readily discernible in its policies 
and practices (see Chapter 7). This more limited purview was, I suggest, less threatening 
than a focus upon its day to day management, organisational structure, or the specific roles 
of individuals. 
At the same time a post-structural understanding of the organisation suggested that it was 
penetrated by wider institutional relations that had to be considered. These stretched from 
the global policies of WFP and the international humanitarian agenda to the more, local 
practices of this country office. They were also to be found in the internal debates, and the 
divisions present in the international aid community in Nairobi, amongst donors, information 
providers and other aid organisations, and in the often conflictual environment of aid 
distribution in southern Somalia itself. 
Studying these spatial practices requires negotiating the tricky mazcway that separates 
'outsiders' from 'insiders'. Becoming an insider involved acquiring a new language (of the 
intricacies of food aid resources and the day to day vocabulary of the organisation) and a 
new persona (finding a particular role within the unit). This affiliation that had been planned 
to last six months but continued for a further 19 gave me privileged access to two 
communities: to policy makers and field staff, of senior and junior status, at headquarters or 
country or regional offices, within WFP and with sister UN agencies, donors, or non- 
governmental organisations. " This 'insiderness' was the key to a deeper understanding of 
the policies and practices of the organisation that 'outsiders' are rarely given access to. 
Aware of the problematic arena of food aid in Somalia, this highly self-critical country team 
was searching for ways of improving the performance of its programme. Rather than being 
seen as a contaminant, cast as an uneasy outsider with a vaguely negotiated role, I was 
encouraged to participate fully in a diverse range of activities that constituted the policies 
and working practices of WFP and encouraged to understand the range of constraints that 
conditioned many of these activities. 
53 25 March 1999 to 30 March 2001. My affiliation with WFP Somalia can split into two roughly equal periods: firstly, as an 
unsalaricd intcrn and, secondly, as a fully salaried international consultant funded to expand upon my initial research findings. 
During this second period I otTicially suspended my PhD studies. 
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These included activities in Somalia (designing and leading interagency food security 
assessment missions, participating in crop establishment and post-harvest assessment 
exercises, the distribution of food assistance in rural and urban settings, and post-distribution 
monitoring exercises) and in Nairobi (programme development meetings, numerous 
workshops discussing the problems of food assistance, office retreats, weekly senior staff 
meetings, and various fora of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB)). 
There remains a certain difficulty and ambiguity of the boundaries between 'insider' and 
'outsider' (Haraway, 1996; Sidaway, 1992; Rose, 1997; Mullings, 1999; Sherif, 2001; 
Skelton, 2001). The potential trap for an 'insider' is immersion in the particulars of 
humanitarian action and everyday life so that there be no point in questioning the taken for 
granted or in seeing the organisation or place in their wider spatial or social context. Yet an 
'outsider' would view the multiple spaces of vulnerability from the perspective of a partially 
finished canvas, seen largely in terms of artefacts - policy documents, the routes of food aid 
convoys, the maps generated from vulnerability assessments, the intricate patterns of land 
use, the built environment of dwellings, religion and travel, and the daily activities of 
humanitarian workers or agropastoralists. However much this canvas is read, or its meanings 
interrogated, it is impossible to grasp the whole. 
These boundaries constantly shifted (see Gold, 1969) during my two years in the 'field': 
initially as outsider with VVTP, then insider; outsider among the Reewin, then partial insider. 
This was further complicated by my presence as 'participant' contributing to the 
development of the same spatial imaginations that I was endeavouring to uncover. 
What seemed in the comfort of Bristol so simple a concept, participant observation, 
unrestricted by the more rigid approaches of quantitative methodologies yet open to my own 
vision - sit, do, listen, observe, record - became clouded. What appeared to be a set of clearly 
defined research questions and broad methodologies had to be rethought to take into account 
the realities that I encountered in the 'field' (including the costs of 'commuting' between 
two countries to conduct research - flights alone from Nairobi to southern 
Somalia cost in 
the region of US$ 800, well beyond my budget). "' Initially, with limited funds at my 
54 My upgrade report reflected the need to maintain a flexible approach to take into account these realities. 
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disposal, my ability to follow my planned programme of research was severely frustrateVý 
It was not until March 2000 that I received sufficient financial resources to undertake the 
extensive fieldwork in Nairobi and the regions of Bay and Bakool in southern Somalia upon 
which my understanding of vulnerability and livelihood networks laid out in this thesis is 
predominantly based. ' 
Yet the situated knowledges of the 'insider' take time to develop, for me much longer than 
the six months I had originally envisioned. At first, my knowledge of Somalia was 
insufficient to enable me to 'ask the right questions' of a culture that I knew so little about- I 
was fortunate that this study found particular resonance with the elders and peoples of the 
Reewin I encountered. This community felt that for too long the reference point for much 
that framed the understandings of Somalia within the international community had been the'; 
'camel histories' that marginalised their own customs and histories. Without this facilitation 
my own research experiences in southern Somalia and my status would have been much 
more arduous. 
5.2.2 The macro-geographies of site: mobile organic ethnographies and locating 
the spaces of vulnerability 
To explore the multiple dimensions of vulnerability in southern Somalia requires grappling 
with the huge stretch between local sites and the wider dynamics of livelihoods. This 
necessitates a richness of understanding that goes far beyond the superficial travels of the in- 
and-out voyager. In doing so the narrow boundaries of the traditional field 'site' as 
conceived by the Chicago school, more "... dwelling rather than travelling" (Burawoy, 200 1: 
147) (see, also, Clifford, 1989), are permeated by wider spaces and broader flows and 
connections of the vulnerability of place described in Chapter 3. The idea of a contained site 
with its own autonomous logic is even more flimsy and artificial once the gaze is extended 
beyond bounded place to include these additional dimensions, dimensions that in turn are 
53 1 was living in Nairobi and conducting my research in Kenya and Somalia from an Anderson scholarship. 
56 This was possible through a WFP Dutch Quality Improvement Grant (budget code 3760 000 EEE NET99SOM01) Of US$ 
92,000. See, Narbcth, (2001). Thesc two regions became the focus of study for two reasons. Firstly their relative importance to 
the WFP operation - during the period of my attachment these two regions received 80% of the total WFP food aid commitment 
to Somalia and, secondly, they also proved to be the most problematic in terms of the distribution of these resources and were 
thcrcrore the focus of intcnse scrutiny by programming staff. 
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constantly in flux. Searching for evidence of an alternative form of order beyond previously 
established conceptual and applied boundaries (Drennon, 2001) means abandoning spatial 
preconceptions before entering the 'field'. 
This demands more than just 'fieldwork by chatting', a set of randomly executed 
interviews. " Rather, it demands a rigorously thought out framework for the ethnographies of 
space that expose the submerged networks, connections, associations, flows, embeddedness, 
and glues of vulnerability. 
The emerging literatures of the multiple site approaches - and their forerunner noticeable in 
the methodologies of the Manchester School of social anthropology and the extended case 
method (Burawoy, 1998; Burawoy, 2000; Eliasoph and Lichterman, 1999) - of researchers 
investigating the processes of globalisation (see, Kearney, 1995; Marcus, 1995,1998; 
Edwards, 1994; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Burawoy et al, 2000; Abu-Lughod, 2000; 
Burawoy, 2001; Gille, 2001; Freidberg, 2001) and transnationalism (Mitchell, 1997; 
Vertovec, 1999; Portes et al, 1999) provide some guidance. " In attempting to read the 
related and multiple spatial processes and consequences of globalisation and 
transnationalism methodological considerations are brought to the fore. Specifically the 
nature of the field site is questioned. In attempting to describe the lived spaces of global 
processes Michael Burawoy (2000: 4) poses a practical challenge: "to be a global 
ethnographer is one thing; to do global ethnography is another. " 
The social scientists who practise ethnographic research have a variety of terms for it: 
ethnography, as anthropologists traditionally call it, or field research, as is common among 
sociologists. Terminological differences aside, the practice generally places the researchers 
in the midst of whatever it is they study. The classical Malinowskian (for example, 1926) 
image of the closed communities of fieldwork (the ]one, white, male fieldworker living for a 
year or more among the native villagers) or 'the tent in a village' isolated from the world 
around, functions as an archetype for normal anthropological practice. In an oft-cited 
passage, Clifford Geertz has pointed out that "anthropologists don't study villages (tribes, 
57 My thanks go to Mark Bradbury (2002, personal communication) for bringing this phrase to my attention. 
58 Transnationalism is also being explored in an ESRC research programme on Transnational Communities (see 
http: //www. transcomm. ox. ac. uk). 
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towns, neighbourhoods ... ); they study in villages" (1973: 22). This has shaped the 
bounds of --ý 
anthropology and sociology and defined the spatial purview of the fieldworker: the 'field' is, 
derived from the face-to-face relations of communication with the context firmly bracketed 
(Burawoy, 2001), while other less localised relations disappear, or do not hove into view. 
This hitherto bounded 'field' also challenges Appadurai (1991: 191,196) who suggests that: - 
As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories, and 
reconfigure their ethnic ýprqjects, the ethno in ethnography takes on a slipperYp 
nonlocalized quality, to which the descriptive practices of anthropology will have to 
respond. The landscapes of group identity - the ethnoscapes - around the world are no 
longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer tightly 
territorialized, spatially bounded, historically setkonscious, or culturally 
homogeneous ... 77te task of ethnography now becomes the unravelling of a 
conundrum: what is the nature of locality, as a lived experience, in a globalized, 
deterritorialized world? 
This should give us pause for thought: how can we uncover the multiple sites and 
trajectories of vulnerability and livelihoods described in Chapter 3? In attempting to 
understand the social and cultural forms and practices associated with the production, 
exchange and access to food how can we solidify the social networks of resource transfer 
long enough to apprehend and describe them? And as David Booth (1995) asks, how can we 
bridge the macro and micro-divide? 
The micro-geographics of site, for example the selection of appropriate individual sites 
in 
which to conduct interviews, the geographies of power within these sites, including the 
positionings of insider or outsider, and considerations of local or indigenous knowledge are 
relatively well covered in the literatures of human geography and social anthropology. " 
39 See Elwood and Martin (2000) on individual sites in which to conduct interviews; Ross (2001), McDowell (1998), cormode 
and I lughcs (1999) and Oinas (1999) on the geographies of power within these sites, including the positionings of insider or 
outsider (Sherif. 2001; Mullings, 1999; Sidaway, 1992; Skelton, 2001), considerations of gender (Haraway, 1996; McDowell, 
1992; Rochelcau, 1995; Katz, 1994; Nast, 1994; Gilbert, 1994; Stacheli and Lawson, 1994; Longburst, 1996; Ruspini, 2001). 
and local or indigenous knowledge (Geertz, 1983; Clark and Murdoch, 1997; Agrawal, 1995; Pottier, 1989; Sillitoe, 1998 and 
2000; Barth, 2002). 
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Conversely, apart from the emerging literatures of the etlmographies of globalisation and 
transnationalism these very real theoretical and methodological concerns of the macro- 
geographies of site remain largely unframed (Marcus, 1995). In the literatures of 
vulnerability and livelihoods they are absent altogether. In a recent publication aimed at 
geographers on the issues and debates of qualitative methodologies (Limb and Dwyer, 200 1) 
the spatial issues of multiple site selection are not even raised. 
5.2.3 Working outwards and inwards 
The placelessness portrayed in the globalisation literature should sound the death knell of 
classical ethnography. Although this place is a lot more organic and less bounded than the 
literatures of vulnerability and livelihoods would have us generally believe (see Chapter 3) 
its relative fixity provides us with the starting point for our exploration of social space. If we 
remain incarcerated and grounded in place the wider processes of vulnerability remain still 
largely invisible. Thus, in this instance, the sufficiency of doing fieldwork in one site is 
questioned. This necessitates that the researcher switches places, moving among multiple 
sites within the field. But this should be no aimless wandering but a carefully orchestrated 
exercise in movement accompanied by a social routemap. Ideally the gaze (and the feet) of 
the navigator should be unimpeded, free to roam to capture the unexpected connections, and 
to follow whatever comes into view. 
Networks are generated by inequalities of power (or resources) between transmitter and 
receiver. There is a hierarchical chain, but like all social chains it can be disrupted and 
diverted as we have seen. The marginalisation of people denied access to this network is as 
important as the -appropriation of resources along the chain. In conducting multi-site 
ethnographies the purpose is not to contrast the perspectives from each site but instead to 
build a montage that lends greater insight into the whole, into the associations, connections, 
disconnections and reconnections (Burawoy, 2001). In this sense it is the networks 
themselves that become the focus of study (Dicken et al, 2001) and the network is followed 
by listening to the voices at the nodes of place. For it is here that this lived space provides 
the central location for the production of counter-narratives (Massey, 1999). These are 
evident not just in words but in the habits of being and the way people live. It is here that the 
voices of the vulnerable can be heard. Fieldwork thus becomes an exercise in mapping social 
terrain and the particular network moments of resource flow. 
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Empirical work has to assemble a picture of the whole by Tecognising diverse perspectives 
from singular but connected sites. The basic problem of getting the 'whole story' is hardly,,,, 
unique to multi-site research but it is especially important in situations where war,,, 
... literally fragments life, making the pieces of the social body harder to find" (Lutz, 1999). 
At least the method provides part of the solution, in that research in multiple-sites allows for 
a crosscheck or triangulation of findings (see, Huberman and Miles, 1998). As Susanne 
Freidberg (2001) suggests in her study of a fresh food commodity chain between Africa and 
tw aril Europe analysing the stories of actors at different points on the ne ork does not necess y 
clarify who is lying or not. It does, however, help to make sense of contradictions and 
ambiguities both within and between individual accounts. 
Based on this evidence we should be able to work both outwards (the macro-geographies of 
site) and inwards from place (the micro-geographies of site), a sort of construction through 
pre-planned and opportunistic movement. 
Sooner or later decisions have to be made of what sites to pick and where to start. Indeed, 
Marcus (1998: 90) acknowledges the seemingly arbitrary nature of choosing connections 
and sites: 
Mulli-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or 
juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes someform of literal, 
physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or connection among 
sites that in fact defines the argument of ethnography. Indeed, such multi-sited 
ethnography is a revival ofa sophisticatedpractice ofconstructivism. 
The ethnographer constructs the reality defined by the paths of the objects of his or her 
interests (Gille, 200 1). Worryingly, what may be left out is just as important as what may be 
included. Marcus (1995) suggests we follow the people, follow the thing, follow the 
metaphor, follow the plot, story, or allegory, follow the life or biography, or follow the 
conflict. My intention was to complement the data and insights of the global to local food 
aid policy and practice networks gained from my role as participant observer within one site, 
121 
THE MULTIPLE SITES OF'DOING'VULNERABILITY 
WFP, by conducting ethnographies of multiple sites in Somalia and with other methods such 
as archival research and interviews in Nairobi. 
5.2.4 Working outwards: the multiple sites of vulnerability 
By crossing the disciplinary boundaries of academia that have shed light on the processes 
and problems associated with vulnerability and livelihoods this study is already theoretically 
multi-sited. And it has drawn together the divergent strands of nature and society (refer to 
Chapter 3 for the utility of, for example, political economy, history, political ecology, 
anthropology, sociology, social anthropology). Furthermore, in addition to the resources of 
the University of Bristol library and the WFP in Rome, other sites of information included 
the World Wide Web, and the libraries and publications of the United Nations Development 
Office for Somalia (UNDOS), the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) in Nairobi, the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI) in Nairobi, and of course WFP Somalia, and meetings in Eastleigh (Nairobi) And 
Somalia with members of the Reewin community, with field and Nairobi based Somali staff 
of the FSAU and FEWS, CARE Somalia, WFP Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, representatives 
from Somali 'minority' groups in Nairobi and in Somalia, Oxfarn GB, and the Nairobi based 
Office of the President Arid Lands Resource Management Project (see Appendix 1). ' 
Despite advances in modem communication and the proliferation of information, there 
remain areas of the world about which there is little general knowledge. one such place is 
Somalia. Even to those foreigners who work in Somalia, and to those who express an 
interest in uncovering more, much remains mysterious and at times unfathomable. Somalia, 
and southern Somalia in particular, pose a number of problems for those wishing to 
undertake academic research, or as part of the process of targeting food aid and other 
resources. 
A number of studies on warlord politics and the war economies, political solutions to the 
crisis, the colonial period, Somalia's fate during the geopolitical machinations of the Cold 
War and the proliferation of guns during this period, the role and fate of 'minority' groups, 
and (albeit rather static) descriptions of kinship structures prove useful in understanding this 
troubled country (see Chapter 4 and 6). However, in referring to these and other sites for 
information on Somalia, and the agropastoral populations of Bay and Bakool in particular, it 
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was soon obvious that, apart from the literatures on pastoral nomadism that still dominate 
perceptions of Somalia (particularly visible in the writings of IM Lewis), little had been 
published on how these societies actually functioned in the face of crisis. 
Diana Putman (1982), writing almost a decade before the crisis, noticed that though in-depth 
socio-cultural research had been done on populations in many parts of the country, this type 
of information was noticeably lacking for the Bay region. Later, in 1984, a USAID funded 
report prepared for the Bay Region Agricultural Development Project noted that this is 
"... an area that has not been closely studied" (University of Wyoming, 1984a: 2). 
Surprisingly, given the duration of international involvement in Somalia the information 
database continues to be meagre. ' 
The limited information that is available suggests that, in the absence of any formal welfare 
system, social networks, in particular those of resource sharing play a crucial part in the 
maintenance of livelihood assets in Somalia. In Mogadishu, for example, UNOSOM created 
an artificial, externally driven economy. Huge, extended families survived off each worker's 
salary - sometimes up to eighty people fed from one monthly paycheque (Menkhaus and 
Prendergast, 1995). A report written in 1994 suggested that mortality rates varied 
significantly among regions and among clans in Somalia not only because of differential 
exposure to risk but also because of variance in the existence and efficacy of social support 
networks. These helped families subsist despite years of formal unemployment and no 
income (11ansch et al, 1994). As long ago as the early 1980s, FAO data suggested that 
"... about 60% in the rural sector [lived] below a basic needs poverty line and about 40% 
below an absolute minimum food poverty line" (Tyler, 1983: iii). 61 The research showed 
what appeared to be an apparently irreconcilable gap between the estimates of poverty 
60 To highlight the problems experienced in the country, the United Nations Development programme for Somalia 
commissioned a study, I luman Development Report Somalia, October 1998 (UNDP Somalia, 1998). This report attempted to 
gather statistical information that could be used for fund raising activities and programme development. Due to the lack of a 
national government in Somalia, the statistical data contained in the report are generated mostly by the aid agencies. Often, 
there would be some variations in such statistics. Although concerns relating to the reliability of these aggregate statistics 
persist they are extremely indicative of the malaise affecting Somalia and are, thus, useful in that sense. But, these statistics 
do 
hide significant disparities between and within regions, between livelihood groups and between households. In 2001, this 
exercise was repeated and the authenticity of all statistics challenged (UNDP Somalia, 2001ý 
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incidence and the anthropometric data that showed the monitored population to be in 
relatively good health. What could explain this apparent discrepancy? A study of 
resettlement programmes that were undertaken in the wake of the drought of 1973/4 
concluded that at one site, Kurtunwaarey, located on the Lower Shabelle river, "... the 
availability of relatives was stressed as a critical factor in how a family would cope with its 
tasks. The number of relatives who have remained at the scheme determine the extent to 
which a larger socially cohesive kinship group could be created that could better protect its 
members from food supply problems. An individual or small family who had only 
neighbourhood ties or friends to call upon is more vulnerable or less capable of supplying 
adequate labour for farm work or income generation" (Samantar, 1989: 43-44). 
Remittances from the Somali diaspora had been observed to play an important role in 
financing imports and mitigating the hardships of those living in Somalia (Green and Jamal, 
1987; del Buono and Mubarak, 1999; Ali, 1997; Mubarak, 1997; Ahmed, 2000). Previous 
studies had also shown the existence and importance of informal support networks in 
Somalia for internally displaced persons (Hansch et al, 1994), the sharing of labour in 
agricultural communities (Helander, 1996), and the importance of kinship support -in 
Somaliland to mitigate the impact of external shocks to livelihood systems (World Bank, 
1999). The role and mechanisms of these transfers was less clear (at least to those of us 
looking in) and, although their form and relative importance may vary, not unique to 
Somalia. 
A number of studies have highlighted the importance of these informal mechanisms in a 
number of different contexts and countries. These include Simon Harragin's (1998) 
informative study on social vulnerability amongst the Dinka of southern Sudan; traditional 
support networks of Southern Sudan (Fielding et al, 2000); of Soviet and post-Soviet 
Georgia (Dershern and Gzirishvili, 1998); among the Ngorongoro Maasai (Potkanski, 1999); 
livestock restocking in Kenya (ALIN, 1993); food transfers in Malawi (Devereux, 1999); 
Kuran (1995) on zakat, an ancient redistribution system and a distinguishing element or 
characteristic of Islamic economies; Panth (1997) on social networks and their contribution 
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to household food security in rural Karnataka, India, and in the drought affected areas of 
Burkina Faso (Reardon et al, 1988); the role of social networks in the acquisition of seed 
(Longley and Richards, 1998); and in urban poverty alleviation (Richards and Roberts, 
1998). 
Evidence from my own post-distribution monitoring of food aid in Somalia, off-the-record 
comments, and similar experiences in South Sudan and Kenya also suggest that community 
redistribution of food aid resources, based upon the social principles of sharing, leads to 
ration dilution and, consequently, a reduced nutritional impact upon those identified by WFP 
as most needy (Fielding and Tillman, 1999; Shoham, 1999; Narbeth, 1999; CoUttS' 1999). 62 
A number of questions still remained. If these social networks were such an important part 
of' livelihoods and the alleviation of vulnerability, and they functioned as well as the 
literature suggested, why had there been a famine, and why did nutritional data continue to 
suggest that malnutrition rates were alarming in some areas? How do these networks 
function in the midst of chronic conflict and drought? More importantly for our 
understandings of' vulnerability, what are the spatial processes that lead to their 
fragmentation and collapse? 
TableS. 1 Working assumptions 
IIo tot" iI k-ýOL IIL. C, 0. oo(I '; CC III It VM 111SCCLI I It ý St at LIS) IS 1101 110111OL'CI)COLI, \ý 1111111 Fct ween 
regions, districts, villages, and between, and possibly within households. Therefore some regions, districts, and 
villages will be more or less affected by, for example, drought or conflict. Within villages, households and 
individuals have differential access to physical, economic and social resources. Therefore it is possible to 
conduct some form of ranking exercise in the selected village. 
2.1 fouseliolds in low potential production areas (crops or livestock) and of low clan status are the most 
vulnerable to external shock or stress to their livelihood portfolios. Conversely, households from high potential 
production areas and of'high clan status are affected, but are less affected than this first group. 
3. The flow of resources from social networks varies over the year, and between years, depending on the highs 
and lo%vs of production surplus and deficit and other drought or conflict induced factors. 
4.1 lie study methodology can be designed in such a way that these differences can be exposed. 
5. By st . aying in each site for a period of up to a month the 'quality' of the data collected could g-e- 
-improved. 
62 In the context of'refugee canips in Somalia, a report published in 1985 (cited in Waldron, 1988) by WFP/LJNHCR called the 
dificience between planning figures and the actual rations received 'derationing'. 
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From these initial explorations a number of working assumptions (see Table 5.1) took shape. 
These would make my choice of sites in Somalia, and the approach followed within and 
between each site clearer. 
5.2.5 The constraints of place 
Often the researcher has to juggle theoretical and practical objectives against other 
constraints such as finance, time, and, in a conflict environment at least, personal safety and 
health, and restrictions in movement. " What is perhaps less familiar are the constraints of 
kinship, language and seasonality that became such integral components of my research 
methodology. 
"Ifyou hear gunfire get out of there quickly" 
As others before me have discovered (see, for example, Anna Simons (1995) and Frank 
Araujo (1993)) the research process in Somalia does not always go to plan and is subject to a 
number of factors beyond the control of humanitarian agencies, aid practitioners, and 
researchers. Undoubtedly, the most omnipresent of these is (in)security. Self-evidently, war 
and its associated scourges create uncertainty (Benini, 1997) that runs counter to the desire 
for the certainty of information for programming purposes. Often, the utter inaccessibility of 
direct measurement that confronts humanitarian aid workers and researchers in areas of high 
insecurity results in an emphasis on indirect inference and a, perforce, institutional 
acceptance, albeit reluctantly, of the uncertainties that are inherent in this information. This 
does not mean that there should be an acceptance of shoddy research methodologies. It 
should mean that the constraints and limitations of working in such environments are made 
clear in subsequent publications. 
In the uncertain surroundings of Bay and Bakool my ability to roam freely was severely 
hindered. As an employee of WFP I was subject to the same security apparatus that 
63 Prior to leaving for Nairobi in 1999 1 sought the help of a tropical medicine specialist. On this advice 
I was vaccinated 
against hepatitis A and B, rabies, typhoid, meningococcal A and C, polio, yellow fever, diphtheria and tetanus. 
In Nairobi I had 
my blood group verified (AB Rh+) and copies of my travel documents were made and this information was given 
to the office 
administrator. 
64 This was a comment made to me by Edward Kallon, the head of the programming unit of WFP 
Somalia, during my role 
leading a food aid distribution in the middle of Baidoa town soon after the withdrawal ofopposition militia 
in 1999. 
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governed all movements of UN personnel in Somalia. Although it is the reality of, the 
situation in the 'field', rather than the labelling of it from afar that determines the actual 
information gathering practices to be employed the impact of the perceived security situation 
and apparatus that has evolved to protect its staff cannot be overlooked. " This meant that, 
prior to each period of fieldwork in Somalia I sought security clearance from the zonal ý 
security officer and carried with me into the field, in addition to the usual requirements of, 
appropriate clothing, an array of equipment necessary to meet the demands of this security- 
apparatus and my own comfort and that of my translator/field guide: a back-pack short wave 
radio for daily communication with Nairobi; a 'quick-run kit' (a full medical kit including a 
sterile needle set, re-hydration salts, mosquito net and repellent, GPS system, a ceramic; 
water purification filter, and a small supply of food); and a bed roll. Ultimately, these 
concerns over personal security not only contributed to the selection of the sites that I would 
make, but also determined the duration of my stay in each of those chosen. 
"Myself against my hrother; my hrother and I against my cousin; nly cousin and I against ý; 
the outsider" 
In today's Somalia, discussions of clan issues are extremely sensitive and yet are an integral, 
part of the exploration of vulnerability and livelihoods. For nearly a decade the focus Of- 
attention on the conflict in Somalia has been overwhelmingly upon the negative aspects Of, - 
the clan. Whatever its shortcomings and the contribution which it undoubtedly makes and, 
has made to the perpetuation and entrenchment of some of the pernicious effects of the civil 
war, for example, the clan-based factionalism that contributed to the disintegration of the 
state, the clan must be taken into account. 
Few commentators have mentioned, however, the positive aspects of clan affiliation. For the 
majority of the population, especially during the absence of a central government or even 
more localised forms of political administration, it, the clan, in its widest sense, acts as the 
65 At the time of this field research the areas of study were designated as UN Phase Four. The United Nations employs 
five 
specific phases to describe those measures to be implemented based on the prevailing security conditions in a given country or 
parts of a country. Phase Four, programme suspension, is to enable the Designated Official to recommend to the Secretary- 
General, through the United Nations Security Co-ordinator (UNSECOORD), the relocation outside the country of all remaining 
internationally recruited staff members CXCCpt those directly concerned with emergency or humanitarian relief operations or 
security matters. All other internationally recruited staff members who heretofore were considered essential to maintain 
Programme activities will be evacuated at this time. 
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main means of insurance, as an institution of support, and the ultimate guarantor of its 
members security (Helander, 1996). This was particularly the case when Somalia dissolved 
into its traditional segmentary divisions as a consequence of the civil war (Lewis, 1993a). 
However, for Somalis and non-Somalis alike, understanding the intricacies of the clan-based 
political culture and the importance of these agnatic, or patrilineal, kinship relationships is 
the most challenging aspect of the Somali crisis (Stevenson, 1993; Doombos and Markakis, 
1994). For many years in Somalia it was taboo even to mention the names of the Somali 
clans in public (Mansur, 1997). 
The complexity of these relationships is illustrated by Jesse Walker who remarks that Somali 
society is an ever-shifting sea of countervailing forces, some driving people apart, some 
bringing them together - on the one hand a system of lineage segmentation, and on the other 
the unifying forces of the clan elders (Walker, 1995). The trauma of civil war and state 
collapse appears to have accelerated - or forced, depending on the critical lens used - the 
evolution of new identities which were non-existent or submerged decades earlier where 
identity is shaped by a combination of factors, including genealogical lineage, adopted 
lineage, language or dialect, physical traits, citizenship, occupation, and town or region of 
origin (UNDOS, 1998). Everywhere in Somalia, lineage identity is subject to more 
manipulation and greater fluidity due to the disruptions of war. 
Although genealogy is considered the central organising force in Somali society (Lewis, 
1994), it is important to recognise that lineage co-exists with a range of other affiliations - 
professional, regional, factional, and religious - in today's highly fluid political arena. 
Although I. M. Lewis goes as far as to state that there is no significant area of Somali social 
activity where the influence of kinship is absent (Lewis, 1994), this is disputed by some who 
argue that friendship, an extremely important element in Somali society, remains outside and 
goes beyond these confines (Warsame, 200 1). 
Clan identity is itself fluid: lineage links can be realigned, rediscovered, or shifted to 
different levels of ancestry according to the situation. Each level of segmentation defines the 
rights, obligations, and relative standing of households and individuals. Which level of 
lineage is mobilised on this sliding scale of identity depends very much on the circumstances 
(UNDOS, 1998). Here family trees are not quaint historical documents, but rather blueprints 
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for a wide array of political (Lewis, 1995) and resource mobilisation. S. S. Samatar (Samatar, 
1991: 25) describes this fluid social situation by reference to an Arab Bedouin proverb. 
My uterine brother and I against my hat(-brother, 
My brother and I against myfather, 
Myfather's household against my uncle's household, 
Our two households (my uncle's and mine) against the rest ofthe immediate kin, 
71e immediate kin against non-immediate members ofthe clan, 
My clan against other clans, and, 
My nation and I against the world. 
The notion of discord against the father in this sense is not entirely appropriate in Somalia 
and this fluidity is perhaps more adequately described by: "Myself against my brother; my 
brother and I against my cousin; my cousin and I against the outsider" (Lewis, 1992). 
And it is not only the segmentary nature of the clan that gives Somali society and lineage 
politics its fluidity. A range of other practices - including the invocation of maternal clan 
links, the 'recollection' of forgotten lineage ties, and the invention of fictitious genealogical 
links - gives clan leaders ample manoeuvrability to prune and graft onto the family tree 
(UNDOS, 1998). Throughout Somalia, a much lower level of sub-clan lineage has been 
mobilised over the 1990s, reflecting, in southern Somalia, if not elsewhere, the general trend 
toward more localised armed conflict at sub-clan levels. This splintering has rendered both 
intra- and inter-clan relations more complex and nearly impenetrable to outsiders. Sub-clan 
identities rarely invoked in the past have become salient in peace negotiations or the 
parcelling out of jobs and positions (UNDOS, 1998). For example, the brutal treatment of 
the Reewin during the war by other Somali clans in 1991-92 has given rise to a much 
stronger sense of group identity than had ever existed in the past, even though there were 
divisions within and between some Reewin clans during the conflict. 
These points cmphasisc the striking transience of ethnic animosities in Somali political 
culture. The ability of Somali communities to move beyond even the bloodiest clan and 
ethnic connicts to re-forge a, however temporary, alliance in pursuit of a common goal 
underscores the essential pragmatism of Somali political culture -a pragmatism employed 
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with equal measure in relations with external actors. A useful analogy may be that of a tree - 
branches may grow in different directions but they are still part of the same tree. 
Ultimately, the intricacies of kinship (and friendship) outlined above must be considered in 
any research process that aims to delve into resource flows that contribute to or mitigate 
against the effects of conflict and/or drought. 
Field-guides: language, dialects andfilters 
Collecting data requires more than reading, observing, measuring, and recording. It 
inevitably involves conversation. While Sir Richard Francis Burton (1856 [1987]) was 
determined to function as an insider during his ramblings in the field (including East Africa), 
learning the languages of most of the places he visited, I do not possess such aptitude. Inside 
the UN System English is the lingua franca - working in southern Somalia posed another 
problem. While I could at least memorise a smattering of fragments useful to life in a 
village, and while I was able to use the non-verbal cues of facial and bodily expression to 
'feel' the progress of conversation - anger, laughter, boredom, I relied upon others to provide 
translation. These filters bring with them their own set of concerns (Smith, 1996; Gade, 
200 1) and yet they are an often-ignored element (cf. Gill Valentine (200 1) where language is 
not mentioned in the development of a research design) of cross-cultural field research. 
This omission is all the more serious since it cannot be assumed that two languages share the 
same vocabularies, meanings and interpretations. Everyday language can have simple 
correspondence. But translation between differing cultural contexts does not necessarily 
convey 'original' meanings and associations, however well translated. How much the final 
rendering of the transfer may have distorted the original response is difficult to gauge. It 
must be recognised that the interpreter's own perception or private agenda may distort the 
words of either or both the informant(s) and the researcher (Gade, 2001) leading to 
misrepresentation or at worst reinforcing the dominant position of the researcher. 
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The natal tongue of most residents in Bay and Bakool regions is Af Mday. 66 The 
formalisation of the written script of Af Soomaali in 1972, its use as the language of 
administration and education in conjunction with the national literacy campaign launched in 
1974, marginalised the use of this dialect, a sore point among many Reewin. 67 The rural 
population speaks predominantly Af Mday, differing from the more linguistically 
cosmopolitan urban centres, such as Baidoa, where both Af Soomaali and AfMaay may be 
heard. 
According to one report, although written over a decade ago, 80% of all children and adults 
speak AfMaay only (University of Wyoming, 1984a). One estimate places the number of Af 
Mday speakers within Somalia at 500,000 to 1,000,000 (excluding the Dighil dialects)-" 
Although these figures are likely to have changed, they are indicative of the need for an Af 
Mday speaker for undertaking research in these areas. 
As a potential barrier, though it is possible to function at certain levels in the regions using 
only Af Sooinaali, effective and nuanced communication requires that the outsider and/or 
interpreter knows at least some Af Maay if any type of socio-economic, monitoring or 
extension work is to be successfully undertaken. This can lead to problems in the design of 
research questionnaires and thus potential misunderstandings in the field. 
I developed a hybrid strategy that engaged with the subtleties and nuances of this cross- 
cultural linguistic setting by firstly 'grounding' the questionnaires with my Af MaaY 
66 Throughout this thesis Af Maay terminology and spellings are used whenever possible. These may include local 
measurements, and the description ofyears. Many words are the same as those found inAfSoomaali, but pronunciations differ. 
ror example, Af Maay uses no guttural sounds and so the x of Af Maxaafifi is pronounced h, and frequently single vowels are 
elongated in the Af Many version of an Af Maxaatiri term. As there is no, as yet, written script for AfMany, wherever possible 
uniformity of spelling is sought but the phonetic pronunciation is thus more important than the written word where spellings 
differ. 
67 There is some debate, however, within the Reewin communities, whether this should be called Af(literallY mouth) Reewin or 
AfAltury. There is debate also as to whether it is a dialect or a distinct language. AfMany is different from, 4f Soomaali (or the 
less commonly used term Af Maxattfirt), spoken by the majority of non-Reewin north of the Shabelle river though there are 
undoubtedly occasions when individuals have demanded that Af Maay should be spoken more as a reflection of Political 
standpoint - to highlight difference - rather than because of any linguistic interests. This thesis, for consistency, will use 
Af 
Alany and Af Sooinnall. 
61 See. Ethnologue: languages of the world at httP: //-. sil. org/ethnologue/countries/Soma. htmi 
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speaking male translator/field-guide prior to visiting the field and then 'regrounding' these 
with the communities at each site before commencing more detailed discussions. For 
example, did the lexicon of humanitarian assistance and development, such as the socio- 
economic labels (poor, wealthy, well-being, ill-being, vulnerability and vulnerable), disaster 
terminology (conflict, drought, coping strategy), and the unitary economic structures of 
intervention (household and community) that so often accompanies such aid have direct and 
transferable referents into Somali? I also sought local clarification of area measurements that 
vary from region to region. 
Without the presence of a field-guide this work would not have been possible. While 
language skills are important, there are a number of other factors to consider. A suitably 
selected guide can help break down the barriers between 'outsider' and 'insider' by 
providing local insight: for example, introducing key informants unknown to the research 
team, or a village or town worthy of a visit. But one poorly chosen can exacerbate this 
tension. Clan status, as described in the previous section, is highly politicised. Field guides 
(and Somali national staff of humanitarian agencies) can face tremendous pressure to favour 
their own clan - misinterpretation, the distortion of information, and the favouring of one 
interviewee over another are all too easy. A guide from the wrong clan may be even rejected 
altogether in a research setting of a rival clan group. 
Gender, too, can add its own problems. In the patrilineal, patriarchal society of Somalia a 
female field guide may not have the same degree of access to clan elders (who are without 
exception male). It may be frowned upon for a male researcher and a female guide to share 
the same lodgings. And a team of males may not achieve the same degree of access to 
female interviewees and women's groups as an all female team. Lastly, and it may sound 
obvious, trust between all parties is essential and this takes time to establish. 
The rhythms of livelihood 
A number of features of the physical environment and the geography of the inter-riverine 
regions influence the material culture, social structures, and economic activities of the 
communities living there. This fertile landmass, of which the regions of Bay and Bakool are 
part, stretches between the Shabelle river in the north, the Jubba river in the south, the 
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Ethiopian border in the west and the Indian ocean in the east (see Figure 1.1)ý" Both rivers, 
emanate from Ethiopia having their headwaters in the highland of the Hararghe province of 
Ethiopia, with this catchment area accounting for 90% of the flow of both rivers - local 
rainfall is relatively inconsequential to river levels. 
The Shabelle enters Somalia near Belet Weyne and meanders about 640 kilometres before 
terminating in a swamp, about 30 kilometres from the Indian Ocean. The monthly flow of 
the Shabelle ranges from a low in January and February to a high in September and October. 
The flow of the Jubba River is, on an annual basis, three times that of the Shabelle and 
exhibits similar flow patterns. Twice a year, in April and October, the river crests in' 
conjunction with rainy seasons in Ethiopia. According to Craven et al (1989) serious 
flooding, on a level which causes economic damage, appears to occur roughly once every 
five years. Such major floods have been recently recorded in the years 1977,1981,1985, - - 
1987,1993, and 1997-8.71 
Two main rainy seasons (the larger of the two, or gu, lasting from April to June and the, - 
shorter, more unreliable, the deyr, from October to December) and a long dry season (or 
jilaal) from December to April set the pace of productive and commercial life and to a 
large 
extent livelihood activities are conditioned by these climatic characteristics. " 
Mobility and flexibility are essential features of the inter-riverine regions. Livelihood 
strategies have evolved to make good use of meagre range resources and to minimise risk in 
order to maintain the solidarity of the household. Along with the ability to store surplus 
grain (see Figure 5.1), which provides for a quasi-sedentary lifestyle, the reliance on stored 
water and the adjustment of labour to accommodate livestock keeping along with crop 
69 Bay region, covering an area of 41,000 square kilometres, lies between Lower Shabelle, Gedo, Bakool and Hiran regions. It 
consists of five districts: Baidoa, Burhakaba, Dinsor, Bardale and Qansadhcre. Bakool region, an area of 26,000 square 
kilomcires. has five districts: I luddur, Wajid, Tayeglow, El Berde and Rabdure. It is bordered on the east by l4iran region. on 
the north by Ethiopia, on the west by Gedo region, and on the south by Bay region. 
70 Other minor floods occur almost every season due to the lack of riverbank maintenance. 
71 Mined by the annual movement of the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). 
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production give the socio-economic organisation of Bay and Bakool a complexity much 
greater than might be at first supposed. 
This productive diversity encompasses a broad range of household strategies between pure 
pastoralism and almost pure farming. At one end of the spectrum, it can include the keeping 
of a small number of milk animals by farming households. At the other are those relying 
mainly on livestock who keep, depending on their wealth status, camels, sheep, goats, and in 
some areas cattle. 
The most common form of livelihood in Bay and Bakool, however, falls between the two, 
and involves households living in fixed homes, in established villages, with investments in 
both a regularly fanned plot of land and herds of animals gazing at varying distances from 
the village. 2 The location of the animals at any given moment depends upon the availability 
of grazing, which in turn depends upon seasonal rainfall. 
The mix of livestock takes advantage of variations among species in tolerance to drought, 
makes fuller use of available vegetation and at the same time caters for different needs of the 
family for milk and meat, transport, income and investment (Khazanov, 1994; Samantar, 
1989). " During periods of drought this diversified production serves as flexible risk- 
management where livestock acts as a fallback income source and food supply (Unruh, 
1995). 
72 According to the FSAU there are two main food economy groups (FEG) in Day and Bakool region: High Potentail: 
Sorghum, Cattle and Camels, and Agro-pastoral: Cattle, Camels and Sorghum. The High Potential: Sorghum, Cattle 
and Camels FEG is found mainly in Bay region around Baidoa, Burhakaba and Qansadhere, and makes up about 50-60% of 
the population. It is also found in Bakool region between Wajid and Rabdhure (Madhayte and Mooragaabey) and south of 
Tiyeglow. This FEG is more dependent on crops than livestock. Agro-pastoral: Cattle, Camels and Sorghum is a marginal 
agricultural FEG, where livestock is more important than crops for most households. This FEG makes up nearly 600/9 of the 
population in Bakool and 25% in Bay. The proportion of the population in the urban food economy group (that is, not 
involved in crop or livestock production) is less than 2% of the population and is predominantly in Baidoa town. There is also a 
small sub-group ofhunters who also make up less than 2% ofthe population. 
73 Often, the presence or absence of cattle in a particular area depends upon the prevalence of the Tsetse fly. The areas 
adjoining the rivers are particularly prone to this pest and thus cattle are less likely to be kept in these areas for long periods. 
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Figure 5.1 Underground storage pits (sing. bakaar) are used for the storage of grains, predommantly 
sorghum, and are built in various sizes and have differing names depending upon their method of 
construction: to store Lip to 15-20 quintal (sing. subud), or even 15 gadiid (sing. go(o, where one 
gadiid is approximately ten 50kg bags of panicles. Temporary grain stores (sing. abna), basically 
earth covering a pile of particles above ground, vary in size but once opened the grain is consumed, or 
moved, at once. The construction of a god involves digging a round pit, one to two merres deep, into 
which one or more central poles will be placed - the number depending on the span of the roof and 
thus volume of the store. A roof is then constructed, similar to that found in a mundid, a small door in 
the roofmadc to allow periodic access to the grain, and then branches and earth piled on top. Before 
scaling a fire is lit inside the store, and periodically thereafter during annual maintenance, to rid the 
storage pit ofpcsts and diseases. Thom bushes may be piled upon the mound to discourage livestock 
from trampling over tile area. These grain stores are found predominantly within the maalad of the 
farming household. Yet, in high potential sorghum producing areas, such as the Oflawe (Qasadhere 
district), a collection of stores may be found within a livestock proof compound situated within the 
farm area, away from the settlements. Several households may store their grain in the same compound 
in this way (Source, Author, Gaduuda Dhunti, December 2000). 
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Somalia is prone to erratic rainfall and cyclical drought. Rainfall is lower or more irregular 
and unevenly distributed than in any other area of sub-Saharan Africa outside the Kalahari. 
The, predominantly, bimodal rainfall pattern only just manages to fulfil the requirements for 
rainfed cropping (Conze and Labahn, 1986). As the duration and also the actual rainfall 
amounts vary considerably there are high risks in agricultural production and crop failures or 
reduced yield levels occur at periodic intervals. These uncertainties are also just as 
pronounced for pastoralists as they are for farmers. As a rule of thumb, one in every five 
harvests will be a partial failure and one in ten a complete write-off (Conze and Labahn, 
1986). Indeed, in one survey farmers expected two good crops, one poor crop, and two years 
with no crop in an average five-year period (Wisner, 1994). In a 100 year period Wisner 
(1994) has noted that droughts have occurred somewhere in Somali territory in 1910-1912, 
1914,1918,1921-1922,1925,1927-1928,1931-1934,1938,1943-1944,1950-1952,1955, 
1959,1963-1965,1968-1969,1973-1974,1978,1984-1985,1990-1991. However, most 
droughts are confined to specific regions or last only one season and their severity varies 
enon-nous]Y. Exceptions are the drought of 1973/4 that covered most regions of Somalia, that 
was part of a more widespread drought affecting the Horn of Africa, and extended over 
several cropping seasons. 74 
Rains are often localised, particularly in the deyr season. Areas only a few kilometres apart 
may receive vastly different amounts of rainfall in a given month, season or year. In many 
seasons it is usual for one part of a region to experience above-average rainfall while another 
part is in severe drought. The same may occur even within villages, where some farms 
benefit form the rains and others do not. In Baidoa, the risk of a total dei, r season failure due 
to inadequate rainfall is twice as high as for the gu season (Eagleton, 1990). In some years, 
particularly in the more southerly coastal areas of the inter-riverine areas, hagai rains may 
appear (July - September), while the period between January and March, filual, is dry. 
These cycles trigger movement of livestock away from agn cultural areas during planting to 
pasture areas. The dry seasons cause a reversal of pastoral migration back towards river 
valleys, where water and grazing is more available. During the harvest periods livestock can 
be found once again in the vicinity of the settlements, grazing on sorghum stalks or other 
74 During the drought between the years of 1973 and 1975 an estimated 301/o ofthe total Somali livestock herd died 
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crop residue (baldaag, meaning literally 'grazing on stalks'). These seasonal cycles are 
important factors in the price and availability of food in the market and household and 
govern migration for employment that has been such a common feature of southern Somalia 
in the last decade. In the dry season, when herders have moved livestock close to the river or 
where water can be found all year round, milk and meat is more expensive in the areas 
further from these seasonal grazing areas. Prior to harvests, agricultural villages are more 
prone to a 'hungry season' when food reserves may be depleted, and the prices of 
commodities higher. "' It is usually during this lean period that malnutrition rates are at their- 
peak. 76 
Commerce also follows seasonal rhythms. Because the regions are served by a deteriorating 
network of paved roads, and supplemented by little more than compacted dirt tracks, the 
onset of rains slows or stops commercial traffic for considerable periods. Most commercial 
activity is based on transit traffic from 'natural' or beach ports along the Benadir coast that 
arc unable to off-load cargoes during the monsoon seasons. 77 This slows commercial 
activity, and thus the availability and price of food and other commodities on the market. 
Similarly, the transportation of food aid commodities to the coastal ports and from these 
ports to the interior is also affected. Lastly, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and the 
annual hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, create enormous demand for livestock consumption in - 
the Arabian Peninsula, driving prices up and serving as the most important selling seasons 
for the holders of livestock. 
The seasonality of livelihoods pervades all analyses of food security from discussions of 
&normality' upon which needs assessments are based, food security monitoring activities to 
the provision of food aid. Yet this seasonality over a full productive cycle and preferably the 
highs and lows of surplus and deficit over a number of years, and its impact upon social 
networks at a local level, is so poorly understood. It is precisely this type of comprehensive 
time series data or 'View from a tent' that is so difficult to gather in an uncertain conflict 
environment. If the working assumption (see Table 5.1) that this seasonality also determined 
73 Prices for grain tend to fall following the harvests. 
76 Rerer to the Nutfltion Updates that are available directly from the FSAU in Nairobi or from the UN Somali2 wcbs'te 
(http: //www. unsomalia. org). 
" The Mogadishu port has been closed since 1995, and regional trade out ofthe Kismayo port has been limited bY conflicts. 
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the flow of people and things was correct, these transitory phenomena (Malkki, 1997) had to 
be included in the research methodology in some way. 
5.2.6 The vulnerability of place - the sites 
Two village sites, Garsaley in Hudur district (Bakool region) and Gaduuda Dhunti in 
Qansadhere district (Bay) were identified as being potentially suitable for conducting 
studies. I had also intended to conduct a further village study south of Buurhakaba (Bay 
region). This was cancelled upon our arrival in the region due to the uncertainty surrounding 
the presence of large numbers of militia that were moving towards the inter-factional 
frontline south east of the town. Instead I decided to stay in Baidoa (in the compound of 
VVTP Somalia) to make use of the family contacts of my translator/fieldguide to explore the 
connections between urban and rural settings. Whenever possible interviews were conducted 
in Baidoa town, and in the surrounding district, with senior clan figures and intellectuals and 
these meetings used to highlight traditional social support mechanisms and the role of 
religion in these processes, kinship structures, regional history, and to try to touch upon the 
existence or otherwise of 'minorities' within the Reewin. 
These two village sites were considered exemplars of extremely vulnerable agropastoral 
communities, both having recent histories of localised gu and deyr rain failure, very poor 
crop production and livestock deaths that had exacerbated the problems of a decade of 
confliCt. 78 In principle at least these two villages would exhibit the movements of people and 
resources that I was trying to describe. From the Madayta (a predominantly agricultural 
area), of which Garsaley was part, there were, in fact, rumours already of population out- 
migration into the southern parts of neighbouring Ethiopia. A local proverb was also 
intriguing: "Madayta U Moraqabey nankii malqaba ya degee", "One who has wealth lives in 
these two regions". Moraqabey being a predominantly pastoral area. 
Both sites also satisfied the criteria of the security apparatus in Nairobi, were reasonably 
accessible, "' and were considered of a size that would enable us to quickly establish a 'feel' 
for the place and a build a rapport with the community: too large a site and population and a 
78 These three sites were visited between the months of July and December 2000 -just prior to the 2000 deyr rains and after 
the extremely patchy gu rains. 
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social and economic picture of the settlement would be difficult to construct, too small and 
the site may not contain enough opportunities for conducting group or household interviews. 
Gaining access to these communities was more than just a practical problem (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1983; May, 1997; Freeman, 2000). It was not just a case of an acquisition of 
consent, of getting in and getting on. To satisfy my research purposes and my own chosen 
stance of the overt ethnographer I pursued a transparent and inclusive approach to the 
negotiation and selection of all the field research sites. In recognition of the fact that the 
authority structures at various levels wished to maintain some control over what takes place 
in their communities a 'chain of approval' was sought where, upon arrival in the region of 
study meetings were established with both regional and district administrations - usually the 
Governor and District Commissioner. During these exploratory talks the purpose of the 
research was explained, my status with WFP made clear, the ethics of research discussed, " 
and a request made for permission to visit and stay in a village within a particular district 
under their administration. The risk of incurring the suspicion and displeasure of the 
community leaders was thus avoided or minimised. The positive aspect of these discussions 
was that the administration facilitated the study (for example, by providing letters of 
introduction or by sending an envoy to facilitate access) and acted as guarantors of our 
security. Perhaps reflecting the pervasive cynicism in Nairobi that seemed to surround all 
dealings with communities in Somalia, I had to consider that their choice of village would be 
made for political (clan), or resource reasons. Therefore, a provisional selection of the 
approximate research site(s) was made in Nairobi prior to these negotiations. A similar 
format was then followed at each of the villages in 'under the tree' meetings with the village 
authorities ('governmental' figures and traditional clan elders). 
I took note of Barakat and Ellis' (1996) request that in situations where the local population 
is in difficulty and resources are limited, the researcher should not add an extra burden. 
Although there is generally a positive attitude towards strangers and concomitant hospitality 
in Somalia, I felt that this should not be 'stretched' or abused to provide for MY 
79 See Booth (1995) on the 'tarmac bias' of some participatory research. 
so Issues such as confidentiality, the methods (whether overt or covert) of recording data, and the end use of the research. 
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translator/fieldguide and myself for periods of up to a month. " In an effort not to 'distort' 
the local economy and create a precedent for future researchers or aidworkers a sum of 
Somali Shillings (SShs) 10,000 per day per person was agreed with regional, district and 
village authorities to cover the expenses of accommodation (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3), locally 
available food and the provision of water. " 
Although I expected that there would be never any shortage of people to interview, in their 
homes, working on their farms, or at local markets, there are opportunity costs involved in 
participating in interview sessions. Tberefore to minimise disturbances to those in the 
community the multiple roles and daily work burden of men and women were established - 
water collection, herding, agricultural work (including field preparation, planting and 
weeding), morning and afternoon prayers, meal times, and child-minding - and the 
schedules for group and household interviews subsequently arranged to accommodate these 
daily activities and routines. 
Working inwards: the bricolage ofplace 
It soon became obvious that doing qualitative research in these sites was not going to be a 
neat and tidy enterprise. There is, after all, simply no formula, scientific or otherwise, to 
follow to achieve the best results (Shaffir, 1999; Kincheloe, 2001). As Karen Ross (2001: 
156) suggests the "... research path often takes on a more meandering quality as it 
progresses, veering off along intriguing tributaries, going down and then back up blind 
alleys, criss-crossing divergent streams... " on its way from research concept to completed 
project. A predetermined research plan, however elaborate, also makes little or no room for 
the role that serendipity plays in the success of fieldwork: key informants met purely by 
chance and spontaneous decisions that help shape the future direction of the research 
process. These meanderings are hardly surprising given that the primary research too] is the 
fallible human being. More importantly it is the inability to anticipate every eventuality in 
research with human subjects (Tuan, 2001) that make it an inherently creative endeavour. 
81 Our local driver and two 'security guards' that accompanied the vehicle made their own an"angements. 
82 At the time of undertaking the fieldwork, the approximate exchange rate was US$I - SShsl 0.000. 
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Figures 5.2 and 5.3 At home in Garsaley with my field guide Abass (Source, Author, 2000) 
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What surely is more important is the motivation behind the study, the ethical stance that 
informs the design, the ideology and theoretical frames which determine the focus. For me 
this is a commitment to study an issue at hand by understanding it from the perspective(s) of 
people whose lives are tied up with or affected by it. While listening to the voices of the 
powerful and the resource rich (in relative ten-ns) I would strive also to listen to the multiple 
voices of the postmodem subaltern and the resource poor (see Chapter 2). It is only through 
listening to these voices that the multiple spaces of vulnerability come alive. And it is only 
through listening to these voices of place that the processes and meanings of social space are 
brought to the fore (Herbert, 2000). 
Many of the variables to be examined when confronting the issues of access to food 
resources, such as vulnerability, poverty, and exclusion are strongly influenced by cultural 
perceptions and the social geographies of place. Furthermore, the complex and dynamic 
interdependencies are difficult or impossible to measure completely objectively. I feel that 
there is no one single methodology that will, alone, reflect the exigencies of undertaking 
research in the uncertain environment of southern Somalia. Therefore an approach built 
upon the multiple methodologies of the qualitative bricoleur (Levi-Strauss, 1966; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998; Kincheloe, 2001; Lincoln, 2001) and the composite approaches of the 
development practitioner (Chambers, 1983; Dudley, 1993) was chosen. In doing so I could 
be sensitive to this complexity and the social processes underlying it and get a little closer to 
seeing through the eyes of others. In effect I would try to get closer to the lived and 
perceived spaces of the vulnerable to uncover the social geometry of the multiple scales and 
networks within and between sites (see Chapter 3). At the same time, I wanted to uncover 
new insights, test, expand and modify old principles, and re-examine accepted 
interpretations in unanticipated contexts. I also hoped that the multiple and overlapping 
methods of this bricolage of place could be used to build rigorous explanations and another 
means to cross check findings (Kincheloe, 200 1). 
If the assumption of resource hierarchy in the community was correct and in recognition that 
the site as place is already tied to the outside world by a myriad of actual or transient 
networks (Chapter 3) 1 could, by following people and things, locate these connections 
within and between households, and within and between communities. 
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A series of visual and diagrammatic tools (see Table 5.2), that evolved to meet the 
challenges of rural development practitioners (see, Chambers, 1994), in addition to the more 
usual question and response approach of semi-structured questionnaires were used to 
encourage group participation to unravel the social and resource heterogeneities and 
hierarchies of place and to establish the existence and mechanisms of communal resource 
ownership or management (for example, water and livestock) (see Appendix 2). 8' 
Time line data highlighted the main events (drought, disease, and the impact of conflict) that 
were used subsequently to discuss seasonality and 'normal' and 'abnormal' migration 
patterns, and the differential impact within the community of these factors. Despite my 
initial misgivings about raising sensitive issues relating to culture and kinship I found that 
there was little that could not be discussed. 
But such participatory group methods are not without their problems and their critics (Booth, 
1995, Campbell, 2002). As Frey and Fontana observe, "group responses can be affected by 
the size ofthe group, by the group members view of the purpose of the interview, and by the 
differences in the background of the members" (1991: 185). The whole process is fraught 
with problems including participants who feel under pressure to conform to peers or more 
dominant individuals that reinforces existing social or political hierarchies, a stifling of 
discussion, interpersonal conflict, posturing and even the total or partial absence of some 
voices in the community. On one occasion during a social mapping exercise in Garsaley 
instead of' the now familiar (unprompted) ranking according to the number of farms Or 
livestock owned one member of the group divided the community by colour - people of 
light, medium, or dark skin colour. While this was met with a great deal of derision by the 
rest of' the group this unexpected response cast new insights onto community stratification 
that went beyond economic measures alone. 
It In the ranking exercises, a PRA tool called proportional piling was used. A volunteer from the interview 9-1113 
divide a pile of beans or small stones (100 is a useful number) to represent the whole community into the variot 
wealth grouping%. Agreement is sought from other members of the group until a consensus is reached. 
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Table 5.2 The visual and diagrammatic tool s of the development practitioner 0 
Social Imippim-, Villagers conduct a rapid population census and provide a 
breakdown of the population by certain characteristics, for 
example, female-headed households 
Seasonal diagrams These may be used in many diflerent ways, for example. to 
show food availability on a monthly or seasonal basis. to show 
labour requirements and the labour expenditure of' different 
members of the household throughout the year 
Time line data Help to explain events in the village or household in 
chronological order, listing major remembered events in the 
village or household with approximate dates 
Community or village mapping Villagers represent, for example. their community. village, or 
compound pictorially, using the ground (a stick in the dust) or 
paper. This may help the researchers differentiate between 
these different levels of interaction 
Well being and wealth group ranking These have a range of potential applications. In this case it is 
used to identify groups or rankings of households according to 
locally defined criteria. This is used to identify different 
livelihood groups within the village, including those considered 
poorest or worst off 
Analysis of difference Especially by, in this case, social group, and wealth 
Matrix ranking and scoring Used to comparc, for example, the relative importance of 
various 'institutions' for the procurement of food 
The use of groups of various kinds whether deliberately or informally structured using local people 
However, not surprisingly, and common to other research processes (see Warsame, 2000), 
one voice that remains largely marginalised in the deeply rooted traditional socio-cultural 
structures of a patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal society is that of women. This 
marginalisation presents a formidable barrier to women's involvement in such participatory 
group (or indeed household) discursive practices. Although women were encouraged to 
participate in 'under-the-tree' group discussions which varied in size from six to 15 people, 
and although women and children were often present at these meetings, very few took an 
active part often remaining on the fringes of the group. Therefore, separate meetings were 
arranged in a location chosen by the women to listen to their problems and concerns, and 
their changing roles in the household and community. 
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At times I felt that certain discussion themes - such as the deplorable state of local roads, 
lack of education and health facilities, or population estimates - were being developed at 
least partly for effect. "' That is, despite their disclaimers, and our best efforts during the 
initial discussions with regional, district and village representatives to reduce the expectation 
of assistance in the future, we were being, through our affiliation with a resource driven 
organisation, addressed as potential benefactors. This illustrates clearly one of the 
difficulties between the processes of research and the provision of humanitarian or 
development assistance and ultimately my position in the divide between 'outsider' and 
'insider'. 
Similarly, there are obvious repercussions for the validity of a study of this nature if these 
expectations are not diminished or, preferably, eliminated. The 'View from a tent' of the 
traditional 'thick' ethnographies should go a long way to reduce these expectations but this 
approach is not an amenable option in situations of conflict. While I could conduct 'covert' 
ethnographies, a moral dilemma that I was not comfortable with (Fine, 1994; Scheper- 
Hughes, 1995), another, preferable, solution is to clarify the status of the researcher at the 
outset and in any subsequent publications. 
Individual interviews with community members, as distinct from 'key informants', were set 
up as far as possible on the basis of the group ranking exercises which firstly indicated the 
nature and extent of stratification in the community, and secondly allowed me to place the 
respondent on this community hierarchy. Thus a representative household, rather than a 
randomly selected informant, from each category became the site of further more detailed 
questioning (see Appendix 3). This provided not just an opportunity to gather information by 
asking questions and engaging in conversation, but also an opportunity for, further 
participant observation (Oberhauser, 1997; Elwood and Martin, 2000). By observing 
artcfacts or interactions with other people I could situate a participant with respect to other 
actors and within a particular place and generate richer and more detailed information than 
could bc gleaned from the interview content alone. Personal histories further reinforced 
54 Clan numbcrs or strcngth are highly political. The manipulation of these statistics, at household, village, or clan level by 
communities in Somalia is not new. See, for example, Waldron, (1988). 
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those of the community through the immediacy of their telling (see, Chapter 6, Box 6.3 
Ibrahim). 
The relatively 'open' methods used in earlier group approaches were supplemented with 
more structured (closed) questions to gather information about the present and pre-war social 
structure of the family, as well as ownership or access to the resources of agricultural or 
livestock production, and water and labour availability. The head of the household (whether 
male or female) was then asked to develop a social network and resource chart for the 
household. " In so doing this profile revealed a pattern of extended kinship (or friendship) 
ties that included wives, children, other family members or guests living in the compound, 
and the wives and children (possibly of divorce) who had moved away from the household 
compound, maybe even outside the village, district or region or outside of the country. It 
also revealed their role in helping to maintain these connections. Knowing where family 
members and friends are living and their roles can indicate the geographic range of social 
resource networks that may exist among people, through birth, marriage or acquaintance, 
and show a past migratory pattern for people of a village or area. Knowledge of these 
interactions emphasises the importance, seasonality and type of resource transfers and 
captures the network connections within and between households, wherever those 
households may be. These transfers may be the receipt or donation of zakat, remittances, 
food aid, or the sharing of household labour with others in the community. This 
interrogation of social networks helps trace the connections and flows of interdependency 
within and between places and the relative positioning of the household on the hierarchies of 
resource flow. Furthermore, these resource connections highlight a range of livelihood 
resources that a household may call upon in times of need that go beyond the economic 
measures of production and employment of the rigidly bounded household unit. 
By knowing where family members are living and by following these networks and routes of 
migration we can work outwards once more. Further interviews were subsequently 
undertaken within the Reewin displaced populations of both flargeisa (Somaliland) and 
Bosasso (Puntland) in the northwest and northeast of Somalia (see Appendix 4). These 
stories also supported the rumours of out-migration from northern Bakool. Unusually large 
35 If the head of the household was male, his wife (or wives) was also encouraged to be part of the process. 
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numbers of people, including many from Garsaley, were drawn to the large international 
relief programme in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Although we were unable to follow this 
connection directly due to security concerns in the region, reports coming from WFP 
Ethiopia confirmed that this was indeed occurring (WFP Ethiopia, 2000). 
When interviews were not possible, we visited farms to observe and participate in seasonal 
(land preparation, planting and weeding) and off-farm activities (for example, water 
collection, post-harvest processing, livestock management, and hut construction). In- 
Gaduuda Dhunti we even acted as informal teachers of English during our stay. People 
would often visit us at night, intrigued by the 'gaal'in their midSt, 16 to socialise, to discuss 
particular issues they felt had not been addressed fully during the day, or to listen to the 
latest world events from the BBC Somalia news service on my shortwave radio. 
Such activities form the basis of reciprocity, deepening the relations with individuals and the 
communities in general (Longley, 2000). In addition, valuable insights can arise from direct 
and participant observation, casual conversations and unexpected events as often as from 
more formal data collection methodologies. These were recorded 'after the event' as much 
as possible - it was felt that the presence of more formal data recording during these periods 
would hinder the information gathering process and reinstall the barriers I was working so 
hard to break down. These insights would often form the theme of a more formal discussion 
that evening or the following day and provide an opportunity for reflection on the continued 
relevance of the information gathered to the original objectives of study. 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The organic multi-site ethnographies that I develop to explore the spaces of vulnerability 
establish that by recovering the site as place in the sense that Massey, Burawoy and others 
have suggested we can work inwards and outwards from multiple sites to discern the truly 
fluid and heterogeneous identity of place. This is in contrast to the rather static 
cthnographics that in the past have characterised apparently bounded and unconnected sites. , 
86 Gaal has two connotations - someone who is a non-Muslim (or infadel) or simply it is often used to signify white person. 
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By following people and things and by attempting to bridge the perceived and conceived 
spaces of the vulnerable multi-site organic ethnographics overcome (or at least reduce) 
socio-spatial distance. And by uncovering the connections of site as place they bring the 
multiple spaces of vulnerability and the full range of resources, including those from social 
networks, into view. For research that starts with the primary aim of looking at food (see 
Chapter 1) this inclusion widens and introduces further complexity to the analysis of 
vulnerability. At the same time the spatial texts that charactcrise the delivery of humanitarian 
and development assistance are questioned. 
Rather than abandoning the rigours; of the research process this was no aimless wandering 
but a carefully constructed research process that had to contend with the uncertainties of the 
unfamiliar culture and conflict environment of southern Somalia. In recognising that 
research can no longer be regarded as an unproblematic, objective, value-free enterprise 
where information is neutrally collected, interpreted and textualised I accept my position in 
this process. While I recognise that the multiple and eclectic research methodologies of 
'doing vulnerability' which in turn are founded upon my personal political and ethical 
position, privileged situational knowledges and aptitudes are not replicable I do hope that the 
processes are transparent. Clearly, while I appreciated the need for methodological 
flexibility prior to leaving for the 'field' I had not fully anticipated the time and difficulty 
involved in conducting research of this nature in southern Somalia. However, 
methodologically rigorous data collection can be undertaken in situations of chronic political 
instability but in my case this was conditioned by a number of constraints - my changing 
position as insider/outsider, a lack of existing information on the area of study, language 
filters, the security situation, kinship, and the rhythms of livelihood. These constraints 
ultimately determined the level of participation and interaction with the host community and 
therefore the information gathered. What should become obvious is that this assemblage of 




CHAPTER 6 THE EXTENDED NETWORKS OF PLACE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have questioned the humanitarian discourse of vulnerability, particularly 
the vulnerability of place and the artificial and abstract construction of the social spaces of 
livelihoods. 
The theoretical explorations of Chapter 3 suggest that there is considerable insight to be 
gained from a more grounded view of livelihoods and vulnerability that begins with place, 
but which in turn nestles within much broader structures and forces. By drawing upon my 
own observations and experiences of place, and in some instances upon existing literatures 
to unravel those elements that remained largely out of view (see Chapter 3), this chapter 
builds upon these foundations to uncover and describe the multiple networks of the Reewin. 
By listening to the hidden voices and the perceived spaces of the vulnerable the spaces of 
disaster are invigorated. These spaces can be viewed no longer as two-dimensional, 
disconnected from the social world outside. 
Caught in the rhetoric of globalisation it would be easy to assume that it is a recent 
phenomenon. Somalia has long been caught up in webs of relationships with regional and 
global reach (see, for example, Little, 2000; and Marchal et at, 2ooo). The global 
entanglements in which Somali livelihoods are enmeshed are, and have long been, multi- 
stranded. The ancient Egyptians imported frankincense from Somalia. It was known to 
Rome as the Regio Aromatifera or Regio Cinnarnornifera. It was a centre for trade by the 
Phoenicians, Greeks, Indians and other East Asians. Its coastal areas were visited by Turks 
and Portuguese. Islam is thought to have been introduced on the coast at least as early as the 
tenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century the area was partitioned between the 
European colonial powers, Britain, France and Italy, as well as Ethiopia. 
In many ways the civil war has added another dimension to the complexity of Our 
understanding. While the problems of Somalia are all too evident, the "... shadow 
networks... " (Nordstrom, 2000) of transborder trade and the cultural and political flows Of 
migrants and uprooted and dispossessed peoples have expanded across war and peace and 
transnational spaces. The livelihoods of individuals and households, sustained by a variety 
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of activities and income sources, have become increasingly globalised. In some instances 
these networks that connect the Somali diaspora and those remaining behind are basic to 
survival. Other networks also contribute to the linkages between Somalia and the world 
outside: such as those of the humanitarian community (see Chapter 7). 
Today on the global stage Somalia represents the umbral land of non-states and failed 
international diplomacy. Beyond market relationships, the webs linking Somali places and 
the wider world pass through multiple trade networks, Post-Cold War geopolitics and 
foreign aid, migrant streams, religion, global media and satellite telecommunications, 
international financial flows, alleged terrorist networks and more. These networks have long 
challenged and continue to challenge the fiction of the impermeable borders of state 
machinery, including conventional ideas about economy and governance, and the bounded 
spaces of humanitarian policy and practice. 
This chapter endeavours to unravel the striking diversity and interconncctedness of networks 
that link people to places and people to things that emerges from my fieldwork. In seeking a 
simplifying clarity for the purposes of illustration I may lose some of the subtler shades of 
local variation but general themes emerge. I describe the importance of place to the agro- 
pastoral Reewin and then work inwards and outwards to fashion a picture of the networks of 
place. While these informal networks are certainly not unique to Somalia (see Chapter 5) 
their importance is magnified by the lack of state structures and the particular confluence of 
culture, economy, politics, and disaster that have shaped what is Somalia today. 
In the process I attempt to depict the problematic notions of community and household that 
colour the policies and practices of the World Food Programme and their embeddedness in 
wider networks of religion, kinship and friendship. This last factor is all too easy to overlook 
in that it lacks the more structured processes of resource transfer found in the first two. In a 
country where 99% of the population are Sunni Muslim religion is rarely far from view (see, 
Qur'an boards, Figure 6.1). Not surprisingly, however, the segmentary lineage structure of 
the patriarchal society strongly influences the content and character of its practice. While the 
clan and political structures of the Reewin have been contextualised elsewhere, notably by 
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Bernard Helander (Helander, 1986; Helander, 1996), " the interaction and actual mechanisms 
of social networks and their importance in the analysis of vulnerability and livelihoods have 
not. Previously published work is used (and referenced) in this chapter to provide supporting 
evidence or to provide a point of departure. Elsewhere analysis is drawn directly from MY 
observations and empirical data. . 
Leaving aside the considerable contestation that exists about its theory and application (see 
Chapter 3), many authors hold that conflict destroys social capital, particularly elements 
Such as the bonds of trust within communities, relations of reciprocity, shared social norms 
and rules, and social networks (Schafer, 2001b). A recent report on the current drought and 
I ood crisis in Swaziland suggests that traditional values are being eroded as extreme hunger 
is florcing people to steal food from their neighbours developing a 'me first' mentality 
instead ofhelping each other (IRIN, 19 June 2002). " 
Yet this is simplistic as new opportunities arise and resource networks are refigured. 
'9 
Consequently, any such description of traditional social networks would be incomplete 
without an analysis of the factors that govern their importance and help determine their form 
(le Sage, 5 March 2001. Personal communication). Rather than an analysis based solely on 
descriptions ofthe nature or existence of resource networks and their mechanisms divorced 
from the wider context, I develop an understanding in this chapter of the interactions 
between them and underlying social, economic and political conditions. And instead of 
looking solely for evidence of their disintegration I describe the more positive aspects of 
network response and adaptation. This involves attention being paid to the macro level 
processes that were described in Chapter 4, as well as the more 'visible' level networks Of 
place that have been uncovered by the fieldwork and will be described in this chapter. 
x/ Bernard I felander conducted much of' his own research in Flawaal Barbaar not far from one site of my own 
fieldwork, 
(iOdUll(Ill DhUoll, 
an Available from hitp: //www. irinnews. org - '-, waziland: II unger erodes traditional values". 
W) In the context of'Afghanistan sce Pain and Goodhand, 2002. 
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Figure 6.1 Qur'an boards are used for religious instruction (Source, Author, July 2000, Garsaley). 
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6.2 GENEALOGY WORKS 
The dynamics of a society, in terms of the social access to food and other resources are 
perhaps the most difficult to understand and quantify. In some cases, what makes one 
household more vulnerable than another is the relative position not only within an economic, 
but also a social, ethnic or clanic hierarchy. We know that the vulnerable are not a 
homogenous category defined solely in monetary terms. They are characterised by enormous 
social and cultural complexities (see Chapter 3). Simon Harragin (1998) demonstrated that 
amongst the Dinka of south Sudan, vulnerability is mainly determined by people's social 
and political status where the most vulnerable are those who are excluded from traditional 
social networks, or people not represented by local leadership. A similar situation exists in., 
Somalia, where vulnerability is partially explained by clan status and clan affiliation - the, 
weaker' the clan the more vulnerable is the household during times of stress. 
This is hardly surprising as a deep sense of kinship has been one of the strongest forces in 
traditional African life (Mbiti, 1969). While kin groups are found in other societies, African 
kin groups are distinctive both by their ubiquity and by the strength of their claims upon 
members (Collier and Garg, 1996). The environment in which kin groups formed is 
characterised by competition for resources and a high level of risk (Posner, (1980) cited in 
Collier and Garg, 1996). 
In general terms in its traditional role, kinship controls social relationships between people 
in a given community. As economists have demonstrated the combination of Sanctions and 
benefits has maintained kin groups as effective institutions of reciprocity, supporting 
transactions that cannot be achieved by the household and for which the state is unnecessary 
(Collier and Garg, 1996). It governs marital customs and regulations, and it governs the 
behaviour of one individual towards another. Kinship largely governs the behaviour, 
thinking and whole life of the individual within the society of which the individual is a'ý 
mcmbcr. 
More spccirically the kinship system is like a vast network stretching laterally (horizontally), 
to embrace everybody in any given group. Taken to its extreme each individual is a brother 
or sistcr, father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, or cousin, or brother-in-law, uncle or 
aunt, or more distant relative to everybody else. The kinship system also extends vertically 
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to include the departed and those yet to be born. It is part of the traditional education of 
children in many African societies to learn the genealogies of their decent. In Somalia, 
children are taught about their lineage, a genealogical and more importantly a sort of 
resource route map. A long list of forefathers names is usually expected to be memorise&" 
The main purpose of such teaching is to enable children to identify who they are in case they 
get lost, such as in situations of war, or where there is a need to locate the nearest relatives in 
situations where the parents or caretakers may have died or disappeared: in a pastoral 
environment where physical addresses are something of a rarity, this is the equivalent of 
emergency contacts in an address book (Giama, 1999). This genealogy also gives a sense of 
depth, historical belonging, and a sense of obligation to the genealogical line. 
Genealogical ties, or bonds, also serve social purposes, particularly in establishing 
relationships between individuals. By citing ones genealogical line, it is possible to see how 
that person is linked to other individuals in a given group. It is also on a genealogical basis 
that organisational divisions have evolved, demarcating the larger society into clans, 
families, households and, finally, individuals. Importantly, these ties also serve as one of the 
foundational stones for resource transfers. 
Loyalty to the clan, at, different levels, is expressed by adherence to mutual support in 
economic, social and political terms. The relationship is not one way traffic however - 
members share the problems of affiliation to a particular clan as well as share the benefits. 
Although livestock belongs to the head of the household amongst Reewin clans camels and 
cattle are usually marked with particular unique clan or clan segment brand marks (see, 
Figure 6.2). This indicates the way in which these stock are also regarded as part of the joint 
wealth of the clan group to be drawn upon in its collective arrangements for resource 
redistribution (diiya blood compensation payments or restocking assistance (see section 
6.4.3, Adoption and the backstop of kinship). " Similarly, cultivable land, whether actually 
90 Being patrilineal, the Somalis count descent through the male line and young people are taught to memoirist the entire 
genealogy of their descent from immediate father to founding one. A persons full name is composed of his/her given name, 
father's and paternal grandfather's. Although matrilineal relationships play a significant role in political networking, the male 
line determines a man's, or a woman's, identity. 
91 This practice became less common during the conflict because of the fear of looting - if an animal 
is not branded the looter 
does not know which clan the owner is a member of and therefore does not know if his clan is a 
friend or foe, an important 
consideration in retributive attacks. 
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under cultivation or land that has reverted to bush, is held by specific clan groups, and in 
some cases divided out amongst clan sections and ultimately individuals. 
In Somalia, any discussion of clan genealogy tends to become politicised, both within and 
between clans, especially where Somalis attach great significance to the size of the clan in 
domestic politics. Although there are many who would prefer to leave behind discussions of 
clanism, its importance cannot, and should not, be underestimated in any analysis of 
vulnerability and livelihood resources. Unfortunately, the academic literature on the subject 
in general, from non-Somalis at least, is limited and confusing. Also, there are precious few 
accounts by Somalis which have been either written in, or translated into, English. 
Disagreements abound even at the level of the division of major clans let alone at the sub- 
sub clan level (see, for example, Ambroso (1994) c. f, Gilkes (1999)). 
Throughout traditional Somali society, the basic pol, tico-legal unit is the lineage -a group 
numbering generally a few hundred though sometimes up to 1000 to 2000 individuals, 
tracing their descent to a common ancestor (Lewis, 1994). The small size of the lineage unit, 
while making it manageable, also makes it vulnerable. Hence it never stands on its own, but 
only exists in association with other similar units. This is more than adequately captured by 
the proverb "Ania buur ahaw, aina ini(I kit-tiir-sanaw" - "Either be a mountain or 
lean on 
one" (Warsame, 200 1, personal communication). 
Lineages are combined into larger units (generally on the basis of sharing a remote 
ancestor), and those into larger ones again, taking the form of a pyramid structure. However, 
these larger groupings will fall apart into their constituents when the situation which led 
them to unite alters, a process of constant decomposition and recomposition (Luling, 1997; 
Mansur, 1995 and 1997). The necessity of defence, the need of pasture and water-induced 
flexibility, including even the severance of kinship ties and the movement to new territory or 
political factional expediency may result in the fon-nation of new alliances. Significantly, 
this is contrary to the European notion of kinship, which limits the family group to the 
closest members the nuclear family. Somalis, on the other hand, will grant the title of 
relatives to remotely related people and even to people with whom they share only the bonds 
ofthe clan or the tribe (Mohamed, 1997). 
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Figure 6.2 Livestock brand marks. These camels are part of the clan wealth of the Galbort, sub-clan 
of the Hadama (Mirifle) (Source, Author, Garsaley, July 2000). 
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To outsiders, the competing web of interests is, at times, beyond comprehension. Yet, as 
Anna Simons (1995: 139) has commented, "Genealogy works ... mapping trustworthiness - 
by charting who has trusted whom in the past and where this has led in terms of thicker or 
thinner, and sustained and broken relationships ... Breaks between lineages 
indicate breaks, 
or at least gaps, in trust. " 
6.2.1 Beyond first histories: the Reewin 
The main clan branches, which constitute about three-quarters of the population, are the 
overwhelmingly pastoral nomadic Darood, Dir, Issaq, and Hawiye . 92 The remainder 
is made 
up of a confederation, the Reewin (or the often used Rahanweyn), "' of two clan groups, the 
Dighil and Mirij7e, the two sons of Mad Reewin, Dighil being the elder and mirifle the 
younger son. " These main clan branches are, to some extent geographically distinct and the 
distinction between nomad and cultivator coincides roughly with the most marked internal 
division within Somalia (Lewis, 1980 and 1993b). 1, 
But settlement patterns of what today is southern Somalia are anything but static. The 
history of migration and conquest influences everything from the nature of ethnic or clan, 
identity in the region to present-day dialects and language. Because historical claims on land 
by Somali clans are so central to current political disputes, discussions of settlement patterns 
in the area are very sensitive. The history and attachment to land that the Reewin promote is, 
at times, at odds with that cherished by some other Somali clans. Reewin interpretations of 
history and historical rights, and even clan identities and clan affiliations challenge the "first 
92 According to Mukhtar and Kusow (1993) the population of the inter-riverine region constitutes roughly between 35-40 
percent of the total Somali population. 1997 UNDOS figures suggest that the populations of Bay (698,600) and Bakool 
(264.800) account for approximately 14.5 percent of the estimated total Somalia population of 6,602,112 (population Database, 
UNDOS Data and Information Management Unit). 
93 In sonic areas of Somalia, especially in the north and northeast, the Reewin are occasionally known as the Eelaay- 'ne 
Eelany are a sub-clan of the Allry7e and their traditional home area is Burhakaba district and the Baidoa area. Some texts also 
rcfcr to these two mainly agriculturalist clans as 'Sab', an ambiguous term. Members of the Dighil and Mirifle consider the 
appellation dcrogatory. Used as a common noun meaning ignoble, the term Sab is applied by non-Reewin to groups that pursue 
certain disdained occupations. In this way, it was felt that the Sab had lowered themselves by their reliance on agriculture. 
" Rahanweyn literally means rahan (crowd) weyn (big), but is also understood to mean, 'big prosperity' or 'big grinding 
stones'. The more esotcric 'big prosperity' is in more common usage and is seen to reflect the abundance of pasture and 
pastoral produce (mcat and milk), and agricultural products, such as sorghum, and plentiful supplies of wild food, including 
honey. 
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history or camel honour that colours many interpretations of Somalia" (Interview with 
Malaak Mukhtar and Yusuf Sheikh Isaac, 17 September 2000, Baidoa). 
Today these distinctions are less clear as the war has acted as an effective dispersal 
mechanism and disputes continue over access to land in these areas. " The Mirifle are 
dispersed throughout Bay and Bakool, being the predominant clan in this region, " whilst the 
Dighil lay historic claim to the areas of the Lower Shabelle (Qoryoley, Afgooye), parts of 
Middle Jubba (Jilib, Buaale, Sakow), and up to Dinsor in Bay region (Interview with Ali 
Mohamed Aden, Osman Ali and Ali Ibrahim Hussein, I August, 2000, Eastleigh, Nairobi). 
The group of clans known as the Mirifle-Reewin is divided into two larger subsections 
known as 'the Siyeed' ('the eight'), and 'the Sagaal' (or 'the nine'), which are further 
divided into clans (sing. qabHO, sub-clans (sing. filib), and sub-sub-clans (sing. gamaas). " 
Although clan 'maps' are often openly disputed, and are indicative only of the complexity of 
the clan genealogies rather than the dynamic alliances of political allegiance, they are useful 
in illustrating the connections between kinship lineages. A complete clan 'map' shows the 
lineage from qabiil to a single qoys (household) (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Solidarity is 
increased with lineage proximity, an important consideration in access to resources and the 
mitigation of vulnerability. Pairings such as the Lama Midbowe (the Eelaay and Hariin) (see 
Figure 6.3) are geographic as well as lineage neighbours. 
95 Other interpretations suggest that the Dighil should not be considered as part of the Reewin and thus form a sixth major clan 
group. 
96 Darood and Hawiye sub-clans are also present in the region. 
97 "is does not necessarily reflect the number of clans in these groupings. However, again, the origin of the Siyeed and the 
Sagaal is unclear. One tale, more allegorical than factual, states that two groups of men sat down for a meeting under two trees. 
They decided tojoin in one group. Under one of the trees nine men were sitting, they became Sagaal, the nine. Under the other 
trCc sat eight men who became Siyeed, the eight. The Dighil are divided into seven clans known as the TodilobadiAw Dighil. 
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Figure6.3 Reewin Mirifle clan 'map' (Source, Author). 
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Figure 6.4 Leysan clan 'map'. The Leysan can be divided into Bara (east) and Orsi (west). The Bara 
are then divided into seven constituent parts, then by following one constituent branch the Obowabow 
five, the Obo Kalafow five, and so on. This map, therefore, represents only a small fraction of all the 
potential lineage connections (Source, Author). 
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63 THE TIES OF PLACE 
Amongst the Reewin of southern Somalia (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.1), clan affiliation is 
simply one of several identities that a person has. Equally meaningful to whom a person is 
considered to be is that of place. In many contexts the ties and networks of place are more 
important than those of clan: as Bernard Helander (1997: 132) asserts -'the most important 
difference from the rest of Somalia is probably that clanship among the [Reewin] does not 
seek to be a totalising social idiom. " 
On the contrary, a distinguishing feature of the Reewin society is its ability to allow other 
forms of socialability. The Reewin exhibit a system of territorial groups whose traditional 
social and political relations are not expressed in genealogical terms solely but hierarchically 
(Lewis, 1998), systems that are absent or rare in northern pastoral Somali social structures 
(Lewis, 1994). As others before me have remarked, southern Somali agro-pastoralists have a 
social system characterised by extreme flexibility (Helander, Mukhtar and Lewis, 1995 
Marchal, 1997). 
A major divide in the social system is that between the segmentary lineages and clans that 
have long constituted the stereotypical frame of reference for Somalia on the one hand and 
the informal associations and place based networks of relatively sedentary agriculturalists on 
the other. The segmentary model stands out as an index to dispersed resources, crucial, : -. 1 
above all to the needs of pastoralists. The informal networks of place, on the other hand, 
operate to provide the necessary labour and other relations central to agriculture. Although, 
these two principles operate on different levels of social action amongst the predominantly 
agro-pastoral Reewin of southern Somalia they are mutually supportive, creating an 
integrated system for resource control, co-operation and the resolution of conflict, and, 
importantly, support in times of need. 1.1. 
The social fabric of the regions occupied by the Reewin agro-pastoral and Bantu riverine 
agricultural groups is therefore quite different from that dominating most nomadic areas of 
central and northern Somalia. For these reasons the Reewin have been derided by other 
Somali groups during times of tension (see Chapter 4) - nomadic herders take a 
dismissive 
view of sedentary agriculture, believing that farmers do not possess the noble fighting 
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character of pastoralists (Natsios, 1996). "1 But, Helander (1997) is careful to point out that 
the Reewin do not constitute a homogenous unit. Generally although there is a sense of over- 
all unity, based upon among other things, on their common forms of attachment to land, 
their combined reliance on agriculture and animal husbandry, and the common dialect, there 
are differences among the numerous clans. Tbus, generalisations are problematic. 
In contrast with a nomadic pastoral existence, the primary focus of Reewin social 
organisation in rain-fed areas is the maintenance of territorial solidarity in relation to arable 
land (see Figure 6.5), artificially created water-ponds, catchments or dams (sing. war, pL 
waro)(see Figure 6.6) and wells (sing. eel) (see Figure 6.7). " Villages (a large village sing. 
tuulo, pl. tuuloyin; a small village or hamlet sing. butilo, pL buuloyin), surrounded by a 
patchwork of farms (sing. beer) which may or may not be contiguous with settlement units, 
are the real foci of political and social life. " Regardless of the emphasis a Reewin household 
places on pastoral production (see Chapter 5, and Figures 6.8 and 6.9), it will always claim 
some form of attachment and access to the networks of place somewhere in the inter-riverine 
area. 
6.3.1 A community of place 
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the adoption of 'community-based' approaches to 
development by donor agencies and NGOs. But in the literature of social development and 
humanitarian assistance, within VVTP and elsewhere representations of community are 
troublesome (Guyer, 1981; Fleming, 1991; Li, 1996). Typically these convey responsibility 
to others stressing harmony, equality and tradition. However, there is also an erroneous 
acceptance of homogeneity, as if the politics of social interaction, including the relations of 
gender or the power politics of decision-making, arc absent. Perhaps more importantly, in 
the context of this study, they also stress rather static bounded and isolated social spaces 
over the more dynamic, porous and networked spaces that have been conceptualised in the 
previous chapters. 
98 One example is the prevalence of a very rich technological farming vocabulary contrasting to the livestock vocabulary that 
can be found throughout Somalia. 
" In addition, other water sources include any natural depressions where water settles (gaydar) and mogee (depressions in 
found in rock areas). 
100 ne terms farm and field, that indicate differing scales of ownership in the English language, are synonymous in AfAfaqy. 
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Figure 6.5 Farnis are separated by, to the outsider, often barely noticeable boundaries (sing. soohin) 
ofstones, or shrubs. People in Bay and Bakool regions use a variety of measures for land area, and 
there is little exactitude in their use. Examples include a darab (thirty by twelve double steps 
(talaabo 
S11111ldhaof double steps)), and a yaasiin (the distance traversed in reciting the Yaashn sulirad). 
II cctares are rarely used. In the areas visited by the researchers, the most common area measurement 
was a ta'ab. measured in double steps. In Gaduuda Dhunti the measurement was 10 double steps 
by 
30 double steps, approximately 120OM2. In other areas a ta'ab may be 360 rný, 600 m-' or 
800 m2 
(Source, Author, Gaduuda Dhunti, December, 2000). 
163 
THE EXTENDED NETWORKS OFITACF. 
"1% 
"L 
Figure 6.6 A war, or water catchment. The collection of water is invariably undertaken by women 
and young girls (Source, Author, Garsaley, July 2000). 
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Figure 6.7 A well, or eel (Source, Author, Bakool, 1999). 
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LL 
Figure 6.8 A rnix of livestock takes advantage of variations among species in tolerance to drought, 
makes fuller use of available vegetation and at the same time caters for different needs of the family 
for meat and meat, transport, income and investment (Source, Author, near Garsaley, July 1999). 
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Figure 6.9 Camels being watered at a trough (Source, Author, near Garsaley, July 1999). 
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But community does remain useful as a frame of reference in several ways. Firstly, it is 
useful to describe the social spaces and processes that locate individuals and the household 
in multiple networks of interaction. By describing the bonds that bind people to people and 
people to place it is argued that communities are important spaces of social interaction that 
are central to questions of livelihood resource access and the amelioration of vulnerability. 
In principle, a sense of belonging to community provides people with a legitimisation or 
endowment to the resources necessary for the maintenance of livelihoods in the drought 
prone environment of southern Somalia. 
Secondly, in turn, the community of place is described within the wider communities of 
kinship or clan, or the much more inclusive affiliation of Somali ethnicity. These suggest 
scales of livelihood analysis that break down the boundaries of conceived social space and 
moves beyond the unbridled individualism prevalent in much of the humanitarian literature. 
This will be explored further in the following chapter. 
Though often composed entirely of families who trace their lineage to a common male 
ancestor, villages are usually made up of various groups of similarly related people who may 
identify themselves as being of the same clan (qabiil), but are more accurately described as 
belonging to a different jilib (sub-clan), or gainaas (sub-sub-clan) (see Figure 6.4). 
Typically, rural villages, especially the larger ones, will contain several different, but closely 
related, male lineages. Ultimately, the strength of connections between individuals depends 
largely upon the size of the settlement: the smaller the settlement the greater the likelihood 
of closer kinship connections and vice versa. This does not, however, exclude strong familial 
relations on the maternal lineage being present within the community. 
This community of place consists of a core settlement surrounded by numerous smaller 
settlement satellites. For example, the community of Gaduuda Dhunti includes seven main 
hamlets, and eighteen smaller hamlets each of these settlements containing one or more 
contiguous compounds (sing. maalad). A typical compound in the villages of Gaduuda 
Dhunti and Garsaley (the structure of which is shown in Figure 6.10) contains one or more 
households (sing. qoys) (see Figure 6.11). Not always in clusters, scattered homesteads do 
exist (especially in the more productive arable areas) and nomadic camps can be found near 
permanent water sites at the end of the dry seasons (see Figure 6.12). 
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These scattered compounds may be dispersed over an area of more than twenty square 
kilometres but those people living in isolated dwellings will identify themselves as being 
attached to the resource and administrative community of the core settlement. In Bay region, 
the population of a village may range from much less than one hundred to more than nine 
hundred people (Massey, 1987), the population at any given time depending upon the 
potential productivity of the arable land, market access, the availability of water throughout 










Corml-d IV h, n, (smg. 
Entrance to the coml-nd 
Figure 6.10 A typical stylised rural compound (maalwo (Source, Author). 
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Figure 6.11 Permanent housing may take the form of round mud-and-wattle 
huts (sing. inundid) 
(seen here), or the less common and easier to construct square mud-and-wattle 
huts (sing. aarish, pl. 
aarish yaal) which are usually considered habitation for poorer groups 
(Source, Author, Gaduuda 
Dhunti, December 2000). 
ýp 
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Figure 6.12 Scmi-permanent nomadic or temporary nomadic huts (sing. hoori), made from a wooden 
franic (inhth) and covered in grass mats (kibil), or smaller nomadic huts (sing. waab) can also be seen 
(Source, Author, near 6arsaley, July 2000). 
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6.3.2 The household of place 
To outsiders, especially Westerners more familiar with the more formulaic two-plus-two of 
the nuclear family, the patrilineal and polygynous system is difficult to comprehend. In 
Somalia as elsewhere, much confusion arises over the precise socio-spatial makeup of 
family and household units and the translation of local terminology. A household clearly has 
many meanings, some of which are functional, others less tangible and more symbolic, 
culturally and locally defined. A household can mean four walls and a roof. It may even be 
just somewhere for people sleep, or where food is prepared, a place of security, or even a 
worksite. In their study of the informal support networks of Georgia Dershem and 
Gzirishvili (1998: 1835) define a household as, "... all individuals residing in a common 
structure and sharing a common budget. " A definition provided by the World Food 
Programme (undated: 38) notes that a household is a "... socio-economic unit consisting of 
individuals who live together ... Usually, household and 
family are terms that are used 
interchangeably. " 
Clearly these understandings do not encompass the spatial terrain of' networks. 
Anthropological analyses have moved the emphasis away from viewing the household as a 
bounded basic unit of society towards stressing its permeability and embeddedness in wider 
social and economic structures. Here the household is only one of several social spaces that 
determine production, consumption, and investment decisions (Guyer, 1981; Fleming. 
1991). Inter-household organisations that form the basis of economic activities and 
collective action should also be considered as the foci for resource (re)allocation. Yet 
unravelling these complex relationships and interdependencies is problematic as we have 
seen. 
A previous study of the Reewin suggests that the household is the primary economic unit, 
and the smallest unit of the family system, with its members responsible for their property 
and the persons comprising the household forming both a unit of production through the 
distribution of tasks and a unit of consumption (University of Wyoming, 1984a; Massey, 
1987). In the literature of WFP Somalia the household is much more narrowly defined, 
where the average household in Bay region is considered to be six people, and in Bakool 
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seven (VVTP Somalia, 1999). "1 That there is no clear understanding or recognition of. the 
spatial and temporal complexity of the household in Somalia is surprising considering that it 
is the primary unit for the analysis of vulnerability, and for VVTP Somalia it is the primarY, 
unit for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. " Evidently, like community the boundaries 
i., ýý of the household are not always so clear or so rigid and easy to convey. " 
Household form varies across time and space according to their asset and production 
strategies and responses to conflict or drought. A focus upon the household as a social space 
reveals a network of extended kin ties, indicated by family members residing in the qoys, 
and the present location of the children and spouses of the household head. Clearly, family 
ties are one important source of support for persons who are not in a position to establish a 
self-sufficient household. The importance of children as a form of insurance is illustrated by, 
the proverb Bershey ber min weheliye (his liver has no partner - he has no children and 
livestock to support him) (Interview with Habiba Boolbara, 12 October 2000, Gaduuda 
Dhunti). Young siblings who are without parents, divorced or widowed daughters, and 
grandchildren with one or no parents are - after elderly dependants - the most 
likely 
dependants to be living within a household head's qoys. Social commitments also extend to 
ineerlo, guests, usually relatives, and dareerlo, 'strangers' or wayfarers 
In the ago-pastoral mode of production, households 'split' to maximise economic and 
production opportunities, spread the resource base (geographically), and therefore minimise 
101 Even if this simplistic and rather static notion is accepted (which I do not propose), according to Vaidyanathan (1997: 
29) in 
a report for the UN Development Office for Somalia there is still "... a universal tendency in censuses and surveys to miss 
children ... " 
102 In this study the term qoys is used to mean a household. The terms min (house) and id (home) are often confused 
in 
translation with qoys. Terms referring to the family system beyond the qoys inclusive of various categories or persons 
(multiple 
generations, multiple persons across a generation) abound in Somalia. These may lack spccif icity or direct correlates to 
English 
terms for the nuclear family and extended family. For example, reer may be used to refer to a particular relative, or everyone 
residing in the qoys, or to several generations of relatives. 
101 For the purposes of clarity I will use the terms the household ofplace to describe those members that are Part Of 
the 
networks of the relative fixity of place and extended household to describe those absentee household members who are part of 
this economic and social unit but who are not residing in the household of place. 
104 The dareerto expects, and will receive, food, water and shelter for a limited number of meals, normally one to two 
days. 
This provision is not made on an individual basis but a collection of food will be made (doortoy) from all those in the village 
who are able to provide it. Afeerto usually do not contribute assets to the host household because "they need what they cannot 
rind In their own house" (interview in Qadiidlc, (Burhakaba district, 6 September, 1999). 
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the impact of economic downturns from prolonged drought or conflict. These strategies in 
turn are often governed by seasonal weather patterns and the availability of income earning 
(including begging) opportunities in larger urban centres. 
Many animals never leave the vicinity of the village in which their owners live. Burden 
camels or donkeys needed for routine, year-round work may be kept nearby at all times. But 
the extent to which animals remain near the village or move away from it depends on several 
factors: the availability of water and grazing, the prevalence of insect pests, the need to 
market produce, and the need to carry out seasonal farmwork. Livestock may be grazed 
away from the village base during the crop-growing season, a task that depends on the 
labour available within the household and the type of animal. For example, smaller 
livestock, goats and sheep, and small herds, stay closer to villages whilst the larger livestock, 
camels and cattle, and larger herds, tend to graze further away from the household, a task 
usually given (especially for camel herding) to the young males of the household. Again it is 
difficult to generalise because particular livestock and labour management strategies vary 
from village to village, and from family to family within a village. 101 Other members of the 
household will remain in the village caring for children or to pursue farming activities. 
The geographic and social dispersion of resources, such as farms, residing in extended 
networks, through inheritance or purchase, is an important element in terms of risk 
minimisation and the subsequent analysis of vulnerability. A farm (or farms) may be located 
within the same village as the household base or even in different villages many kilometres 
apart. Similarly, the head of a predominantly urban household may be part of the business 
community and own farms in rural areas (Interview with Junced Shcckh Hassan, 19 
September 2000, Baidoa). In these terms the most fortunate households will not only possess 
sheep, goats and herds of camels and cattle, but several farms in different locations and 
adequate labour to manage all of the above enabling them to profit from the unequal and 
localised seasonal distribution of rain. 
Migration, or movement, therefore, is often the established pattern and is a strategy of 
Reewin livelihoods. Within the agro-pastoral economy population displacements are by no 
105 Generally though, a few milking animals will remain near the village for household consumption. 
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means random or limitless. In its permanent cultivating and trading villages, and above all in 
its wells, every clan and group possesses a series of centres between which movement 
rotates. 106 Household splitting and migration does not necessarily reflect an exception to the 
nonnal patterns of society. Household members do not necessarily live together 
continuously year round: the numbers present in a household of place at any given time,, 
during the year depends largely upon the seasonality described earlier, the nature of the 
productive assets available to the household and the nature of the shock or stress 
experienced. z 
For any analysis of vulnerability, therefore, there is a need to focus on the multi- 
dimensionality of the migration process, and a need to consider the continuing resource and 
decision-making links between the migrants and their areas of origin. These labsentee'p 
householders are an integral part of the resource base of the household of place. Decisions 
are taken in the context of the household, and migration is seen as a form of port-fbliO', 
diversification by families. Similarly, those that remain in the household of place are central 
to this process. 
These multiple ties of people, resources and place are clearly illustrated by a case study of . 
the village of Garsaley in northern Bakool region, close to the Ethiopian border (see Box-, ',, 
6.1). While migration is an important strategy for avoiding the problems of place the impact 
of mass migration for the community can be dramatic as this study highlights: as the pool of 
available labour within the village shrinks farms and community resources remain untended.,, 
Five years ago, people started leaving the village of Garsaley (Bakool) to seek employment 
in the urban centres of southern Ethiopia (Barre and the salt lake of Kumbul), a journey of 
some 100 to 200 kilometres. At this stage the out-migration was relatively small and was in 
response to the drought problems facing the region in the mid to late 1990s. During Kamiis 
Dhukuy (1999 - The Thursday year of the unexpected drought) out-migration increased. 
106 Similarly, it is erroneous to regard pastoralists as rootless involved in a constant and aimless series of migrations. 
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After all, as village elders explained, Abar lug me leh -A drought has no legs: if you run 
from a drought it cannot follow you. However, the combination of the push of Jimaa shall 
roorki (2000 - The Friday year of migration) and the pull of the large international relief 
in the Somali region of southern Ethiopia (during May and June, 2000) led to an 
of people from northern Bakool, including many from the village of Garsaley. In 
addition to the income generating opportunities to be found, such as water carrying, housc 
building, begging, porterage, household chores, and the collection and sale of firewood, the 
large food aid distributions at Barre, Kumbul, Jareddi, and Hargheley encouraged entire, ol 
part households to move toward these sites. 
The impact upon villages in the region of the last decade of problems and more recently the 
out-migrations in response to the continuing food aid distributions in southern Ethiopia has 
been dramatic. Elders of Garsaley suggested that this is likely to continue until such aid 
distributions cease, similar resources are made available in Bakool, or household or 
asset bases are re-established. Prior to 1991, the population of the community 
Garsaley, including its satellite settlements, was estimated to be 1600 households. Before the 
migration in search of food aid began, the number of households had already declined to 
1000 because of the direct combined impacts of prolonged conflict and recurrent drought. In 
August 2000 when I stayed in the village the figure was nearer 300. The growth of scrub 
several feet high suggested that many farms had not been tended for several seasons and 
water catchments had been left to silt up due to a lack of available labour. The implications 
of this are serious: a decline in food production and water storage capacity. 
Furthermore, employment opportunities that had been available in the banana plantations of 
the Lower Shabelle prior to the war had been restricted due to the presence of opposing 
militia and the subsequent closure of the Baidoa to Mogadishu main road. Nevertheless, and 
more positively, many households have family members elsewhere who are able to provide 
support to those remaining in the village. These transfers include: the proceeds from the sale 
of the food aid collected in Ethiopia; food, money, or clothes sent by household members in 
employment in the larger towns of Baidoa (Bay) and Wajid (Bakool), or from employment 
or the proceeds of begging in Hargeisa (Somaliland) and Bosasso (Puntland); one household 
received remittances from a family member living in Saudi Arabia and several families have 
latives in Kenya who also remit money. 
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These ties are also evident from interviews conducted amongst the Reewin in Hargeisa 
(Somaliland) and Bosasso (Puntland) (see Chapter 5) that suggest that 'internally displaced 
persons' (IDPs), a term used by the international community to describe persons dislocated 
by conflict or drought but remaining within the borders of Somalia, may be similarly linked 
to their household place of origin through the transfer of resources (see Box 6.2). 101 Their,: - 
embeddedness in social and economic networks of the host community is less clear, some 
respondents talking of exploitative employment arrangements, a lack of basic facilities and a 
feeling of social ostracism. 
Maad Emed Buule (aged 40 of the Leysan clan) from the village of Shabellow near Baidoa, 
(Bay region) moved to Hargeisa in 1996. Prior to the civil war he and his family owned three 
farms in the village and cared for eight camels, 17 cattle, 24 goats, six sheep, four donkeys 
and 20 chickens. Although the farms remain, his house was destroyed by militia and many 
of his livestock looted, killed or the rest sold to enable the family to survive. After the failure 
of his crops, Maad with two sons and a daughter decided to try to find employment 
in 
Hargeisa to support the rest of the family and to rebuild his home. Unfortunately there was 
not enough money to bring his father, mother, stepbrother, and another son and daughter 
with him. They remained in Bay region, finding refuge wherever it was safe. Today while 
Maad and the others try to earn enough money from the sale of books or cleaning shoes to 
survive in I largeisa. those who stayed behind now look after the farms. Maad considers that 
he is treated very badly in Ilargeisa. Several times he has had his walking stick taken off him 
and broken and he has had his temporary shelter ransacked. Every night Maad dreams of 
his 
family in Shabellow, and the farms and community that he has left behind. If only he could 
f ind the money for the transportation to take him home. 
107 Internally Displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who 
have 
not crossed an internationally recognized State border" (definition contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. see WFP document EB. A/98/INF/5). Cf. 'refugees' are those similarly dislocated by drought or war 
but who 
have crossed international boundaries. 
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Although the porous nature of the household appears complicated enough, a single 
household should not be considered in isolation from others, each with their own productive 
and social resources, that may be found within the same compound. Previous studies 
undertaken in Bay and Bakool have not acknowledged the importance and role of the 
compound as a wider unit of production and resource sharing (c. f University of Wyoming, 
1984a). Multi-household compounds, potentially comprising several generations of the male 
lineage each with their wives and children, provide others in this structure a source of 
resources in times of need, including labour, and food. 
Similarly, compounds within the same community may be linked directly through marriage. 
In Islam, and in Somalia, a man is entitled to a maximum of four wives, who, in theory at 
least, may each live in different compounds, which may or may not be contiguous, and 
which are part of the same economic and productive unit. "' However, the condition for 
polygyny is that "... he will be able to deal equitably with his two or more wives in the 
matter of food, drink, housing, clothing and expenses, as well as in the division of his time 
between them. Anyone who lacks the assurance that he will be able to fulfil all these 
obligations with justice and equality is prohibited ... from marrying more than one woman" 
(a]-Qaradawi, 1993: 191). While the benefits for the productivity of the household and clan 
strength may be obvious polygyny has been described "... as a spectre that demoralises and 
haunts every married Somali woman. The problem is not religion ... but rather Somali 
tradition that does not respect the true form of Islam in its treatment of women" (Warsame, 
undated draft). 
Although there will inevitably be exceptions, resources are also shared between these 
productive and social spaces through relationships of marriage. Furthermore, households and 
compounds may be connected through marriage on the female side or through lineage on the 
male side to others outside of their immediate community. Marriage is generally seen as an 
arrangement between two families which creates an emotional and economic link not only 
between two persons but between their families and respective lineages. While taking on her 
position as wife and child-bearer for her husband's family, the woman retains her permanent 
Jos According to a survey in 1980 more than 20 percent of marriages in Somalia were polygamous and the figure in post-war 
Somalia may be higher (UNICEF-Somalia, 1998). 
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identity as a daughter within her father's extended family and can ask for assistance from its 
members. Thus, accompanying marriage is an extension of resource networks involving the 
transfer of property, the bonding of family groups and the establishment of an important unit 
of economic production and consumption. 
6.4 SCALES OF TRANSFER 
Individuals, households, families and communities are bound together by the unwritten 
moral contract of social obligation and the expectation of reciprocity. But as the proverb 
Muraadkaa ku sheene ma maka sheegaaw (If you do not express your needs they will not be 
addressed) (Interview with the Buurhakaba Womens Relief Organisation, 5 September 1999,, 
Buurhakaba, Bay region) suggests the communication of need is an important component in 
the transfer of resources. On the one hand the violent collapse of the State led to the 
dispersal of many families to different parts of Somalia and beyond. Yet, perversely, this 
same collapse has reinforced the importance of family and indirectly the ability of the family 
to maintain connections from the local to the global. Iý 
In the unregulated business environment of post civil war Somalia there has been ý a-, 
remarkable expansion of the private telecommunications sector. At the time the civil war 
broke out, it was only possible to make international calls from the central post office in 
Mogadishu (Marchal et al, 2000). Now many people can call anywhere in the world from 
their own homes or the homes of friends, and at prices that would shame many Western, 
utility companies. Customers can now call relatives overseas to infon-n them of events in the 
country, and to ask that money be transferred to them (see, the section on remittances 
below). Furthermore, the proliferation of HF radios, many remnants from the UNOSOM era,, 
in many of the larger towns and villages has further facilitated communication between 
family members. These recent technological innovations have sped up greatly a process that 
in the past had relied predominantly on the face to face to exchanges between travellers 
(often framed by the greeting Nabad, War ma haysaa" (Peace, Do you have any news)) and 
family of more localised problems and needs. 
Needs are expressed firstly to immediate family (qaraaban ima - help from very close 
relatives), who may or may not live within the same community of place. If there are no 
immediate family members within this community, or if they are experiencing similar 
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problems, help will be sought from relatives elsewhere, relatives that may be in nearby 
communities or even further afield in neighbouring regions. " It is this localisation of effect 
and impacts (of drought or conflict, for example) within the inter-riverine area that is such an 
important element in the effective functioning of these extensive social networks and that 
will be expanded upon in the Section 6.6. 
If immediate family arc unable to provide help assistance is sought from the wider 
community of clan, the resource backstop during periods of household insecurity. The 
particular level of clan involvement depends very much upon the resources that can be 
drawn upon beyond in the progression from the qoys (household) to the qabiil (or clan), 
passing through the levels of gamaas (sub-sub-clan) andfilib (sub-clan) (refer to Figure 6.4). 
Thus, the family, however it is defined, becomes the central pillar in the amelioration of 
problems. Perceptions of well-being and ill-being undertaken during this study amongst the 
villagers of Garsaley and Gaduuda Dhunti and supported by numerous proverbs throughout 
Somalia illustrate that a lack of relatives, including children, is seen as central to the nature 
of ill-being. 110 
WaIii minkaa ku waaytii min walaalkaa luku deyee - what you are missing from your house 
you may find in the house of your brother. "' 
Xirlaa koo gutumaase maay makoo gohaase - you are obliged to help your relatives because 
they are part of your own body. I" 
6.4.1 The resource networks of household 
If the assets and resources of the household are insufficient to meet material needs, 
assistance can take several forms. 
109 The term kiinaan describes the migration of people in search of assistance from Bakool to unaffected, or less affcctcd 
relatives living in Bay region. Here there is an important distinction between the 'normal' seasonal movement of household 
members (described earlier), and the 'stress migration' evident in the outpouring of people from areas of conflict or drought. 
110 Other factors include the presence of drought and war, and a lack of physical assets. 
III From an interview with a group of elders from the village of Guduuda Dhunti, Qasadhere district. 10 October 2000. 
112 From an interview with a group of women from the village of Godka, Burhakaba district, 6 September 1999. 
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Relative vuhterability: Zakat 
Poverty and weakness in general are blessed in the sense that Allah is believed to accord 
special protection to the mundanely helpless (Lewis, 1963). To show kindness and charity to 
the poor, to give them alms and support, is an act of religious merit. Equally, to refuse help 
and succour to the needy may incur Allah's displeasure. 
The social obligations of Islam are made most explicit in zakat, the third of the five pillars of 
Islam and are, as well as an ancient redistribution system, a distinguishing characteristic of 
Islamic economy. '" The word, also referred to as the 'poor tax' or 'poor-due' and 
I almsgiving', has evolved semantically from its primary meaning - 'purification' - to 
its 
current definition of 'obfigatoty charity'. While zakat may be regarded as an act of 
beneficence, paid willingly, it should not be considered as a gift. The religious significance 
of' zakat contrasts the voluntary donations known as sadaqa, provided for the poor and 
needy. The implication within Islam is clear enough: personal property must be purified by 
payment of one's dues to the community, for the upkeep of its weaker members (Kuran, 
1995). It is, effectively, a rationalised form of social security (Ruthven, 2000). The system 
traditionally levies a tax on sufficiently wealthy Muslims to finance eight causes, including, 
first and foremost to the poor and needy, (inasaakiin (poor) andfaqiir (destitute)), officials 
who gather the zakal, assistance to individuals serving Islam, and, lastly, to aid poor 
travellers. In this sense, some "... Islamic economists have touted zakat as an unmatched 
instrument flor inequality reduction... " (Ruthven, 2000: 163). 
The exact amount levied, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, depends on the particular form 
of' 'wealth' and is levied either in currency or in kind - cattle, grain, produce, or 
commodities such as gold. Thus, the burden of zakat falls primarily on farmers in some 
places, and mainly on pastoralists and urban residents in others. Agro-pastoralists are levied 
on tlicir income Crom livestock and crop production. For crop production, zakat is payable 
after every harvest (which in the inter-riverine areas is twice per year, the gu and deyr 
III The first or the 'Five PiIIa rs' (riskns) of the faith, which are sti II the basis of belief and practice common to al I Muslims, 
is 
shahada, the protession of faith by which the Muslim acknowledges his allegiance to God and his prophet. 'rhe second pillar 
is 
salist, or prayer, a basic duty rici-l'ormed both individually and publicly. After zakal, the fourth pillar is sawnt, the annual 
fast of 
Ramadan, the runth rnonth in the lunar calendar, during which all food, drink and sexual activity are forbidden between 
dawn 
an(] dusk [Ile fifth pillar offislarn is the I laij, the pilgrimage to the holy site of Mecca. 
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seasons) and the owners of livestock once per year. The specific levies, drawn from 
interviews conducted in Garsaley, Gaduuda Dhunti and Baidoa and which can be seen in 
Table 6.1, depend upon the harvest yield or the livestock held. 
Zakat is not collected, but it is the responsibility of the producer to identify close relatives or 
neighbours in the community of place who are in need of assistance. "' However, it is not 
always distributed to those within the producer's community. It can also be given to close 
relatives or strangers from other parts of Somalia who have heard that the harvest has been 
good in a particular area and have come to seek assistance. In this instance Islam favours the 
payment of zakat because "a traveller is poor even if he is wealthy" - because he may have 
no relatives to rely upon for help along his route. 
Table 6.1. Zakat and the lev) syst 
Asset level 
em anionost the Reewin ol'southern S 
Levy 
omalia (Source. Author) 
Payment due 
- 5 camels I goat 
67ne per year 
10 camels 2 goats Once per year 
15 camels I malc camel Once per year 
30 cattle I two year old bull Once per year 
100 goats I female goat Once per year 
200 goats 2 female goats .r year Once per year 
For each 10 quintals sorghum' 
15 1 quintal harvest 
ý At each harvest 
For each 100 shillings 2.50 car y 'r Once per year 
In this sense zakat is always targeted to those relatively more vulnerable within the 
community. Or it is completely self-targeting. Apart from benefiting the poor, there are no 
rules or categories governing 'who gets what'. This flexibility is in marked contrast to the 
rigid criteria established for the disbursement of WFP relief food assistance (see Chapter 7). 
Remittances 
The transfer of remittances within extended families has been a part of the country's 
economy since many Somali nationals emigrated in search of better education, trading or 
114 Some respondents stated that pre-war the sheikh (the religious leader present in each village) was responsible 
for the 
collection and disbursement ofzakat. 
115 One quintal is equal to 100kg. 
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employment opportunities, or simply to escape persecution and conflict. The first remittance 
brokers started to appear in the informal financial markets between 1975 and 1980 as trust in 
the formal banking sector diminished and then their scope expanded with its collapse. It, 
remains the principal source of hard currency, a dominant feature of the informal economy 
and central to the livelihoods of many extended households. However, remittance flows are - 
not unique to Somalia and the importance of these migrant economies has been highlighted 
in a number of countries and contexts (Bisogno and Chong, 2002; Seddon et al, 2002). 
Large-scale migration occurred first in the late 1960s when truck drivers and youngsters 
emigrated to the central, eastern and south eastern countries of Africa seeking employment 
offered by Somali transport companies operating in those areas. Further out- migration 
resulted from the oil boom in the Arab Gulf States during the early 1970s. From 1982 to 
early 1988, due to political instability particularly in the northern and north-eastern parts of 
the country, thousands of people fled to the Gulf States, Western Europe (including large 
communities in The Netherlands, Sweden, UK), Italy, North America, Australia, and to 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda. Finally, with the collapse of the Somali state in early 
1991, hundreds of thousands of nationals fled the country. By some estimates, as many as. - 
one in six or over one million Somalis now live outside of the country (UNDP, 2001). 
The flow of remittance money is based on the hawala system, a traditional method of 
informally transferring money from one place to another. "" This system relies on trust, 
confidentiality and the informal networks established by the three main money transfer 
agencies (Dahab-Shil, Amaal Bank, and in the south Al-Barakat). These private companies 
have a network of offices around the world wherever there are concentrations of Somali 
diaspora. 
The provider of the remittance presents the amount of money to be transferred to the 
financial broker and obtains a receipt which details the amount of money transferred, the 
name and full address of the recipient (town, village, nearest available telephone or high 
frequency radio, people who know the recipient and in some cases the clan of the recipient). 
A commission of 3% to 7% is levied for the transfer of funds depending on the geographical 
116 In Nepal it is callal the hundi system. 
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origin of the remittance, the remoteness of its destination and the amount of money to be 
transferred. The broker then sends a fax or a telephone message within 24 hours to his 
representative or nearest branch office who will contact the recipient. if the recipient is not 
in the main town where the broker has a representative, he or she will be contacted by radio 
or messenger. In both instances the recipient (or their agent) is requested to travel to the 
branch to collect the money. 
Most remittances are sent to relatives in urban areas (to whom the merchant or broker can 
readily deliver them) and then transmitted onwards. The increase in the number of high 
frequency radios in larger settlements in response to the collapse of the formal 
telecommunications sector during the conflict has greatly increased the ability of families to 
keep in touch and facilitated the transfer of resources. Ultimately, it is communication, 
whether through HF radios or through face to face contact (by relatives or friends), that is so 
important in the flow of resources and which provides the link between remitter and 
receiver, between and within countries. 
These transfers reduce substantially inequality levels within extended families and provide 
interlocking security systems based on diversity of income sources and mutual solidarity 
(Green and Jamal, 1987). In some instances families with low incomes may come to rely 
upon remittances sent by their family members, relatives or friends living abroad (Ali, 
1997). All transfers may be in the form of gifts but they are gifts within a context of mutual 
social obligations. Obligations do arise for the recipients. If a household becomes better off 
and or their relatives suffer disasters, there is a clear and clearly recognised social obligation 
on them to make transfers in their turn (Green and Jamal, 1987; Phelps, DePass and Powell, 
2000). 
There is a surprising dearth of information on remittances considering their perceived 
importance to the household economy, especially so in rural areas. Although hard data on 
the level of remittances is not available, estimates of the level of remittances, provided by an 
emigrant work force, refugees, and from business communities living abroad, arc in the 
region of US$ 300 to 500 million per year (Green and Jamal, 1987; Ali, 1997). Their 
significance grew as part of the emerging parallel economy in the 1980s, when they were 
estimated to be worth US$ 370 million annually (UNICEF, 1991). This was equal to 13 
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times the Somali-based national wages bill and partially explains how households at the time 
were able to survive on basic government salaries that covered only 8% of household 
expenditure (Mubarak, 1996). Writing in 1987, Green and Jamal suggested that remittances 
probably exceeded 20 times the Somali-based wage bill, exceed a third of the total GNP, and 
are about the same as non-agricultural GDP. 
Even taking the lower estimate of remittance transfer this figure dwarfs the total funding for 
Somalia from donors to the UN system that was estimated to be in the region of US $115.5 
million for the year 2000. "' The 2000 UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia raised less than., 
US $50 million. As a proportion of this aid is spent on logistics operations and maintaining: 
offices in Nairobi, and on foreign personnel, the amount actually entering Somalia is much 
smaller. 
In a recent report Ismail Ahmed (2000) suggests that the size of annual remittances in 
Somaliland is estimated to be four times the value of livestock exports. These are so 
important that the economic disaster predicted for Somaliland following Saudi Arabia's ban 
on imports of livestock from the Horn in 1998 was largely averted by the increase in 
remittance flows that during the ban financed virtually the entire import bill for both, 
Somaliland and the Somali region in Ethiopia (Ahmed, 2000). He suggests that the average 
annual remittance received by households in Somaliland is an astounding US$ 4,170. "" A 
survey conducted amongst the Somali community in Minnesota (United States) noted that an 
average of US$ 2 million a month leaves the city for Middle Eastern banks to be distributed 
in Somalia and in refugee camps in neighbouring African countries, sent by individuals in 
chunks of US$ 100 to US$ 600 (Phelps, DePass and Powell, 2000). Preliminary data from 
UNDP's household socio-economic survey indicates that on average, remittances make up 
22% of per capita household income. Remittances to southern Somalia are poorly 
documented. In Baidoa, the records of just one remittance agency showed that US$ 75,000 
was remitted monthly through their office (UNDP, 2001). 
111 11iis figure does not include sources from non-traditional donor sources such as the Arab States or Islamic institutions that 
tend to bypass the UN institutional framework. 
1111 GDP per capita has been estimated to be US$ 795 (UNDP, 2001). 
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Remittance flows show great seasonal variation, increasing sharply during droughts and 
economic downturns when normal livelihood patterns are disrupted. In rural areas, for 
example, remittances may provide security against crop failures, illnesses, sudden price falls 
and loss of income or assets. In common with experiences in other parts of the world, due to 
a history of better access to education, political privilege, or accident of geography, some 
social groups and clans have a higher percentage of their members in the diaspora than 
others. Migrant workers and refugees tend to come from better off families who can afford 
to invest in sending a family member abroad. The rural poor and the internally displaced 
from groups who have fewer relatives in the diaspora receive fewer remittances and are less 
well served by telecommunications. Certainly some clans, notably the Darood and Issaq, 
and the Leysan amongst the Reewin, benefit more from the receipt of remittances than others 
therefore reinforcing existing resource inequalities. 
Other mechanisms 
Amongst the Reewin of southern Somalia there is an important distinction between 
ownership and access to farmland. In areas of land or labour shortage, patterns of land rental 
may be important as a means of maintaining or increasing crop production and preventing 
land reverting to bush. Who rents land and from whom land is rented can be important 
indicators of social and economic stratification among villagers. The tertris of renting 
indicate levels of monetisation (if money is paid) as well as the kinds of ties that bind 
villagers and family members. In particular hoorsi is an agreement between friends and 
relatives to temporarily use a farm. In this case, when a person is unable to farm all of his 
land (due to a lack of available labour) he may make the land available for another's use for 
a fixed period. Some of the surplus produced may be given to the owner of the land, and 
some may go toward the purchase of a farm or the clearing of new land by the 'renter'. For 
those suffering from severe asset depletion (such as Ibrahim, see Box 6.3 below) this is a 
vital mechanism for (re)gaining economic independence. 
Falling under the general term kaalma, meaning 'to raise from a problem', there are several 
ways, in addition to those described above, by which the less able, or the relatively more 
vulnerable are helped. Numerous terms exist, but these include: wagaal nag, helping close 
relatives restart by providing gifis of livestock money or food; aduud, the restocking of 
livestock, irmaansi, the loan (or permanent gift) of a wet (milking) animal for a period of a 
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several months; and wnaa. credit, rrpid v6hcn the oppart=ity arises. This maY be in the 
form of a witnessed transaction (for example, the majak SM Sh6Lh) of sorghum for 
consumption to tide a family over the period between the gm and de)r. or seed for the 
coming planting season and should be paid back at the next good hancst. likc-f0r-likc- 
lbraahim (aged 65) lives in a we room arish on one side of the main street of the village of 
Gaduuda Dhunti. There are no windows and lbraahim and his t-Ao %MS, Njak2il (12) and 
Sakud (22) sleep on cow hides placed directly on the brusW awd floor. There is no 
furniture and a small charcoal fire bums in the Corner heating a banard aluminiurn pot CA 
soor (sorghum porridge) for their only meal of the day. This hut at Icau keeps them dry 
when itrainswhichisan imProvementon their previous lod&gs. ljisAjfe. jlawz (64) li%vsl 
in the villagc. 
The other villagers consider lbraahim to be amwgst one of the Poorest within the 
community. This was not always the case. Prior to the war, Ibraahim was one Of the luck-Y 
ones - in 1990, lbraahim lived in a large compound (maaW, owned a t'r9C farmof one 
hundred ta! ab, twenty goats, two cattle, and ten chickens. More inTertantlY- Ibmahim Was a 
prominent shopkeeper. Ibraahims two shops sold clothes and gencral groceries and every 
j7hursday he would make the trip to one of the larger towns in the area to buy PrO'*i'ins* 
Then the war startcdL Hearing that there were bands of roving militia in the area. Ibraahim 
buried the stock from his two shops. Unfortunately this was found shortly MICrIA'ards by 
Harehan militia and looted. Consecutive droughts took their toll and the few crops that wM 
planted failed and the livestock was gradually slaughtered or sold to feed his family- 
Eventually, even the farm had to be sold. With his small family. Ibraahim migrated to the 
Lower Shabcllc river in an cffort to find food from the international feeding centres that had 
recently been established. Thus, began nearly eight years of constant migration in search Of 
employment and food, centred around the two rivers of the Jubba and Shabcllc. before lu- 
felt it was safe to move back to his village prior to the gu of 2000. In the meantinic. his 0%%m 
I 
clan militia (Hubeer) killed one of Ibraahim's two wives during the gu season of 1999- 
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Lýun'cnt]Y, Ibruhim has access to two fanns, his own of 20 ta'ab, which he was able to buy 
in 1994, and a homi arrangement of 10 ta'ab, respectively thirty and 5 minutes walk away 
from his home. During the 2000 gu smson his own farm had been completely planted but 
inadequate rainfall meant that his crop of sorghum and nuize failed. lie was able to harvest 
only 36kg of mai=. On the hoorsi f=m. only six out of 10 taab, were planted, the remainder 
,I 
is bush that has grown as a result of neafly a decade of neglecL The hancst from this farm, 
also faile& In pirparation for the coming de)r rains, Ibmahim and his two boys were 
endea'Guring to Prepare their land for planting. Not having enough food they were unable to 
Pay for a %%'Ork Party (90ob) to help Orm, but through a gift of USS 5 from the research 





WIth lirtu2lly no hantst. and no Other assets (in 1999, he sold his compound for SShs 
450. ()Oo to pay off debts) Ibraahim is struggling to make ends meet and is sad that he does 
not have enough money to be able to send his two boys to school. Although he was fortunate 
enough to find work on a neighbour's farm during the last gu harvest and received 36kg o 
seed in return for his labour. %%hich%ill be planted in the coming dejr (2000) season, he still 
owes a total Of SSIIS 170,000 to two friends in nearby vill3ges- Ila-ving no relatives in the 
""'age, lb"aahim and his two boys depend on the generosity of neighbours and friends. Once 
a giver Of =LX . Ibraahim is now a receiver. After the last harvest (gu, 2000), Ibraahim and 
his two sons "ere given a total of five sacs of sorghum panicles by four different neighbours 
who had seen his PlighL Recently. Makail ate for free in one of the restaurants in the village. 
lbraahim was looking foruw-d to a good dC)T (2000) season and contributed SShs 2,400 to a 
Q"ýan reading fund to pray to God for a good harvesL I le hope$ that them will be an even 
better gu (200 1) season to allc%iate his current plight. 
House4old and cofirpol, #14 re$OmrCrflO%. s 
Figure 6.13, Dispersed mourres and 4oweholdand compound kivi nerivorks, below, tries, 
for the purposes of anal), Sisý to summarisc and simplify these dynamic processes and 
comPle, relationships described in the prc%ious paragraphs. This framework offers no sense 
of scale Or of geographic distance, but understanding the whereabouts of absentee' 
household 
membCM %% hether inside or outside of somalia. and their resource connection to 
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the household is central to this analysis of vulnerability. In the same way it is necessary to 
understand the location of productive assets such as livestock and farms and their connection 
to this umbilical household. Due to the pattern of extremely localised rainfall these assets 
may not be similarly affected by drought. Connections may exist within communities, - and 
between communities in the same district or region, between regions, and even between,, 



















Key: 40 represents a household within a compound 0 
L livestock ownership 
F farm (owned or hoorsi) 
E employment (income earning opportunities including begging) 
R remittances 
represents theflow ofresources and the connections between household members, neighbours, tile 
links 
to immediatefamily and through marriage 
Figure 6.13 Dispersed resources and household and compound level networks (Source, Author). 
6.4.2 The cooperative networks of community 
The previous sections have made much of the social and resource networks of extended 
households. Needless to say, communities of place are not black holes, devoid of social and 
resource interaction. These areas can be considered as a framework for living - containing 
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the networks, forms of interchange and memories that bind people to their locality and their 
environment. Social institutions are organised at this level and are primarily designed to 
enhance co-operation and social cohesion among people in a given location. 
Co-ordination of village life reflects the exigencies of a difficult and often unpredictable 
environment that encourages the strong egalitarianism found in other parts of Somalia and 
the mutual aid that occurs among family members and between families. Indeed, some 
suggest that in Somali society life can be seen as a collective existence and egalitarian in the 
extreme Lewis (1963) rather than the unbridled individualism glorified in some Western 
industrial cultures, and, furthermore, in the human rights based machinery of the United 
Nations. Decisions that affect only a family are almost entirely the province of that family. 
Decisions and activities which have important implications for the larger social group of 
villagers are inclusive and consensual, emphasising the importance of solidarity above all 
else (University of Wyoming, 1984a). 
As the following section describes, villages not only provide households with familial, 
friendship and religious networks for the sharing of resources but also a sphere of co- 
operative networks for labour sharing, water management and the storage of grain. Whatever 
their lineage association, members of a village (or resource community) are regularly 
associated with the construction and maintenance of water-ponds, the actual watering of 
livestock and any aspect of cultivation which requires collective endeavour. In this way, an 
individual has at least two sets of relationships to other people within the community: with 
other villagers, for example, as above, and with their kinsmen in other villages for the shared 
defence of the clan's grazing lands and interests in the equitable distribution of, and 
responsibility for, payments of blood wealth, or diiya (Lewis, 1968; Ifelander, 1997). This 
community based resource management contrasts with the individualistic systems of 
pastoralist nomads. 
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Mel biyaa en taIna barigal me lee, Where there is no water there is no settlement 
Rainfall and water (biyo) play a central role in the lives of pastoral and fanning groups. So 
much so that the main droughts (sing. abaar) are remembered with special names and 
complex water management strategies have arisen to govern its use (and misuse). "' 
Drawing upon the loric oral history of the village of Gaduuda Dhunti the elders were able to 
list over fourteen droughts that had affected their community (see Table 6.2). Varying from 
one community to another these disaster discourses provide a useful insight into the 
localisation ofdrought. The drought of 1973/4 that affected large parts of northern Somalia 
and that led to the government resettlement of nomadic groups in the riverine and inter- 
riverine area of southern Somalia is not mentioned here. 
Table 6 21 oca Author) lisation ofdrou : Gaduuda Dhunti (Source ht chronolo . 
1907 
. g gy 
Ismin Koonlur *The Monday year when people migrated south' 
19322 TaIaad(_0-'uruqii - 'TheTuesday year of smallpox' 
1943 Jitnaa Twigaay - 'The Friday year of stealing' 1 
1950 imaa Gt(uracq -The Friday year of migration' ji 
1955 Talawla Lania(leerooclkii - 'The Tuesday year of two deyr seasons' 
1956 Arbaa Ufurow Insafarkii - 'The Wednesday year people went to Ufurow' 
1958 Sahli Alagaara - 'The Saturday year of eating leather' 
1965 Jimaa Baasla - 'The Friday year of Pasta' 
1966 Subti lainaShaaban - 'The Saturday year of two Octobers' 
1975 Talaada Qasadheere Inguuraay - ThcTuesday year people emigrated to Qasadheere' 
1992 Kainfis Teleb - 'The Thursday year of eating whatever you see' 
1993 Sahti Qara'armaay - 'The Saturday year of eating watermelons only' 
1996 Talaa(la Dbukuy - 'The Tuesday year of the unexpected drought' 
Jimaa Shalfarfir - 'The Friday year of scattering' 
Furthermore, the same elders differentiated droughts according to their severity. Abaar 
neebsooy ('take a rest') refers to the failure of the gu or deyr rains suggesting people should 
stay at home and 'take a rest' from farming activities, whilst the more severe abaar nuuhiyi 
119 11 i story is calcu I ated in seven-year cycles with each year of the cycle named after a day of the week. To further differentiate 
one year from another, each year is given a title that aptly describes the major event occurring in that year. This system 
provides a chronology ofevents and information about the kinds ofthings important to the life ofa village and its residents. 
For 
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('nothing is left') refers to the complete failure of the sorghum crop, empty grain stores, no 
pasture and no livestock. In the chronology above, the drought of the 'Saturday year of' 
eating leather' was classified as abaar nuuhiyi, resulting in people eating their leather shoes. 
The problems of 1992 were also in the same category. In Garsaley villagers referred to 
droughts using different terms but the differentiation of severity remains: kalulaw (a 'mild' 
drought), hurgufa (six months without rain), and lafa rug (a drought of 'chewing bones'). 
These specialist discourses also affirm the central role that migration plays in livelihood 
strategies, and similarly the close correlation between drought, the availability of food and 
hunger. 
The way in which people cope with and seek to gain some measure of security in the face of 
the unpredictability in the amount and geographic spread of rainfall (described in Chapter 5) 
is a crucial part of their institutions and cultural practices. '2" The number of waro near a 
village, their total capacity and the amount of water stored is a major determinate of the 
number of people who will be found living in the village at any given point during the 
year. '2' When village water sources are dry (most likely during the long dry season orfilaal) 
alternative wells or catchments will be sought, often involving migration to other sources 
nearby or much further afield. "' During the dry season it is common for round trips of 60 
kilometres or more to be made to collect water or for entire villages to move in search of 
water security. 
Customary law, or heer, "I governs such resources as water catchments (war) and determines 
the penalties for their abuse. Each war, 'owned' and located on the land of the father of the 
pond (or aw), is managed by a particular water using community (fathr) although resources 
are available to different fatfir and neighbouring clans when their catchments are 
example, the establishment of the village of Gaduuda Dhunti was remembered by elders by referring to Talaada t'ijnjqii (the 
Tuesday Year of Smallpox) and counting fifteen years before this event. 
120 ý I'he 2001 UNDP Human Development Report suggests that 76.9% of the population do not have access to safe drinking 
water (UN DP. 200 1 ). 
121 For example, Gaduuda Dhunti has a total of 26 ivar, in addition to a well in the centre ofthe village, ranging 
in 'distance' 
from the centre of the main settlement from a ten minute walk to one of50 minutes. 
122 Some water resources are reserved solely for livestock due to their high salinity. 
123 In AfSooniaali this is written xeer. 
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exhausted. "' In this instance permission to use the war must be obtained from the aw. The 
management structure is centred around the aw, his lieutenants, the gob and the sagaale, 
posts filled by men, and the water using group. The water is open for use to all those who 
regularly assist in its maintenance and periodic enlargement and de-silting, which is 
undertaken by thefalfir during the dry season (either the hagai orjilaal) when the pond is 
empty and food is available. 125 There is a well-defined and established code of water-use 
rules, and those that infringe them are either fined, or, ultimately, denied access to the 
water. '2" 
Labour 
As a social and economic unit, the household involved in agro-pastoral subsistence 
production displays three basic conditions which dictate its organisation: its size; its ability 
to draw members of other households into its activities; and the facility with which it can 
shill labour from one activity to another (Massey, 1987). The number of persons in a 
household who are able to contribute productive labour is a critical determinant of the 
production strategy ofa household. Thus labour shortages, due to a lack of immediate family 
or the inability to draw on labour from outside, is potentially the major constraint for the 
utilisation ol'productive resources and, consequently, the availability of food. 
To mitigate this, there are a number of circumstances where labour-sharing arrangements are 
made. These can range from reciprocal labour exchange between households to more 
elaborately organised associations of young men. Increased demand for labour is usually in 
response to the varied needs of the seasonal agricultural production cycle, specifically that of 
land preparation, planting and weeding. In these situations, the economic advantages of 
polygyny and numerous children of working age become evident. 
124 - Me researchers were also told of another term, isbij-deyin, (biyi (water) and leyin (belong) - 'they belong together') 
to 
mean 'water using community'. 
125, [lie volume ofsilt removed by each shareholder is typically four gunin (one gurun is the length from elbow to fingertip) 
by 
their height. 
I., fi ý 140 systems of Penalties exist, imposed by the asv: sedahjiir, typically a three year old came], or a three year old 
head of 
cattle. or three goat% is imposed for those opening the pond without the consent of the community, driving livestock 
into the 
pond area, fighting in the dam area, or for those not excavating. Sodon is a milder set offines and is imposed for wasting water 
around the darn area, and washing clothes in or entering the water while wearing shoes. The fine in this case is one goat 
Similar rules do not exist for the management ofhand dug wells. 
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Helander (1996) cites an example in Ooflaawe (Bay region) using an average land holding 
of 0.873 hectares that would require 29 to 58 (adult) man-days to weed such a field. Because 
at least three rounds of weeding were required, total man-days for each field would equal 
three to six months full-time work. 
One form of group labour is known as the goob, or work party. '2' This is a temporary 
assembly of kin and acquaintances (children or adults) gathered together at the request of' the 
owner of a farm to perfon-n a specific agricultural task (such as weeding, harvesting or 
planting) (see Figure 6.14). 128 Most goob last only for a day, though a small goob may be 
needed for several days to accomplish a task. However, these services do not come without a 
cost. Those who do the work of a goob expect to be fed on the day(s) that they work. While 
soor (sorghum porridge) and milk is usually provided, occasionally a requesting farm owner 
may slaughter a goat to feed those in the work party. 
A second form of labour group is called a laanbeer (or youth group). "' The laanbeer, 
comprised of males aged between 15 and 40, have traditionally provided the defensive force 
for the community and also support those, such as the disabled, with, for example, fanning 
activities. "' This more formal structured group has its own division: als, (commander in 
chief), gob (officers), galan (non-commissioned officers), and the raall (or privates). Food is 
again expected in return for their labour. The laanbeer also acts as an emergency team 
within the community and will undertake tasks such as the collection ol'building materials 
and the construction of housing. "' 
127 Ina survey undertaken by the University of Wyoming (1984b), the goob is the most common work group found in the Hav 
region, with over 10% of the households interviewed having used a goob in the previous year. 
128 The most labour intensive task is weeding. 
129 Can also be called a (goob) barbaar. 
130 Women can also be found in these groups but they are predominantly made up of men. 
131 Whilst the researchers were in the village of Gaduuda Dhunti, there were two laanbeer groups, each of30 people 
During 
the gu season, these two groups had assisted with land preparation and planting on 50 out of an estimated 
500 farms within the 
community. 
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Figure 6.14 Labour intensive tasks, such as planting, often rely on the group labour of a goob, or 
%% mk party (Source, Author, Gaduuda Dhunti, December 2000). 
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Community reserves 
Prior to the conflict strategic community reserves, or qaraan, were said to exist in many 
Reewin agro-pastoralist communities. These were an important element of community 
cohesion and were established in recognition of the cyclical nature of drought and the need 
to look after less fortunate members of the community during these periods. 
After a season of plenty (or aaran), normally associated with abundant food and livestock 
pasture, contributions were sought by the village chief to establish this community reserve, 
the size of contributions (in kind or cash) depending upon the capacity of each household to 
pay and community consensus. Livestock was kept and managed by the village chief 
sorghum held in separate underground stores, or the resources sold and the subsequent funds 
retained by the chief for future use. 
This communal buffer stock was used to provide insurance during periods of food stress, 
such as drought, and assistance was most typically sought by those in need to pay for burials 
or to assist in the hiring of farm labour. Disbursements from the qarcian were also 
occasionally made to hold a 'feast for protection' -a communal reading of the Quran 
(kulan or huus) to pray to God to protect the community from calamity befalling them. 
Community consensus was required for withdrawals to be made from this fund, the final 
decisions resting with the chief and the sheikh (a religious authority present in every 
community), disbursements being made depending upon the needs and asset status of the 
potential recipients. 
The sheikh guaranteed that the process was transparent and accountable guarding against 
accusations of wrongdoing by the chief. 132 This managerial and decision-making partnership 
was important. Although the traditional decision-making authority of the chioff is higher than 
that of the sheikh, the religious role of the sheikh is perhaps more significant. 
6.4.3 Adoption and the backstop of kinship 
Whereas it is well known that many Reewin clans, due to the adoption of strangers, have a 
slightly different and more heterogeneous character than many other Somali clans the very 
132 Without exception the sheikh is male. 
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nature of these differences is less well understood (Helander, 1997). Lewis believes that "the 
southern cultivating Somali ... derive, to a very considerable extent, from immigrant waves of, 
northern nomadic pastoral Somali... " (Lewis, 1994: 133). This is strongly refuted by the 
Reewin themselves. 
This generally gradual process of adoption (or sheegata), which, according to prominent 
Reewin elders (Interviews with: Haji Mad Jiroon, 18 September 2000, Baidoa; Malaak 
Mukhtar, 6 October 2000, Baidoa; Malaak Hassan Shure, 8 October, 2000, Hawaal Barbaar), 
started once the original Reewin settlers arrived in the region 700 years ago, is not restricted 
to members of pastoral clans. According to Reewin elders, Miliffle clans have always 
allowed immigrants (for example members of the other predominant clans, and residual 
Oromo and Bantu peoples) to settle with them and to become adopted as full members of the 
clan. This has never been a question of peripheral events but, rather, the institution of 
fle clans adoption - allowing relatively free movement throughout the area inhabited by Miri 
- is so central that in some clans the number of adopted members have overshadowed that of. 
birth members (or dhalad) (Helander, Mukhtar and Lewis, 1995). 
Although the preceding paragraphs have emphasised the importance of locality and the 
community networks of place it needs to be underscored that migration and resettlement are 
fundamental strategies in the agro-pastoral mode of life of the Reewin. This is no different to 
the rest of Somalia. Tbroughout Somalia there is constant movement, both temporary (for 
seasonal employment, livestock management, or the search for water) and settlement 
migration, between regions and within regions, and within and between districts of the same 
regions. A household or a small lineage may, by moving to a new area, enjoy circumstances, 
that are much more in line with their particular needs. Thus, although Reewin clans do 
contain large numbers of members from the other Somali clan families, the bulk of, 
migration and adoption takes place among the heterogeneous Reewin clans. 
Adoption, of households or an entire unit of a clan, from one Reewin clan to another also 
occurs and there is no restriction on the number of times that this process can take place. 
Adoption within the Siyeed, within the Sagaal, and between the Siyeed and Sagaal arises. 133 
133 Lcss common is adoption between clans of the Mirift and the Dighil. 
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This process of incorporation is historically a much more common practice in southern 
Somalia than elsewhere, due to the high number of migrating newcomers seeking access to 
resources and protection within the identity of dominant clans (see also, UNDOS, 1998). "' 
After an initial probation period (tyaaba) of one year the adoptee, and the future children of 
the adoptee, will relinquish all ties with their former clan and share in the benefits, and the 
problems, of the host clan. "' The former includes the gift of virgin farmland and the latter 
the payment of diiya (an Arabic term, but in Somalia also known as mag) or blood 
compensation, the individuals range of support being linked directly to his diiya-paying 
group. 
Diiya-paying groups consist of closely related kinsmen united by an explicit contract (heer) 
which defines the terms of their common obligations. Thus the clan is held rcsponsibic for 
the acts of its individual members. The definitive bond is solidarity in the prosecution of a 
blood-feud. An infiingement on the person or property of an individual member implicates 
the group as a whole. As the diiya-paying group is united politically against outsiders, so 
internally its members are subject to a common rule of law. Strength and weakness are here 
primarily a matter of size of an individual's diiya-paying group and ultimately the extent of 
the widest agnatic support that he can muster. 
Adopted members are fully integrated into the clan, enjoying the rights (including access to 
resources), and sharing the same responsibilities as existing members. Individuals or, more 
commonly, households, may change clan identity several times. The benefits for the host 
clan include an assimilation of new assets, if any, and an augmentation of numerical 
strength, an advantage in war and political representation. This process of adoption may be 
also important in the transfer of knowledge, a sort of community 'extension' service 
(Interview with Malaak Mukhtar, 5 October 2000, Baidoa). 
134 Declaring sheegata is relatively simple - the elders of the chosen clan are approached and asked 
for membership, an animal, 
a goat for example, is slaughtered, and a public declaration is made stating the desire of affiliation to the new clan. 
It can be 
done by individuals or an extended family. 
135 During periods of high levels of in-migration, Somalis from small clans seek protection by taking client status within the 
lineage of a stronger clan. After all, what is the point of moving to one that is weaker? Generally a more powcrrul clan 
is 
sought as these are thought to be able to provide better protection in the case of conflict, or are better able to provide resources 
in the case of asset loss. 
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Ultimately, the constituent clan forms a vital social network that the state cannot provide 
(Laitin and Samatar, 1987) and where no formal welfare system exists, it is the final 
resource backstop during times of need. Assistance from the clan (tolka kaalmooyi) may take 
the form of a gift of a 'starter' herd of mixed livestock collected from wealthier individuals 
within the clan, or, the most important gift of all to the Reewin, cultivable land. 
The fact that migration, adoption and resettlement throughout the entire inter-riverine area 
have been going on for several hundred years also means that most families have relatives 
spread out among a large number of clans and over a large geographic area. These personal 
and familial networks which transgress clan, ecological resource, and political and 
administrative boundaries may help to mitigate, by stressing local (and more recently global) 
links and collective identity, major troubles such as conflict or drought. The immediate 
importance of such geographically extensive networks is that close kin in other communities 
may be relied upon to offer assistance and are an important element in access to resources 
such as food aid. 
6.5 'MINORITIES'AND SOCIAL NETWORK ENDOWMENT 
Research in different countries indicates that social networks are important elements in 
community cohesion and in the quality of household and inter-household relationships (see 
Chapter 3). This research has shown that amongst the Reewin these networks are highly 
interconnected since its members are likely to share the multiple bonds of place: household, 
community, religion, friendship and kinship. This results in high degrees of social 
integration and resource support for those within the network as a whole. Conversely, the 
theory of social capital and livelihoods given in Chapter 3 suggests that non-members are 
excluded from these benefits. But network endowment, or the degree of connectedness, 
during periods of need is an important part of our understanding of vulnerability amongst the 
Reewin. 
As an outsider the social stratification of Somali (and Reewin) society is perhaps one of the 
most difficult, sensitive and complex topics to understand, further complicated by the 
admixture of clan adoption amongst the Reewin. Certainly, in the way that the physical 
assets of households' vary so does social network endowment. But understanding the degree 
of endowment amongst the Reewin is far from clear. 
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Somalia has been noted as one of the few virtually ethnically homogeneous countries in 
Africa, if not the world (see, for example, Lewis, 1993b; Samatar, S. S., 1991). In spite of 
this reputation for homogeneity, Somalia has its cultural and 'ethnic' splits: this fictitious 
monoculturc is extrapolated mainly from the study of the northern part of the country where 
most of the field research about Somali culture was undertaken (Mukhtar, 1996a and 1996b). 
The subtleties and implications of social stratification within Somali society have remained 
largely ignored (notable exceptions include, Cassanelli, 1982; Luling, 1983; Bcsteman, 
1995). 
One level of division is between Reewin and the other major clan groups (see Chapter 4 and 
earlier in this chapter). At another level, the most divisive element of social stratification 
within Reewin society (and elsewhere in Somalia too) is the distinction between bilis 
(meaning literally 'noble') and hoon, a generic expression to describe all 'lowcr-castc' 
members of the clan. This socially heterogeneous category is charactcriscd by the 
stigmatised identities of occupational status and physical appearance. The first includes such 
groups (found throughout Somalia) as the Midgaan, Tumaal and Yibir, generally 
leatherworkers and butchers, blacksmiths, and midwives respectively and considered by 
'noble' Somalis as 'ritually unclean' or 'polluted' (Interview with Ahmed Hirsi Jango'aaon, 
Abdikadir Mohamed Haji, Burhan Musa, Abdi Ali, and Aalin Haji, 12 July 2000, Pan Affic 
Hotel, Nairobi; Hirsi Jama Jango'aaon Yasin, 3 June 2000, Intercontinental Hotel, Nairobi). 
The second group, thejareer, practices Islam, shares Somali values, and is considered part 
of the Reewin kinship structures by adoption. But despite this Somaliness they are 
considered different by Somalis and Reewin alike. 
References to the jareer predominantly refer to physical characteristics. While jareer 
literally denotes hair texture ('hard hair'), it encompasses other traits, such as particular 
kinds of bone structure and facial features, which are negatively valued. For example, the 
shape of the nose carries special significance, with broader noses being commonly seen as 
significant markers of status. Significantly, jareer are considered to be more 'African', as 
distinct from 'pure' Somalis (or fileec meaning 'soft hair') who are considered more 
'Arabic'. This last point hints to their origins: thejareer are mainly descendants of slaves 
(adoon, another pejorative) imported from further down the East African coast - Tanzania 
and Kenya - shipped to Somalia by Ormanli traders from Zanzibar sometime in the early 
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I 91h century. A smaller proportion came to Somalia during the period of Swahili coastal city- 
states from Kismayo through Merca and Brava prior to 1500 (Green and Ahmed, 1999). 
But analYsing how a complex of physical features or occupational status reflects network 
endowment is anything but clear. Vulnerability and the identity of boon in general have 
become synonymous with the label of 'minority'. In 1993, African Rights (African Rights, 
1993a: 9) wrote, "One of the biggest obstacles to attempts to protect or assist the minorities 
is the lack of infort-nation about them and their problems. " Little has changed, and the issue 
has become highly politicised, contested and much debated amongst Somalis and others. 
Many Somali communities have been struggling not only for physical survival but also for 
international recognition. They want to be regarded as legitimate residents of certain locales 
with rights to political representation, or as vulnerable groups entitled to priority attention 
from international relief agencies, a status that is associated with receipt of international 
resources and recognition in the human rights and asylum machineries of donor or host 
countries. Some individuals have even changed their clan affiliation to protect themselves or 
gain temporary advantage from claiming 'minority' status. Identity and therefore social 
network endowment becomes a moving target. The trauma of civil war and state collapse 
appears to have accelerated the evolution of new identities (and labels) which were non- 
existent or submerged decades earlier (Cassanelli, 1995; UNDOS, 1998), such as those of 
f- I fileec andjareer. Unsurprisingly, in such circumstances it is often dif icu t to find impartial 
sources of information. 11 1 
Assigning 'minority' status to jareer is misleading. Within the Mirifle thejareer constitute 
up to 60% of some clans, certainly not a 'minority' in numerical terrns; (Interview with 
Malaak I lassan Shure, 7 October 2000, Hawaal. Barbaar). In the areas studied, discrimination 
between bilis and boon is openly manifested through the cultural institution and values of 
marriage. Although intermarriage between bilis and boon does occur it is frowned upon - 
marriage is endogamous, taking place within not between social groups, bilis to bilis, boon 
to boon. Mowlid Maan Mohamud (Interview, 4 August 2000, Eastleigh, Nairobi) went as far 
as to suggest that in marriage between a bilis woman and a boon man "her family will say 
she has died. " Thus, the extension of networks, and the potential resource benefits that 
marriage confcrs, are largely restricted because of these societal pressures. Otherwise, 
according to Reewin ciders, this social underclass has the same resource entitlements and 
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responsibilities as others in the clan. This includes the payment and receipt of diiya, the 
receipt of zakat, access to water, grazing, and farmland (Interview with Malaak Hassan 
Shure, 7 October 2000, Hawaal Barbaar; Malaak Mukhtar and Yusuf Sheikh Isaac, 17 
October 2000, Baidoa). 
Undoubtedly the numerically weaker Reewin clan groups (such as the hunter-gatherer 
groups of the Eyle near Buurhakaba and the Gabaawiin farmers along the Shabelle river), 
not part of any major factional coalition, appear to have had little recourse against successive 
waves of militiamen and bandits that scoured the countryside. "" When force is all that 
matters, communities without weapons, or communities that have enjoyed little respect or 
political status prior to the turmoil of conflict are treated with disdain. Membership of the 
'long branch' (Idan dheer), or the 'small branch' (laan gaab) was a major determinant of 
this status, their ability to withstand the excesses of war and their subsequent vulnerability. 
But this simplistic conflation of numerical strength with increasing vulnerability neglects 
such small clans as the Asharaf which nevertheless maintain influence in the business sector 
and have strong connections to the world outside of Somalia. 
Beyond the social network exclusion of marriage that boon-caste status confers the subtleties 
of political, economic and social marginalisation remain largely hidden to the inquisitive 
short-term gaze of outsiders. 
6.6 THE RUPTURE AND STRENGTHENING OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Read alone the previous sections provide rather dry and static descriptions of the networks of 
place. In Chapters 3 and 51 have made much of the dynamic nature of the social capital of 
vulnerability and livelihoods. 'Traditional society', often motionless and misrepresented, 
should not be overly romanticised. To do this would run "the risk of portraying a situation 
where there is no need for outside humanitarian intervention because they can look after 
themselves" (Boyle, I March 2001, personal communication) or that there is no differential 
access to social capital. It becomes evident that the analysis of vulnerability needs to go 
beyond this static picture. It requires an understanding of the processes that give particular 
136 nose considered small numerically (qabiii yaryar) are the Yaladla, WanjOr, QOomal, R,, r Dumal, Eemid, Ilaraaw. 
Gasaara Gude, Gabaawiin, and Eyle. Reewin Mirifle clans considered large numerically (qabiil w1wUn) are the Iladama, 
EelaaY, Geelidle, Harfin, and the Leysan. 
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shape to these social networks. This section therefore draws upon the wider dynamics of 
vulnerability narrated in Chapter 4. 
So what has the previous decade of problems meant to a largely marginalised rural and 
urban majority for whom formal welfare systems do not exist? In the context of this study of 
the vulnerability of place one of the most profound questions in the current environment of 
chronic and acute problems has to do with the ongoing relevance of the traditional extended 
social networks of the Reewin described in earlier sections. 
Historically, pre-colonial Somali society developed, in conjunction with and informed by the 
tenets of Islam, an intricate system of rules, codes, procedures, and political authorities to 
manage the 'anarchy' of pre-colonial statelessness. Many if not all of these practices 
survived ninety years of colonial and post-colonial rule (UNDOS, 1998) but the problems of 
southern Somalia have had a profound impact upon the livelihoods of agropastoral 
householders and these networks (Menkhaus, 1998). However resilient communities seem to 
be these resource networks are not inexhaustible. 
6.5.1 Shocks and stresses 
The degree of access to and resource capacity of social networks in part governs the ability 
of households to cope with, adapt to and recover from threats to their livelihoods. As I 
suggested in Chapter 3 these networks are not static. Instead they are in a state of constant 
motion, adapting to the positive and negative influences of a society in flux, the nature of 
which are central to the effective functioning of the networks of place and the viability of 
livelihoods. Many Somalis I encountered ascribe to the very real problems of everyday life a 
degree of religious fatalism that seems at odds with the problems endured. A more analytical 
approach suggests that these influences take on two broad forms, stresses and shocks. I argue 
here that these have a markedly different impact upon the social spaces of vulnerability., 
Stresses have been described as a small, regular, predictable disturbances with cumulative 
effects, and shocks as large infrequent, unpredictable disturbances with immediate impacts 
(Scoones, 1998). For the Reewin stresses have included drought, whereas conflict and the 
importation of currency can be considered shocks. Although opinions differ as to whether 
drought should be considered a stress or shock (see Devereux, 1999) historical evidence 
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demonstrates that droughts are a regular and recognised feature of the inter-rivcrine regions. 
While drought longevity is admittedly largely unpredictable the rainfed agro-pastoral system 
and the informal social mechanisms of assistance have evolved to meet the additional burden 
on the household and community that this stress induces. Poor households attempt to adjust 
to these influences in various ways and informal resource transfers within extensive social 
networks are just one manifestation of social capital or the moral economy. 
In Somalia as elsewhere, the process of transferring resources between actors involves a 
number of elements. These include the glues of mutual trust and reciprocity that derive from 
the bonds of religion, kinship and friendship. To understand the impacts upon these 
networks of the stresses and shocks that arise from protracted and compound complex 
emergencies we must take account of the relations and interactions between connected social 
spaces, rather than an analysis of the characteristics of the networks in isolation from these 
influences. 
6.5.2 Social norms and redistribution 
Individuals behave according to pre-determined norms because they fear the sanctions of 
violation. Similarly, individuals expect others in the network to demonstrate the same 
behaviour. Personal relationships are important in these informal transactions where trust 
instead of collateral is important, where, in the absence of 'visible' or pecuniary penalties the 
only sanction is social ostracism within the community and in the eyes of Allah. Shared 
values as well as the existence of institutional structures set up sanctions and offer 
incentives: expectations about the behaviour of others form as a result of interactions among 
groups defined by kinship, religion, or some other shared value. Confidence in the backdrop 
of third party sanctions discourages betrayal. Here, Somali oral culture helps the functioning 
and expansion of informal financial and resource intermediation. That is not to say that these 
resources transfers or exchanges are not without a 'cost. Numerous proverbs collected 
during this study testify to the importance of sharing and reciprocity and the sanction of 
social ostracism for non-compliance: 
Kiligii cunow kaligaa celceli - If you eat alone do not expect assistance 
in the future 
Abaar bahaase eebaa dorante - Drought ends but shame stays with you 
forever 
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Daab beerey lamba madbowaa duubsaaree - 'Tit for tat', if someone is helped 
in one 
season he will in turn give help in another season I 
Farbaferti hegdo lekakabe - Everyone will be assisted by his close relative 
Bakil watee ha kubah, ya mal sheey damadjeyeh -A miser thinks that giving assistance will 
be the end of his wealth 
Bakil a saay qaban ya hole leh - Only a miser can increase his wealth 
Quudyaradheya qayle sheene - Limited resources spur conflict or tension 
BUri nankoo walaa in taraas toIna walba ma ka A-A collection of small things from the 
wealthy, if it does not cause problems for the giver, can help those that are poorer 
Jede noolafisaar hooba ka d1dida dhimili - You must support the right person or that 
help 
dies. 
Redistribution is a community insurance mechanism: take care of somebody now and they 
will take care of you in the future. Reciprocity matters. People also matter. -People are our 
bank" (Interview with Malak Mukhtar, 19 September 2000, Baidoa). Thus, the cultural 
endowment, and history, of a society is important in the creation and reinforcement of these 
norms. 
6.5.3 The resource heterogeneity of scale 
The resource heterogeneity of scale is also important. Typically, economists distinguish 
common (aggregate or economy-wide) risk from individual (or idiosyncratic) risk: the 
former affccts everybody in a particular social or geographic community, the latter only 
affccts a particular individual within this community. 137Group-based mechanisms are geared 
towards insuring against idiosyncratic shocks or stresses, affecting some members but not 
all. While idiosyncratic risks can be insured within a community, they obviously cannot 
137 See Dcrcon (2000) for a discussion on the economics of group based insurance mechanisms and safety nets. 
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provide insurance to deal with problems common to all members, for example widespread 
drought or when drought and war coalesce. 
TbC presence of this heterogeneity, whether between households within communities, 
between communities, and within and between clans, is a central component for resource 
transfers to function. This is particularly the case if the network extends to family or clan 
members outside the area most immediately affected by the stress or shock. When this 
heterogeneity is eroded by a diminution of group or community assets the capacity of the 
system as a whole to respond to the needs of those relatively more vulnerable is greatly 
reduced. 
In this instance, a proverb says that Lama darantyo eh misqadayan, or two naked people 
cannot help each other. Similarly, Mintana je an yaa inisqaday, tabardore inisU kuf or te, 
twins help each other because of love, but fall together because of a shared problem 
(Interview with Yusuf Omar Yusuf, 9 August 1999, Jowhar). 
6.5.4 War, drought and social networks 
The major social disruption of the combined effects of civil war and drought, that resulted in 
the widespread famine of 1991-92, led to a breakdown of the unstable lincage-bascd 
alliances that are notoriously prone to fissure. This broke the 'glues' of trust between major 
clan groups and, at times, within clan groups, between sub-clans, between communities, and 
within communities. The impact of this was profound, as greater trust realiscd through 
networks of personal contact is associated with better resource outcomes (see, for example, 
Fukuyama, 1995; Barr, 1999; and Thrift and Olds, 1996). As the 'bridges' between different 
clan Communities were undermined the networks of trust contracted - to some degree as a 
purposeful strategy of inter-clan war. "' Householders stayed within their communities and 
the reassuring safety of immediate family for fear of attack by roving militia gangs. 
Although identity in terms of inter-clan bonds was at times undermined, intra-clan and 
community of place identity was often reinforced. However, the combination of drought and 
war greatly decreased the options available to escape these problems. T'here was a basic 
138 See Longley and Richards (1998) for a discussion of infonnal networks and war. 
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contradiction between the need to 'run' from the drought yet the desire to seek the bosom of 
the community in the face of insecurity. 01 nakuusa-abaar nashaltabiidi Udur 
iskuduuguwaqyna i1aahay mana tusu - War brings people together, drought scatters us 
everywhere, and disease stops us from burying people (Interview with the elders of Gaduuda 
Dhunti, 10 October, 2000). 
In the extreme conditions of 1991 to 1992 the problems were of a scale never experienced 
before. The effects were far reaching. The inherent heterogeneity of the agropastoral 
livelihood pattern, and of Reewin society, "' in turn dependent upon location, historically 
variable and localised rainfall, varied household asset bases, differing clan allegiances, rural 
and urban linkages, and differential access to transport infrastructure, contracted. This led to 
an almost complete breakdown of the traditional networks of assistance. One interviewee 
went as far as to say that this was the only time in the last decade that communities were 
unable to help themselves (Interview with Malaak Mukhtar, 21 September, 2000, Baidoa). 
Initially, the household of place networks contracted - peoples access to resources 
diminished as livestock and employment migration routes were blocked by warring factions 
(for example, the Mogadishu to Baidoa road that for a long time was the frontline between 
militia of the RRA and the SNA). Or areas that had traditionally provided employment 
opportunities were the scenes of the worst fighting. This was particularly the case for those 
living in the Buurhakaba district of Bay region - predominantly the Eelaay clan - who 
traditionally sought seasonal labour opportunities in the plantations of Lower Shabelle. 
Villagers lost assets due to the repeated looting of crops and animals and multiple 
displacements. People also tended to shorten their time horizons, unwilling to invest in the 
future: farms were not planted, and business investments limited. This further contributed to 
the deteriorating acute food security situation and added to the chronic problems that are 
much in evidence ten years later. 
139 According to one senior elder, for Reewin society to function effectively, there must be an interaction between four levels Or 
'pillars': the traditional leaders and the traditional system of governance, supported by the ulamaudiin (the religious 
community), the business community (that includes farmers who create employment opportunities and who maintain the links 
to the international commimity), and the poor (who provide labour). 
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As the problems continued, the asset base of household and community, and at the wider 
level of clan, became eroded. The consequences of this, in addition to the inability of the 
international community to deliver much needed resources, was devastating as the scenes of 
starvation unfolded. There are even tales of households eating at night to avoid sharing their 
meagre resources, something unthinkable and shameful prior to the conflict. 
The sharing of resources was not universal, but the cynicism and exploitation of the situation 
by some was astounding. During the height of the famine in 1992, when people were dying 
in their hundreds in Baidoa, people were also starving to death in the streets of Mogadishu 
whilst the stores of the capital remained full of food. For those with foreign currency, 
notably US dollars, or Somalia shillings, food was readily available from traders. The 
perversity of this situation cannot be overstated as these businessmen were paying gunmen 
to hijack food from the international community that was destined for those dying (Interview 
with AH Shirwa, 13 January 2000, Nairobi). Obviously there were those who did not share 
the social values of the majority. 
Paradoxically the war also had the effect of creating new, or reinforcing existing, resource 
opportunities in the form of remittance networks between those remaining in Somalia and 
this new diaspora. People that were able to flee the fighting, usually those with adequate 
assets, either to relatively safer areas of Somalia (in the north-east and north-west or by 
seeking refuge abroad), did so (see Figure 6.15). 
Conversely, the most affected by the combined impact of the war and drought were typically 
the marginal households within the community unable to escape the problems of place - the 
landless and livestockless labourers and those with weak entitlements to local informal 
networks. When disaster strikes it is perhaps inevitable that those who are already more 
vulnerable in normal times suffer most in times of crisis (see Chapter 3). 
The widescale problems of the early to mid-1990s are very different in nature to the much 
more localised droughts and sporadic isolated pockets of violence of the last few years. 
Whilst drought may have a negative impact upon food production, and even economic 
access to resources, food may be acquired, at least initially, through informal mechanisms. 
This study suggests that the inherent social and geographic flexibility of these resource 
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networks, in the absence of the conflict induced restrictions on movement (of trade and 
migration) and the breakdown in trust, allows them to function during localised 
(idiosyncratic) short duration drought. If the problems cannot be shared within the 
community of place, resource transfers from outside the community are necessary and are 
sought. 
Widespread (aggregate) drought, however, undermines the abilities of families, 
communities, and clans to help themselves and each other: the longevity of this system is 
called into question with the protracted nature of the crisis. As income-based household 
strategies become exhausted there is an increasing reliance placed upon family, community 
and clan networks: initially these expand exhibiting a degree of elasticity to meet increasing 
demand. If the drought persists the resource networks of household and community, and the 
family and clan are unable to meet demand. Eventually widespread diminution of assets 
across these levels leads to rupture of the resource networks. There is an increasing reliance 
placed upon migration and remittance flows for those fortunate enough to have relatives 
abroad. 
One question remains. How important are these mechanisms? Empirical evidence suggests 
that resources from these informal networks can account for up to 60% of the household 
economy. For some these resources are unnecessary. For others, the absence of help from 
family and clan would certainly lead to increased hardship. 
Although farmland, that in some cases had lain idle for almost ten years, is now being 
cleared, and the bonds of trust within and between clans are strengthening (perhaps 
surprising in the context of the intcr-clan (and intra-Reewin) strife of the previous decade) 
these relative improvements should considered in the context of a decade of asset loss for the 
majority of households. During discussions in Baidoa this was put succinctly: "For most of 
the last decade we were lying down, now we are on our knees. It will not be long before we 
will be able stand and walk again, God willing" (Interview with Haji Mad Jiroon, Adan 
Ahmed, Abdi Mohamed Abdi, and Mostafa Ahmed, 18 September 2000, Baidoa). 
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6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the social networks of place by gradually exposing, layer by 
layer, different scales of analysis: household, compound and, in its widest sense, community. 
But both the diversity and geographic extent of these networks challenge the notion of 
livelihoods and vulnerability that exists to date. These are not the bounded inert building 
blocks of externally labelled space, but rather porous and blurred spaces that are shaped by 
the politics, economics and cultural dynamics of society and refashioned by the processes of 
complex protracted emergencies. This spatiality may not be the boundaries of cartographers 
lines on maps or the macropolitical spaces of global politics but rather the day-to-day social 
spaces of dynamic household and place. In doing so it brings into view a number of 
mechanisms for gaining access to food or the resources necessary for its purchase or 
production. 
It is the obscured and partially enclosed spatiality of the less privileged, more than any other, 
that must be at the centre of this reinvigorated vulnerability of place. An approach based on 
the themes of social capital - networks, connectivity, embeddedness, trust, and reciprocity - 
can be used in the analysis of vulnerability where the nature of a single relation is 
deten-nined by the nature of other relationships of the network, and vice versa. The 
distribution of 'power' over the actors - or its inverse, the nature of the dependencies of each 
actor vis-A-vis the partner in the relationship - determines the, in this instance, flow of 
resources and the resulting synergies (including the degree of network endowment) that arise 
in a given network. It is this resource hierarchy and heterogeneity within the network that 
enables the resource transaction to function. These hierarchies exist at different levels - they 
can be at household and between households, between communities, and within and between 
larger geographic and lineage groupings such as clans. These links are vital because they not 
only connect groups to one another but potentially also give members in any one group 
access to the larger world through a chain of affiliations. 
This requires a more subtle understanding of the spatial impacts of disaster that go beyond 
the platitudes of the economic resources of a bounded place and two dimensional victim'. 
In terms of the analysis of vulnerability, it is important to understand what impact disasters 
(and the political and economic processes that accompany them) have upon these resource 
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networks. While war destroys or damages a wide range of 'capitals' such as the physical 
assets that are embedded in the landscape (road and rail networks, water systems, and the 
structures of abode and education) it is too simplistic to suggest that social space is 
destroyed by war. It does introduce a hermetic quality to this lived space that drought (in the 
absence of conflict) does not - in the process of physical destruction and domination trade 
and migration routes become blocked and people resort to the relative security of 
community. Social space is restricted but it is also refigured. Failure to consider these 
processes leads to a situation where the abilities of people to withstand the acute and chronic 
problems of protracted complex emergencies are underestimated. 
Migration and settlement patterns are anything but static as this and Chapter 5 have 
described. The history of migration and conquest influences everything from dialects and 
language, the nature of ethnic or clan identity, land tenure and ownership rights, and the 
fluidity of political and clan factional alliances. Waves of displacement, and even multiple 
displacements, of varying magnitude continue to be a feature in some parts of southern 
Somalia due to more-often-than-not localised conflict and drought. Recent trends of rapid 
urbanisation (or rural-urban drift in search of new or better livelihoods), and noticeable in 
towns such as Baidoa, refugee return and reintegration, and the continuing return of people 
to their home areas add further dynamism to this picture. This influences the structure Of 
social networks (including their geographic spread) and livelihood patterns. But it does not 
decrease their importance or alter the fundamental nature of clan affiliation. If anything, risk 
can be further spread between urban and rural areas. 
Recognition of the economic and social nature of these porous lived spaces and how they are 
shaped has implications for the practices of humanitarian assistance. These issues are 
explored in the following chapter. 
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PLACE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have questioned the limited spatial vision of existing 
conceptualisations of vulnerability and livelihoods. They have drawn upon recent 
explorations within human geography and the social sciences in general to suggest that these 
limited worldviews be expanded to include the hidden spaces of everyday life. This largely 
theoretical voyage is supported by empirical studies that highlight the dynamic complexity 
of the networks of place amongst the Reewin of southern Somalia. 
In this chapter I meld these strands together to provide a spatial foundation for a critique of 
humanitarian practice. I argue that the analysis of vulnerability that has been developed in 
this thesis, primarily by introducing the livelihood networks of place, has profound 
implications for the targeting of emergency food aid resources. Notably, the degree of 
sensitivity that is required for the targeting of emergency food resources. 
The particular focus of this critique is the local interface between the spatial practices of an 
active food aid organisation (the World Food Programme) combating food insecurity, and 
the livelihood networks of the Reewin of southern Somalia. The narrow externally defined 
and driven channels for the targeting of food aid resources that are noticeable in the policies 
and practices of the WFP are questioned. I also suggest that we need to take a critical look at 
the scales of analysis and action of aid provision. More simplistically, do the policies and 
practices of WFP reinforce or conflict with the livelihood spatiologies of the Reewin? 
While the analysis laid out in this chapter is critical of the limited understanding of 
vulnerability and livelihood networks evident in the practices of WFP Somalia there is a 
recognition that WFP is not a static organisation but is itself an organic body, constantly 
responding to stimuli from outside and within. At the headquarters level in Rome this much 
is evident in thematic policy documents and the forward looking series of emerging issue 
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papers that are considered for approval by the Executive Board., 40 The Mission Statement of 
the organisation itself is "... to be considered as a living document that will be reviewed 
periodically. " 
Furthermore, my own involvement suggests willingness at the country office level to address 
the problems faced in the provision of humanitarian assistance. An understanding of the 
social networks and transfer of resources, highlighted in this study, is considered an 
important element in the continuing evolution of the country office programme (see Chapter 
5). 1 also recognise that the particular confluence of the geographies of conflict and the 
history of international aid in Somalia (that was explored partially in Chapter 4 and 
expanded upon here) shapes the local practices of the organisation and poses particular 
challenges for the international community in general. 
For external actors caught up in this confusion, the problems are manifold. it mayý mean 
dealing with a combination of. incapacitation, contestation or loss of legitimacy of the state 
and its various organs; protracted conflict and instability with periodic upsurges of extreme 
violence; undermining of the social and economic fabric of society and capacities for 
recovery; and a highly politicised and contested humanitarian space in which external aid 
and domestic resources must be applied to alleviate widespread suffering. The absence or 
contested nature of the state, traditionally a central pillar of UN involvement including 
conventional relief practices, poses a dilemma for the international community in 
sanctioning humanitarian or any other kind of intervention in Somalia. 
As greater awareness of the problems posed by these multidimensional situations (but 
certainly not unique to Somalia) grows in the theoretical arena, there remain no blueprints 
and very little guidance on the functional incorporation of humanitarian principles of 
engagement, the political economics of war, or livelihood approaches. Often our 
140 The Executive Board was jointly established by the United Nations and FAO and composed of 36 States Members of the 
United Nations or Member Nations of FAO to be elected by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the 
Council of FAO and act out in the General Regulations. All policy documents are available from the WFP website 
http: //www. wfp, org. Specific examples include: WFP/EB. 3/99/9-B Lookingforward. - humanitarian policy concernsfor ýVFP, 
WFP/EB. A/98/4-A From crisis to recovery; WFP/EB. A/99/4-A Enabling development; WFP/EB. 3/2000/3-D Participatory 
approaches, WFP/EB. A/2000/4-A Emerging issues relevant to WFP6, and WFP/EB. A/2002/5-B Urban food insecurity: 
strairgicsfor ; VFP. 
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understandings of any given situation are validated only by congruence with observable 
events, and the gluey subjectivity of the present. 
7.2 THE CREATION OF HUMANITARIAN SPACE 
There is an obvious desire to simplify issues in order to understand a situation better (Sutton, 
1999). This is often an attempt to develop some order out of perceived chaos, to weed out 
some threads of causation from very complex disaster situations. While the relationship of 
Policy formation is far from straightforward (Stone el al, 2001), especially for situations of 
chronic political instability (Fitzgerald and Stewart 1997), policies obviously shape the 
practices of humanitarian action. 
Chapter 3 highlighted the taxonomies of particular interpretations of vulnerability, 
interpretations that led not only to erroneous understandings of disaster but to inappropriate 
responses to the problems associated with them. The problems of labelling and the enclosure 
of social space are not confined solely to explorations of theory but are to be found in 
numerous examples throughout the policies of WFP. Words and phrases from this lexicon of 
spatial enclosure abound separating nature-society and space-society from vulnerability with 
little or no referents to the social world outside: 'urban food insecurity', 'relief', 
'development', 'natural and man-made disasters', 'natural and man-made emergencies', 
'hungry poor', 'poor people', 'vulnerable people', 'refugees', 'households', and 
6 communities'. These same leitmotivs are mirrored in the policies (and other documents) of 
WFP Somalia which in turn are reflected in the daily practices of humanitarian action. 
7.2.1 The World Food Programme, Somalia 
The international aid community has a history of activity in Somalia going back at least as 
far as the mid-1960s, and the World Food Programme since at least 1975. Following many 
operations in support of large numbers of refugees during the 1980s, WFP food aid 
deliveries reached a peak during the 1991-1992 famine of 127,512 metric tons (M7) 
Providing emergency food assistance to nearly 1.5 million people. With the withdrawal of 
American led UN troops in 1995, WFP (along with other agencies) relocated to Nairobi 
where from this 'office in exile' international and national staff continue to programme and 
co-ordinate its activities, a contingency which will continue until the security situation 
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improves. Sub-offices are maintained in Hargeisa (NW), Berbera (NW), Bosasso (NE), 
Baidoa (S), Bardera (S), Beletweyne (S), Mogadishu (S), and Merka (S). 141 
From 1994 to mid-1999, through a series of emergency operations (EMOPS), WFP 
distributed 113,310 MTof food to an average of 1.4 million beneficiaries a year. During the 
mid to late 1990s, WFP Somalia implemented three Emergency Operations (EMOPs). 
EMOP 5036.04, "Food aid in support of emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction", 
extended from I January 1995 to 30 June 1998, requesting a total of 79,542 tonnes and 
targeting 533,000 refugees and vulnerable groups. EMOP 5976, "Food aid in support of 
flood affected people in Somalia", programmed for a seven month duration from I January 
1998 to 31 July 1998, requested 9,744 tonnes, targeting 657,500 flood affected victims in 
Somalia. This EMOP was extended from I August 1998 to 31 January 1999. EMOP 5999, 
"Food aid in support of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Somalia" was started on I 
August 1998 to 31 March 1999 and requested a total of 12,069 tonnes to support 470,660 
beneficiaries during the 8 month period. This EMOP was then revised for a period of three 
months starting I April 1999 to cover additional needs for the period until 30 June 1999. The 
three-month revision requested 10,330 tonnes of food at a total cost of US$8,038,291 for an 
additional 422,340 beneficiaries. As a consequence of a deterioration of the food security 
situation a further revision was necessary to accommodate a donation of 1,500 tonnes of 
cereals from the Danish Government. 
Distributions reached a low during 1997 (6,931 tons). 142 During the period 1975 to 1998, the 
majority, 77%, of aid deliveries have been emergency assistance, compared to 23% 
development assistance. While this flow of resources continues to reflect the needs of a 
population affected by over a decade of problems it is also a rcflection of a particularly 
challenging working environment, donor commitment, and the level of resources available. 
7.2.2 Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (6073.00) 
Following the dcparture of the UNOSOM peacekeeping operation in August 1995, the future 
of humanitarian assistance in Somalia became uncertain. This and the absence of a state 
14 1 As of May 31,2001. 
142 Statistics provided by Tiziana Cassotta of the Central Information Management and Statistics Branch (SPI) WFP Rome- 
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apparatus led to a dramatic change in the international community's humanitarian strategy. 
Institutionally, this shift was symboliscd by the establishment of the Somali Aid 
Coordination Body (SACB) and recognition of the need to apply a new conceptual apparatus 
of aid - the notion of a continuum between relief and development practices. 
The Addis Ababa Declaration of I December 1993 envisaged the creation of the SACB with 
the aim of facilitating donors in developing a common approach among themselves for the 
allocation of resources available for Somalia. As a result of the Declaration a Code of 
Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia was 
implemented which defines the circumstances required for the successful and sustainable 
implementation of rehabilitation and development assistance. The same principles are also 
applicable for humanitarian assistance with due regard to its particular nature. The 
Declaration envisaged a broad, voluntary, participation in the SACB consisting of donors, 
UN agencies (including WFP) and programmes, NGOs as well as multilateral and regional 
institutions and organisations. The United Nations Development Office for Somalia was also 
perceived as instrumental to this process, supporting the SACB by serving as its Secretariat 
and by providing analysis of policy and operational issues relevant to the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation and development activities in Somalia. 
The new conceptual apparatus became operational through the application of a zonal 
framework or an area based approach, itself a product of external labelling that ignored the 
true nature of 'war' and 'peace' in Somalia: most of central and southern Somalia was 
defined as a 'zone of crisis' appropriate only for relief assistance, parts of central Somalia 
and the entirety of Puntland were labelled 'zones of transition' where rehabilitation activities 
should be supported, and Somaliland was termed a 'zone of recovery' where the 
development process was to be supported. 141 This operational framework reflected the 
simplistic linearity of war and peace described in Chapter 3 in stark contrast to the changing 
(and changeable) security situation throughout Somalia (see Chapter 4). 
These developments in the institutional apparatus of aid in Somalia were mirrored within 
WFP. In January 1999, the organisations Executive Board approved a Protracted Relief and 
143 For a more thorough examination of this refer to, le Sage and Majid, 2002. 
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Recovery Operation (PRRO 6073.00) for Somalia for a three year period commencing on 01 
July 1999 to 30 June 2002 (see, WFP, 1999). The application of a PRRO in Somalia was a 
recognition within WFP of the policy and operational issues in supporting the transition 
from crisis to recovery "... to assist in bridging the gap between relief operations and 
development programmes" in the environment of protracted complex emergencies 
(WFP1998: para. 7). This change reflected, in the words of the PRRO document, "... the 
emergence of some relatively peaceful areas in Somalia and the remarkable determination of 
rural communities to re-establish a sense of normalcy in their lives and take charge of their 
own recovery and communal rehabilitation ... It is hoped that this move will contribute 
to a 
broader framework for integrated rehabilitation programmes in Somalia, while maintaining 
flexibility to both grasp development opportunities and respond to emergency situatione' 
(WFP, 1999: paragraph 29). As Chapter 4 highlighted PRRO 6073-00 straddles a territory 
that shows acute geographical and political differences. It also straddles a territory that 
exhibits large differences in livelihoods and humanitarian conditions that vary considerably 
from year to year and from region to region: from the recurrent crop failures and sporadic 
conflict in the south to the more pastoral based economics of the north. 
Within this framework the broad objectives of the PRRO are to: 
#t 
promote and support local initiatives that create short- and long-term employment 
opportunities and lead to seIr-reliance; maintain minimum nutritional standards 
among population groups most at risk; promote and support educational activities 
and increase enrolment, with particular emphasis on attracting and retaining girl 
students; provide life-sustainingfood to the hungrypoor in areas with acute local and 
seasonal food shortages., and promote adult literacy education " (WFP, 1999: para. 
43). 
The PRRO was designed to concentrate some 70% of its resources in the south, where 
drought, flood and conflict have contributed to chronic and often acute food insecurity. By 
May 2001, WFP had distributed 31,172MT of food. Of the total distributed, 42% was 
utiliscd for relief assistance, 40% for rehabilitation and recovery activities through food-for- 
work, and 18% for social support activities through Mother Child Health (mCH) and 
tuberculosis (TBY treatment centres, care institutions, and hospitals. This is against the 
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PRRO targets of 33% relief assistance, 48% rehabilitation and recovery assistance and 19% 
for support to social institutions. 
Unfortunately, the implementation of PRRO 6073.00 coincided with poor food production in 
Somalia, reflected in global malnutrition rates of 15 to 30% in the worst affected areas of 
Bay, Bakool and Gedo. Although efforts have been made to move the programme forward 
into more developmental activities, in southern Somalia the PRRO has dwelt on the shorter- 
term relief perspective focusing on meeting immediate needs, such that: 
"7he objective offood aid will be to save lives and assets in rural and urban areas 
during temporary and severefood deficits, as a result of: a) regional or isolated crop 
failure, b) floods during the growing cycle, c) disruption of cereal trade; d) 
breakdown or erosion of coping mechanisms; and e) large-scale displacement and 
other occurrences that could lead to rising malnutrition, hunger and, possibly, 
famine. Food assistance will be provided on a short-term basis until it becomes 
possible to undertake or resume rehabilitation and recovery activities " (WFP, 1999: 
para. 54). 
The fragile nature of peace in some areas, or put another way, the unpredictability of conflict 
is reflected in the difficulties of strategic planning. Donors maintaining a strict distinction 
between relief and development funding are unlikely to commit resources to support a 
longer term developmental perspective when this future is so unpredictable (see, Holt, 
Metaxa, and Ahmed, 2001). Similarly agencies such as WFP are unlikely to move beyond 
quick impact activities. These cannot address the wider elements of vulnerability described 
in earlier chapters. 
7.2.3 Scales of practice, scales of action: the targeting of resources 
Targeting scarce resources toward the food insecure lies among the many objectives of food- 
related information systems. The effectiveness of interventions depends upon the ability to 
identify, select, and then deliver food aid to those who are food insecure. While many 
definitions of targeting relate to 'who gets what', a more operational definition is the process 
by which areas and populations are selected to receive a resource and then provided with it 
(see, Sharp, 1998). 
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Although targeting is not a new too], its use has become even more relevant in today's era of 
ever shrinking aid budgets and the increasing humanitarian recognition of the necessity to 
concentrate assistance on those identified as most in need. Furthermore, all aid carries the 
risk of creating economic disincentives and dependency, the distortion of already fragile 
market structures, and the diversion of resources to warring factions. 
Targeting is not a separate activity, but an objective that runs through all phases of an 
operation (Figure 6-1) (Sharp, 1999a). This chapter is primarily concerned with two 
elements of this process: the assessment of vulnerability, and the (post) distribution of 
resources. 
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Figure 7.1 Phases in the targeting cycle (Sharp, 1999a) 
For WFP, targeting means selecting the areas, populations and households that will receive 
food assistance. This requires that one group (the recipients) be distinguishable from another 
(non-rccipicnts) according to some set of previously determined criteria. In this sense it 
rcflccts its two edged nature: in order to select beneficiaries, it is inherently necessary to 
exclude others and restrict the distribution of resources. While the concept of targeting 
seems simple the practice is both complex and difficult. The choice of targeting methods 
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depends on the type of intervention, the capacities of the implementing institution(s), the 
characteristics of the beneficiaries and the operating environment. 
As Chapter 2 argued, the design of targeted resource programmes depends upon the ability 
of policy makers to distinguish the target population according to some exogenous criterion, 
in this case 'vulnerability' and the various exogenous labels accorded to it. T'his is 
particularly acute for a 'needs based' programme such as WFP Somalia. In the context of the 
PRRO vulnerability is projected onto a potential beneficiary population that, under the 
general banner of relief, prioritises 'female headed households', 'expectant and nursing 
mothers', 'households with malnourished children', 'displaced persons, 'persons suffering 
temporary loss of income' and 'those with no alternative source of income'. 
A number of studies have shown that targeting is problematic even in areas of relative 
stability, and functioning governmental structures (Sharp, 1997 and 1999b; and Prime 
Ministers Office, Tanzania et al, 1999). In areas of sporadic conflict and potentially 
unrepresentative authority structures the problems are compounded further. A number of 
studies have indicated that food distributions in these conditions are liable to abuse and 
manipulation (Keen, 1994; le Sage, 1998; Ockwell, 1999; Leader, 2000; le Billon, 2000; 
Jaspars, 2000). The history of food aid in Somalia in recent years in Bay and Bakool is no 
different. With food aid operations representing virtually the only form of aid that these 
areas have benefited from these problems are pronounced. 
It should not therefore be surprising to discover (and acknowledge) that in southern Somalia, 
humanitarian agencies such as WFP operate within a highly complex and contested 
humanitarian space. Indeed, the latest report from the United Nations Secretary General Kof I 
Annan describes Somalia as one of the most dangerous environments in which the UN 
operates (United Nations Security Council, 2002). 
At this point it would be easy to attribute the complexity of this space to the Somali arena 
alone: the vicissitudes of climate, the insecurity of warring factions, a lack of a central 
government and unrepresentative authority structures. The political economies of chronic 
political instability are important and should not be overlooked in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless much of this spatial contestation originates from 
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within the machinery of international aid. Insensitivity to the multiple social dynamics of 
Somali society has helped to fuel the distortions and false economies of aid, that are 
noticeable today. 
7le pragmatic functionalism that is evident in the practices of VVTP today has much to do 
with the residual legacy of over 40 years of international assistance to southern Somalia. 
Again, history matters. For while food aid is seen as part of the solution to household food 
insecurity the legacy of the distortions that the enormous quantities of aid introduced from 
the 1970s onwards, including the UNOSOM era, and the income earning opportunities allied 
to its provision have led to many of the problems that cannot be ignored in today's aid arena. 
A central feature of this legacy, the fangibility of food aid, transforms the resource into one 
that is sought and contested. A typical food basket of maize (or sorghum), lentils, and 
vegetable oil is more than the sum of its calorific components. It has a monetary value, and 
the case with which it can be sold, given as a 'gift', used to pay off debts, traded, or bartered 
gives it the near functionality of currency. And, for many, "money is power in Somalia" 
(interview with Roger Carter, 21 January 2000, UNICEF, Baidoa). 
During the 1964/5 Pasta drought, so called because this was the first time that pasta was 
distributed in Somalia, the international community, in collaboration with their government 
counterparts, provided food aid to southern Somalia. Food was stockpiled at community 
water points and lcft for those who were most in need to collect. But the prevailing attitude 
during this period was that 'we are not beggars' - it was socially and culturally unacceptable 
to accept the 'free food' from an external source (Interview with S. Omar, WFP Somalia, 6 
August, 1999, Nairobi). Consequently, the uncollected food became contaminated and unfit 
for human consumption. 
Over the last forty years the attitude towards food aid has changed considerably: from the 
6wc arc not beggars' mentality in the 1960s, the aid fuelled economy of the 1970s and 1980S 
and the cra of the 'briefcase' NGOs, through the problems and the mass distributions of the 
UNOSOM era (see Chapter 4), to one today where 'free food is considered food for all'. 
There is an "... egalitarian perception amongst Somalis that everyone is poor, everyone is 
vulnerable, everyone has the same right to food aid as everyone else" (Interview with AH 
Shirwa 13 January 2000, Nairobi). It is the obligation of the international community to 
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give, and the right of Somalis to receive it. One interviewee, who wished to remain 
anonymous, suggests that the current aid mentality in Somalia has even contributed to the 
corruption of the Islamic principles of protecting the most vulnerable (Interview with 
Anonymous, 17 August 1999). 
In today's contested humanitarian space people start positioning themselves to take best 
advantage of this highly visible, fungible resource. At times a coercive environment exists 
where the needs of a few predominate - the so called 'afarjeebley, 'the men with four 
pockets', stand between WFP and the intended beneficiaries attempting to profit from the 
economies of aid. At times the transparency and accountability of the administrative 
structures present within the food aid chain, and through which resources flow, has been 
questioned by VVTP. 
Although there is an acceptance within the organisation of the need to work with local 
administrative structures for reasons of transparency and the security of relief food 
operations (Interview with Kevin Farrell, VVTP Somalia, 21 January, 2001, Nairobi) this has 
led, at times, to an environment of coercion. The 'taxation' of food aid, in the order of 20 to 
30%, has been demanded by authorities, a levy that is strongly rejected by WFP. '" However, 
post distribution studies have shown that some beneficiary communities appear quite willing 
to pay this 'peace tax': after all "the RRA ejected the occupying militia of the SNA and 
brought peace and relative stability to the area" (Interview with the elders of Dulmuruh, 
WaJid district, Bakool, 28 January 2000). 141 Disagreements have arisen also over the total 
quantities of food aid allocated, the timing and modality of distribution, and whether all 
clans - represented by the authority - receive assistance (whether they are considered needy 
or not). This last point conflicts with the needs based approach of VVTP Somalia and the 
principle of impartiality stipulated in the UN Principles of Engagement with Somalia (see, 
SACB, 1995; SACB 2001). 
144 In November 1999,37OMt of food aid was 'misappropriated' in HudurdistriCt- 
145 During interviews held in the village of Garsaley, members of the community stated that they are already paying taxes, in 
the form of a percentage of produce sold at markets, to fund the administrations. For example, produce sold in the local market 
Of Buur Dhonley was taxed at the rate of I goat SShs 2,000,1 head of cattle SShs 10,000,1 camel SShs 10,000,1 donkey SShs 
10.000, and I quintal of sorghum SShs 4,000. Foodstuffs (such as maize, sugar, rice, wheat flour and oil) brought in from 
outside of the district were taxed at the rate of SShs for every 50 kg. A tax of SShs 2,000 and SShs 5,000 per month was levied 
on kiosks and shops respectively. 
222 
WFP SOMALIA AND TEE CONTESTATION OF PLACE 
WFP has been remarkably effective at reflecting this difficult operating environment in the 
development of its current model for the targeting of emergency food aid assistance. This 
attempts to address the issues of security, beneficiary selection, logistics and food 
distribution management, at the same time attempting to minimise the misappropriation or 
leakage of resources. It is by no means a perfect recipe for managing food distribution in a 
complex protracted emergency but rather a constantly evolving "... approach to reach the 
hungry poor in a transparent manner without suspicion and major security incidents" (WFP 
Somalia, 2000: 2) and to reduce its negative externalities. 
Food security assessments 
WFP relies principally upon the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia (FSAU) for the 
analysis of vulnerability, the early warning of emergencies and to make a prediction of food 
needs over a given period. The Unit was created in 1994 to provide agreement and 
uniformity about food security information on Somalia and, in addition, a better 
understanding of the vulnerabilities faced by different population groups. 146 Analysis is 
undertaken primarily in its office in Nairobi from data collected by some 20 officers in 
different regions of Somalia (that includes monthly food security indicator monitoring, 
seasonal crop assessments (crop establishment and harvest)), and supplemented by market 
surveillance information collected by USAID funded Famine Early Warning Systems 
(FEWS), livestock and nutrition information, and satellite imagery. ""' 
The core analysis in FSAU has depended on the Household Food Economy methodology 
developed by Save the Children UK (see, Boudreau, 1998). Arising out of the need to 
understand the African famines of the 1970s and 1980s and drawing upon the entitlement 
work of Amartya Sen (198 1) and the participatory methods of rapid rural needs assessments 
(see Chapter 5) this approach seeks to understand the links between the production of food 
and its consumption. This approach aims to delve deeper than officially available data by, 
understanding how people manipulate their assets, and most aspects of income generation 
beyond own farms and migration (under the blanket title of 'coping'), as well as any demand 
and supply information that cannot be gleaned from such simple market price information. 
146 Core funding is provided by the European Union. In 2000, co-ordination was transferred from WFP to FAO_ 
Active 
partnerships include USAID Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) and Save the Children Fund-UK (SCF). 
147 Normal iscd Diffierence Vegetative Index and rainfall estimates from USAID FEWS. 
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In Somalia this is particularly important in the total absence of 'the State' as a source of 
information. 
The multiple dynamics of vulnerability (that were described in Chapters 2 and 3) made 
visible in the spatial phenomena of disaster are reduced to a mapping of the country in a way 
that most usefully expresses its economic geography in relation to food security in 'normal' 
year situations. To date more than 20 different food economy groups (FEG) (which are 
related to an analysis of different modes of livelihood) have been identified in Somalia. 
These groups comprise individuals and communities who share similar methods and patterns 
of accessing food and income and are at risk to similar factors that may undermine this 
access. Typically, in 'normal' years agropastoralists, for example, derive the majority of 
their food from crop and livestock production, purchase or even wild foods. Income is 
generated from the sale of livestock or crop products, and for poorer groups a variety of 
petty trade, casual labour and the collection of bush products (such as wood poles for the 
construction of huts). The nature and relative importance of resource sharing and 
redistribution mechanisms within these FEGs is unclear (see, also, Sheekh, 2002). 
This template serves both for baseline vulnerability analysis and the monitoring of change, 
notably who will be affected and how severely by downturns in the economic situation (for 
example, the livestock ban and the importation of currency, see Chapter 4) or by droughts, 
floods or conflict. This zoning offers a geographic template usually far more relevant to the 
subject of food access than administrative boundaries. The district map of the country is 
superimposed upon the food economy area map so that responses can be planned according 
to populations in administrative units. 
The output is therefore generated at several levels - by food economy group across regions 
and within districts, and further dis-aggregated within the food economy group by wealth 
group (Poor, middle, and upper income). This information provides WFP with a framework 
for regional programming purposes, district level food needs, a guide for rapid participatory 
assessments at sub-district level for the development of distribution plans, and the timing for 
interventions. 
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Yet it is one thing to identify individual wealth groups within a population and assess needs 
calculations on that basis, and another to target actual households for assistance (Interview 
with Edward Kallon, WFP Somalia, 19 September, 1999, Nairobi). As Chapter 4 highlighted 
there are marked variations in local living conditions and household resources. 
To compensate for this information gap at the sub-district level WFP uses its own local 
information to target specific populations for relief distributions. The quality of information 
from WFP field monitors and their local contacts is therefore of great importance in 
determining the allocation of resources in the relief and other sectors of the PRRO. 
The distribution process 
To suggest that the distribution of resources is shaped purely by local experience would be 
misleading. The current model while reflecting these problems is also influenced by a policy 
of gender mainstrearning in all activities, including the provision of resources (see, WFP 
Commitments to women: 1996-2001 and PRRO 6073.00). 111 Commitment I states that 
efforts should be made to "Target relief food distributions to households, ensuring that 
women control the family entitlement in, 80% of WFP handled and sub-contracted 
operations. " In 1996, the country office introduced a gender-based distribution policy that 
prioritises households headed by women and families with one or more malnourished 
children. The rationale for this, at least for the country office, is that women, as domestic 
managers, are more likely to maximise the resource in the domestic economy. 
An emphasis on collaboration with implementing partners for the distribution of emergency 
assistance envisaged in the project document (see, WFP 1999, para. 56) has generally not, 
materialised. This has been either because few are present, especially in the food deficit 
areas of the south, or because they are unwilling to be associated with food distributions 
because of the risks involved in dealing with such a visible and contested commodity. This 
places a heavy demand on WFP field staff at all levels of project implementation. 
Prior to each distribution, an assessment team registers the female heads of each household 
and counts the number of houses in each village and hamlet in the targeted area. Different 
villages and hamlets are then clustered together under an Extended Delivery Point (EDP) 
148 Available from http: //www. wfp. org/policies/policy/policy/Commitment. htmi. 
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(and Secondary Delivery Points (SDPs) if necessary) for which considerations are made of 
logistical access, proximity to settlements, and clan affiliation. A food distribution plan is 
then prepared showing the name of the EDP, the number of households that fall under the 
EDP and (based on a figure of six persons per household) the population targeted, and the 
food allocation. 
In an effort to reduce security risks and competition for resources the community is 
'sensitised' (WFP Somalia, 2001) or informed of. the targeting criteria (with an emphasis on 
the labels of VVTPs vulnerable groups); the food entitlement of intended beneficiaries; the 
quantity of food allocated per EDP taking into account the villages and households of the 
cluster; the quantity allocated per village and sub-villages (if the distribution points are more 
than the given EDP); and the distribution modalities. A food voucher is then issued at each 
EDP to a selected community representative. 
During the distribution a secure enclosure is selected and the women are screened (one per 
household of six (see Chapter 6)) - to ensure that the correct number of beneficiaries is 
present. 149 Women are then called forward from a secure enclosure to sign a beneficiary 
acknowledgement form and to sit on their allocated ration as a sign of personal receipt. To 
reduce confusion and to ensure order, the women remain seated on their unopened bags, 
until the distribution is completed. "O 
73 THE CONTESTATION OF PLACE 
The distribution of resources has become a site of spatial contestation between the policies 
and practices of the World Food Programme Somalia and the extended networks of place 
described in earlier chapters. Post-distribution monitoring exercises have shown that this 'sit 
on your bag' system has proved effective at getting resources further down the 'food aid 
chain' and as directly as possible to the domestic sphere. These same exercises, though, also 
highlight that ration dilution and problems in the distribution process still occur (see, also, 
FSAU/WFP, 1999; Von Braunmuhl, 1999). 
149 During a review of the fifteen month implementation period of the PRRO, women were the direct recipients of 95% of relief 
assistance (WFP Somalia, 2001), meeting the PRRO 6073.00 target of 52%. 
ISO Generally bags of 50kg, or portions thereof. 
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These problems are largely a product of the functional ignorance of an under-socialisation of 
place. In the context of humanitarian food assistance vulnerability is reduced to the 
functionality of bounded place (in this case an extended delivery point) reflected in the 
geographic zoning and static assessment templates of food economy groups and the policy 
labels of vulnerability. In this process the degree of interaction within and between different 
livelihood groups (whether, for example, rural or urban, agropastoral or pastoral), through 
the social networks of place (of household, family, community and clan) that have been 
explored in earlier chapters, remains underexposed. This has clear implications for the 
assessment of vulnerability and the distribution of resources. An emphasis on the assets of 
bounded place (of production and economic income) results in, potentially, an 
underestimation of the resources available to individuals and households within each food 
economy group and, therefore, an underestimation in their ability to face and recover from 
the problems of disaster. 
Furthermore, understanding the livelihood networks of place illuminates the two main 
concerns of food aid distribution. Firstly, that the intended ration does not reach the 
household. And (or), secondly, that ration dilution occurs after it reaches this level: food aid 
becomes part of the resource networks of place. Given that the ration component is 
calculated to provide a minimum number of calories per day (210OKcal) for a specified 
period this is a more worrying concern, relating to the effectiveness of the operation of relief 
in relieving food insecurity. 
7.3.1 Pre-distribution 
In turn there are two potential causes for the first point: the 'misappropriation' of resources 
and inaccurate population data upon which the ration level is determined. In response to the 
problems of delivering food in Somalia during the UNOSOM period, WP now uses the 
private sector for the movement and security of humanitarian cargoes to final destinations. 
The security bond system, which has been in place for a number of years, is applied 
to 
contracted services for south and central Somalia. WFP tenders the transportation of 
food 
commodities from port to final destinations. The chosen contractor deposits a cash/bank 
guarantee equivalent to the value of the food transported. Under this agreement, the security 
and transportation of food to the final destination is the responsibility of the contractor. 
In 
the event of loss, the equivalent amount is deducted from the cash bond. With these current 
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logistics contractual arrangements and the presence of national and international staff at the 
distribution site the 'misappropriation' of food aid is now negligible. 
The technical analysis of food needs must be projected onto the population. Yet, population 
figures vary and are problematic and estimates do not escape the uncertainties prevalent in 
virtually all Somali statistics (FAO, 1997). "' Furthermore, in Somalia population statistics 
are highly politicised, where clan power is measured partly by numerical strength. When the 
level of resource flow has a positive correlation to population data there are obvious reasons 
for inflating the population figures of the village and the household prior to the arrival of 
food aid. 
Disagreement on the number of Somalis living in the country has serious implications for 
the assessment of the food security situation for the country as a whole, and, by inference, 
region, district and sub-district and, therefore subsequent interventions by WFPYI Estimates 
of population for Bay region alone illustrate the wide variations in, and problems with, 
demographic data in Somalia. The United Nations Development Office for Somalia 
(UNDOS) gives a figure of 698,600 for 1998, the 1999 WFP regional strategy suggests 
600,500, and the World Health Organisation 621,615 (UNDOS, 1997; WFP Somalia, 1999; 
UNDOS Data and Management Unit, Nairobi). FSAU food needs planning figures are based 
upon a population of 600,500. When this figure is broken down to the district level problems 
are evident, again. The data used by FSAU, based upon figures supplied by UNDOS, 
suggests that the population of Baidoa district is 133,700, Burhakaba 125,800, Dinsor 
151,000, and Quansadhere 80,300. When a comparison is made with the WHO figures, 
151 Derwgraphic data are scanty and incomplete for Somalia, although two censuses have been carried out during the pre-war 
Period. The first census carried out in 1975 was not published, and only an analytical report based on the census results was 
brought out in 1984. A national demographic survey was undertaken in 1980-8 1, but the data were not processed, barring a few 
hand tabulations. Another census was carried out in 1985-86, but the census got bogged down in doubts about its accuracy and 
was not published. 
152 Earlier UN estimates put the population in mid-1995 at about 9 million. Some put the figure as high as 9.6 million (The 
1996 CIA World Factbook), and even 10.1 million (World Bank, 1998). These estimates are now generally discarded. A recent 
assessment undertaken on behalf of the United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS, 1997) arrived at a figure of 
5.52 million people in 1995. This is close to a previous UNDOS figure of 5.44 million but lower than the 1995 figure of 6.256 
million established by Timothy Fowler of the US Bureau of the Census. In the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agcncy 
Appeal for Somalia (January-Decembcr 1999) (UN-OCHA, 1998) a figure of some 6 million is given. All estimates should be 
taken as an approximate indication of the population since they are based on questionable data and assumptions. 
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although there is a larger total figure, large discrepancies are apparent - Baidoa 150,000, 
Burhakaba 172,000, Dinsor 121,615, and Quansadhere 90,000. 
More importantly, the reification of historical quantitative data cannot hope to capture the 
seasonality of the rhythms of livelihood (Chapter 5) and the fluidity of the networked 
household (highlighted in Chapter 6). Even the 'push-pull' affect of food aid needs to be 
considered. The timing of food distribution is crucial to reduce the dekror phenomenon - 
people from outside of the targeted communities who follow food aid convoys in an effort to 
benefit from a distribution. "' To reduce this temporary migration and the security concerns 
that often accompany this increase in numbers at the distribution site the issuance of the food 
voucher, the arrival of the food convoy and the international monitoring staff coincide as 
closely as possible. 
Further complicating this picture are the disaster migration dynamics of conflict or drought. 
After the eviction of the SNA from Bay region in June 1999 about three trucks returned to 
the region every week from Mogadishu carrying sixty families. A report from WFP (WFP 
Somalia, 2000) suggested that with the improvement in security in Bay and Bakool over six 
thousand people returned to their places of origin. More recently, hundreds of families have 
fled the intra-factional fighting in Baidoa (see Chapter 4). 
These factors highlight the need for accurate local population data immediately prior to each 
distribution that captures these migration dynamics. While WFP staff make every effort to 
count and register households within the extended delivery point, in the limited time 
available for pre-distribution planning it is not possible to reach an accurate consensus On 
population figures. 
Chapter 6 drew attention to the dynamic nature of settlement patterns in Bay and Bakool, 
and the interaction within and between the communities and households of place. The 
representative figure (Figure 7.2) shows a main settlement, comprised of compounds and 
households, and several large hamlets, and isolated compounds, which are considered part of 
153 The original meaning of dekror referred to the movement of livestock in search of water. Dekror now also refers to people 
who follow humanitarian aid (normally food aid) for many kilometres and from district to district. An interesting example of 
the way language adapts to new socio-economic realties (Jeremy Hopkins, WFP Somalia, January 20 2001). 
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the same community. This administrative settlement and resource sharing area may cover an 
area of twenty to fifty square kilometres. Even if it were possible for WFP staff to assess 
accurately individual households in such a large area this would only be a 'snapshot' at that 
particular population moment. 
Consequently this necessitates in reliance upon local administration to provide this 
information, which as I have asserted earlier has been a source of near constant contestation. 
Local authorities play an important role in facilitating (or not) communication between tile 
beneficiary community and relief organisations. Without their honest and transparent 
involvement in the compilation of population data there will, inevitably, be ration dilution 
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Figure 7.2 The resource community of place. A sense of scale is shown - one bar represents I km. In 
this schematic the area of the community is in the order of 50km2 (Source, Author). 
7.3.2 Post-distribution 
While WFP continue to press for a distribution more in line with the objective of reaching 
the most vulnerable groups as identified in the PRRO, there is a recognition within the 
organisation that there are some serious limits and inevitable shortcomings from this policy 
ideal (WFP 2000b; WFP Somalia, 2001). One outcome of the contestation of aid is a stark 
contradiction between an organisational culture promoting the rights of individual need and 
the Somali insistence of egalitarianism that everyone is vulnerable and everyone is entitled 
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to food. Typically, Vulnerability criteria used by outside agencies are at odds with local 
socio-cultural norms and perceptions of entitlement. 
The hierarchy of power between provider (WFP) and receiver (the 'vulnerable') (see 
Chapter 2) goes through a profound shift with the transfer of resources. The result is a de 
fiiclo relinquishment of the ability to control the final 'destination' (in geographic and social 
terms) and end use of food aid. It now becomes part of the social networks of place and 
subject to the same social forces as any other 'internal' resource. Food aid 'moves' within 
communities (sharing with those excluded (and unlabelled) from the distribution, for 
example, widowers, or young bachelors, and those not present during the distribution but 
who are considered part of the community), religious leaders, between communities and sub- 
clans, and between districts. And at times between regions: intra-family transfers have 
resulted in food aid moving more than 150 kilometres (Interview with AH Shirwa, 13 
January 2000, Nairobi). This is hardly surprising due to the complex geographic web of 
household and familial social networks and the importance placed upon the egalitarianism of 
sharing highlighted ill this Study. Perhaps unexpectedly, food aid can empower, as reciprocal 
'debt' obligations are met or credit is repaid (interview with Qadiidle Womens Group, 
Iluurhakaba district, Bay, 6 September 1999). 
While these socio-cultural network geographies are important they are not the only 
mechanisms of food aid movement. A survey conducted by the FSAU and FEWS ill 1999 on 
the impact of emergency food aid on local markets in southern Somalia (FSAU/FEWS, 
1999) highlights the impact that these distributions have on the local economy. While the 
study acknowledges the difficulties of attributing and quantifying the level of change as a 
sole consequence of food aid, rather than some other factor, the infusion of aid does have a 
significant impact on market prices and the local economy more generally. White and yellow 
maize distributed as food aid is found to be sold on the open market directly, sold privately 
to relatives/friends at discounted prices, and exchanged in the market for milk, meat and/or 
high value foods (such as sugar). This is not necessarily a reflection of a lack of need for 
food but in instances where the aid is the only resource coming into the household and in the 
absence of other humanitarian interventions its monetisation allows the household to meet 
other livelihood requirements such as medicines and clothes. 
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Food aid deliveries also correspond to an increase in overall economic activity (particularly 
in the tea shop trade and the presence of wholesale cereal traders). These additional food 
supplies help stabilise local markets by maintaining prices at an affordable level, increasing 
the economic access of poorer groups, albeit indiscriminately. But this comes at the expense 
of producers (Interview with Yacquub Cali Mursal, 21 September 2000, Baidoa). 
The impact of food aid on market prices is felt not only in the post distribution period. The 
study also noted that prior to the delivery of food aid, prices begin to fall. Prices then drop 
more rapidly once the actual deliveries begin, and remain relatively low throughout the 
delivery period (see Table 7.1). Most of the impacts were, however, short-lived and limited 
to the period of actual food deliveries, though this may be more an indication of the 
discrepancy between the amount of food distributed and the amount of food actually 
required in these areas. 
There are further concerns about the diversion of aid from beneficiary communities by 
militia groups, resulting in the large-scale sale of food aid commodities on local markets (see 
above). This form of indirect 'taxation' has worrying implications for the transfer of 
potential violence along the food aid chain. The changes in the modalities of distribution 
have effectively transferred this risk from WFP to the community, if not the household. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS: CONFLICT OR REINFORCEMENT? 
Despite logistical, operational and security concerns, it has been possible to conduct 
humanitarian operations in southern Somalia. However, problems remain. The theory of 
targeting suggests that if relief food assistance reaches only those who need it, at the right 
time, is of the correct quantity to cover the food deficit, is culturally acceptable, and of 
adequate quality, the resource will stay within the household. This, however, assumes that 
the household is a bounded social space with no ties of social attachment and interaction - 
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the undersocialised concept of place of humanitarian policy and practice. Secondly, it 
assumes that there are no other livelihood needs. And thirdly that aid does not become part 
ofthe war economy. And as we have seen these are all relevant. 
In societies dealing with choices to ensure their survival and welfare, social, economic and 
environmental forces work together and overlap. Chapter 6 asserted that the interaction of 
the multiple networks of place within Reewin communities is strong due to multi- 
generational residency, and the shared bonds of reciprocity and mutual obligation. These 
networks of place form on the basis of opportunities and constraints deriving not only from 
local, and regional but transnational linkages. Aid agencies tend to forget, or choose to 
ignore, that beneficiaries live in this social world to which they are not party. Although WFP 
places the highest priority on meeting the immediate needs of the most vulnerable as defined 
in the PRRO, it cannot always be assumed that disaster-affected communities share this 
same value structure. Outsiders find that it is difficult to be accepted at this level, a 'gap' that 
is palpable in the ephemeral interface of humanitarian practice and the networks of place. 
This functional ignorance is symptomatic of a 'top down' approach to the control of 
resources from the identification of needs to the delivery of resources with little, or no, 
involvcment of the beneficiary community and an emphasis on an abstract and conceived 
confinement of place. This creates an imbalance of power in the relationship between the 
two groups which has two profound implications. Firstly, it treats all communities with a 
lack of' trust, limiting local participation in the relief process and therefore empowerment 
over the food aid resource. Secondly, it reinforces the moral distance between receiver and 
provider. For beneficiary communities there is no 'cost' associated with emergency food aid 
- whereas access to resources through social networks comes with the social cost of 
reciprocation and obligation. "' Table 7.2 below draws together the main points from this 
and preceding chapters. 
WIT can accept that the leakage of resources or inclusion error is an inevitable part of the 
targeting process or it can attempt to bridge this divide between in an effort to invigorate the 
154 1 'his does not mean that there is no cost involved - there is the cost of the commodity, the cost of shipment and 
local 
transportation, anti, at times, the cost of lives lost in its protection from port to EDP. 
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spaces of disaster. After all, who knows who is 'vulnerable' within the community 
than those from the resource community? 
Table 7.2 Conflict or reirifbi-cernent? 
Social networks of the Reewin Policy and practice networks of NN'FP Somalia 
They are flexible - the), expand and contr'act Although emergency stocks arc held in Baidoa 
depending on the nature of the shock or stress to the (depending on the security situation) the provision of 
system emergency assistance is relatively inflexible due 
resource delays 
Strong sense of egalitarianism A focus upon the individualism of human rights 
PýriOritise the most -vulnerable (in -relative -terms) Clearly defined criteria exist for the distribution of 
and/or self targeting resources 
Function at different social and geo-graphic -scales Concentrate on the *hungry vulnerable poor' 0 
(household, compound, community and clan, and individuals in the undersocialised locale ol'place 
sub-district, district, region, national, international), 
and across different wealth levels 
There is a 'cost' involved in resource exchanges - 
i-h-e There is no 'cost' associated with external resources 
expectation of reciprocity such as food aid. 
Developmental activities, at least in theory, attempt to overcome these problems by greater 
engagement with the community and by drawing together the triumvirate of the conceived, 
perceived and lived spaces of place. The organisations stance on 'participation' and 
'participatory approaches' is straightforward. Its Mission Statement stipulates that WFP will 
"... ensure that its assistance programmes are designed and implemented on the basis of 
broad-based participation. " This theme is continued in the Executive Board document 
Participatory approaches (VvTP/EB. 3/2000/3-D). What this means in practice is less clear. 
At times, it would seem that participation "... is merely a bumper sticker of convenience" 
(Interview with Dan Maxwell, 26 January, 2002, Nairobi) moulding the spaces ot'disaster to 
fit the capabilities and strengths of the organisation. 
The breakdown in trust that has occurred between the international community and the 
Reewin and the changing perceptions and contested nature of targeted relief food aid make it 
extremely difficult to be very positive about the future of food aid. There is no perfect recipe 
for the delivery of resources into Somalia. This does not mean that it is not possible to 
engage with beneficiary communities in a more constructive manner. 
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To be more effective as an organisation WFP needs to reinforce rather than conflict with the 
networks of place. This can only be achieved by greater understanding of these networks and 
their socio-cultural dynamics. Although there have been recognised problems at this level, 
including the abrogation of responsibility of the socio-political contract that exists between 
the authority and the community they serve, this means greater involvement of beneficiaries 
in the process of targeting resources. This would enable community representatives to be an 
integral part of food security assessments, the identification of needs, and in the design and 
transfer of resources. This should not be simply a reversal of the power dynamic but a 
facilitation of local participation and empowerment throughout the whole process. 
Furthermore, of the conflictual elements from Table 7.2 the differing scales of interaction 
within place and the localised actions of WFP stands out. Can WFP interact with these 
networks beyond the individual (and household)? What are the key ingredients of these 
social networks and the web of interactions of household, compound, community, and clan 
that WFP Somalia can complement? For example, community reserves offer a distribution 
modality that is self targeting, and is managed by the community. Can WFP explore the 
(re)establishment of community strategic reserves, and/or the improvement of underground 
grain storage? Why focus on the household, why not the compound? Can WFP work 
between, not just within, wealth strata, with the business class to benefit the poor? To 
answer these questions will necessitate starting a dialogue with Reewin communities, 
traditional and religious leaders, businessmen in southern Somalia, and the organs of 
international aid in Somalia, the information and resource providers. 
Despite the presence of humanitarian organisations such as WFP in southern Somalia the 
depth of livelihood insecurity continues to challenge the effectiveness of short term relief 
interventions. Too often, distributions are too limited and too infrequent to reverse the 
deterioration in livelihoods that households have experienced due to the multiple shocks and 
stresses of the previous decade. In the absence of any other substantial resource input food 
aid alone is a very blunt instrument when required to address the complex and dynamic 
issues of food (in)security in Somalia. And yet it is expected to achieve so much. I suggest 
that many of the problems relating to the contestation of place described in this chapter 
would still be a feature of emergency food distributions in other societies, complex 
emergency or not. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I have drawn upon insights from the literatures of disaster research and 
elsewhere to analyse in detail current conceptions of vulnerability. Running through the 
analysis have been several major themes. Firstly, a counter-narrative of the theoretical 
geographies of space that are challenging this discipline and others in the social sciences 
promotes a clearer understanding of disasters and the disaster affected. Secondly, by 
celebrating the multiplicity of voices in social and disaster(ous) space, an emphasis on how 
people actually live and their access to the resources - including food - necessary for 
functioning livelihoods leads to an invigoration of the undersocialised concept of the 'two 
dimensional victim' and the vulnerability of place that in general have characterised these 
literatures to date. And, thirdly, tendentiously, by drawing these two themes together I draw 
attention to the contestation of place. This spatial contestation, the conflation of the 
livelihood networks of the disaster affected and the policies and practices of humanitarian 
assistance, has profound implications for the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
This final chapter aims to summarise the main arguments of the thesis, to review the extent 
to which it has realised its goal of contributing to our understanding of vulnerability, to 
explore the wider implications for humanitarian practice, to suggest potential ways in which 
the analysis presented in the thesis may be extended, and to develop an autocritique that 
explicitly draws attention to the major problems in this research. 
8.2 REVISITING THE GEOGRAPMES OF VULNERABILITY 
Ile labelling of the spaces of vulnerability is a recent phenomenon. Networked societies are 
not. Yet the international humanitarian community seems slow to realise the full 
implications of the vitality of the social world of disasters. 
The concept of vulnerability is implicated in all discussions of food security and hunger and 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. Apart from some notable exceptions geographers 
have tended to ignore vulnerability as a topic of research, a lacuna that is surprising given its 
bridging position between the two central traditions in human geography, nature-society and 
space-society. However, vulnerability makes a mockery of disciplinary divisions. 
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Geography, because of its own internal diversity, should be in a strong position to make a 
significant and constructive contribution. In safer times and places vulnerability would be 
hard to study in depth. But when, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, empirical research requires 
getting ankles dusty in the somewhat hazardous situations of chronic political instability and 
the foreignness of unfamiliar cultures, the difficulty of generating descriptions of the spaces 
of disaster can be daunting. 
This study has attempted to bring the spaces of disaster and the contestation of place into 
view even though much of the research remains exploratory, both theoretically and 
empirically. This research does, though, have a utilitarian value. What I do attempt in this 
thesis is to develop a coherent argument that is both relevant and applicable for policy 
formulation and the programming of humanitarian assistance. 
Chapter 2 argued that post-development narratives render problematic what was once 
conventionally self-evident, development. These same narratives also prove useful in 
generating an analytical lens to challenge the discourses of humanitarian action. These 
discourses give particular form to the spaces of disaster, spaces that are inhabited by the 
passivity of the 'two dimensional victim'. In an effort to reduce the complexity of disaster to 
a functional clarity, these in turn are given the labels of vulnerability where the ties of social 
interaction and association between individuals and groups dernaterialise: geography 
disappears. The chapter argued that research related to social needs and capacities (on how 
people actually live) and grounded in the spatial geographies of the disaster reality should 
lay the foundations for more sensitive humanitarian relief interventions. 
Chapter 3 took a step sideways to review the literatures of disaster research to question the 
meanings and application of the term vulnerability that have shaped research and policy 
agendas, and which, in turn, have informed the ways that disasters and food. crises are 
responded to. Although it is clear that vulnerability is much more than poverty there is no 
unitary theory. However, three main fields and an emerging fourth were distinguished. The 
first, Social problems without social content, describes situations of disaster but in such a 
way as to generate an instrumentalist and adversarial view of the environment (or nature) 
and society. Clear distinctions are drawn between 'natural' and 'man-made' disaster(ous) 
events, where the social world of people is lost in a focus upon technocratic solutions to 
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some hazardous condition. The roots of disaster vulnerability approach attempts to reinsert 
more radical interpretations of disaster by the inclusion of political economy and human 
ecology perspectives. Relations between nature and society and the agency and quality of 
social life are brought to the fore. Disasters are no longer divorced from normal life, they are 
a reflection of it, intimately related to conditions of social inequality (evident within and 
between countries) arising from the processes, failings, and unevenness of development. 
Recognising that society matters, disaster taxonomies of vulnerability emerge: lactating 
mothers, children under five, and so on. However, while this is an improvement on the 
unsocialised world of disasters, the social is still a very large domain and these labels are 
still externally generated prescriptive devices. The melding of the third (The vulnerability of 
Place) and fourth (The hidden voices ofthe vulnerability ofplace) fields not only gives voice 
to the disaster affected but by tying them to the geographical location of place it also 
provides an opportunity to examine some of the underlying social and biophysical elements 
that contribute to vulnerability. Rather than an acceptance of a passive 'two dimensional 
victim' there is an emphasis on the situational complexity of daily life. How people actually 
live, get on or get by. 
While I accept that this is a marked improvement in our understanding of vulnerability I 
argued that there was something still missing from these debates. Although there is a greater 
acknowledgement of the multiple trajectories of daily life there is a reluctance to recognise 
and engage in the spatialifies and temporalities of livelihoods. What I seek is a shift, a spatial 
counter-narrative that celebrates not only the spatial ecology of place but also the 
multiplicity of voices of disaster. To achieve this I drew attention to the spatial dilemmas 
that are stretching the imagination of the social sciences, in the process opening a series of 
doors onto the mobile geographies of social space. 
Lefebvre's spatiology proves fiuitful for broaching this spatial problematic and a means to 
bridge the divide between the conceived, abstract spaces of the policies and practices of 
humanitarian actors, and the everyday experiences, activities and spaces of the disaster 
affected. Our journey through Lefebvre's organic space led us in an exploration of 
heterogeneous associations, taking in en route the networks of social capital, representations 
of scale, and the inequalities of space. This insertion of the geographies of space brought 
into view a host of networks, connections and resources that are potentially pillars in the 
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survival strategies of the disaster affected. I found that place is no longer bounded by the 
prescribed taxonomies that characterise the literatures of disaster, but rather spaces that are 
alive with the movement of people and things functioning through scales between the local 
and the global. Agency is therefore given back to those affected by disaster. 
Theoretical explorations were then grounded by two empirical studies: the disaster realities 
and livelihood geographies of the Reewin of southern Somalia (see Chapter 6) and the 
policies and practices of humanitarian assistance of the World Food Programme (see 
Chapter 7). These were given contextual background in Chapter 4 by a narration of the 
biophysical, political, economic and social process over more than three decades that have 
led to the precariousness of livelihood situations for the majority of people in southern 
Somalia. This chapter also described the Cold war geopolitics of foreign aid and the 
international engagement of the UNOSOM era. These aid histories partly determine current 
attitudes to external assistance in Somalia without which any analysis of aid would be 
incomplete. 
Tle interface of these two studies I argued would bring to light the contestation of place. 
However, the more spatially inclusive conception of place and livelihoods discussed in 
Chapter 3 raises some serious methodological challenges. Furthermore the conditions in 
southern Somalia for conducting research are far from ideal. Concerns over my own 
personal security, and the difficulties of understanding a 'foreign' culture which included the 
filters of language, the intricacies of a predominantly egalitarian clan based society and the 
rhythms of livelihood gave form to My research methodologies. 
Uncovering the spatial contestation of place involves assembling a picture of the whole by 
recognising diverse perspectives from singular but connected sites. Information was 
therefore gathered from sites of production and consumption (libraries, United Nations 
agencies, and non-governmental organisations), and numerous individuals within southern 
Somalia (and the IDP camps of Hargeisa. and Bosasso), and in Nairobi. Organic multi-site 
ethnographies and the largely qualitative bricolage of place uncovered the spatial terrain of 
vulnerability and the confluence of livelihood networks (in the Reewin villages of Garsaley 
and Gaduuda Dhunti, Baidoa). This also meant trying to shed my own representational 
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spaces and those of WFP, while discerning as participant observer the spatial imaginaries at 
work within the organisation and how these are propagated beyond it borders. 
In contrast to the bounded spaces of humanitarian policy and practice that had been 
demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3 the empirical research underscores the theoretical assertion 
that the spaces of disaster are much more vibrant than those prescribed in the policies and 
practices of humanitarian action. This has generated a more spatially complex and dynamic 
conception of the vulnerability of place, bringing into view a host of social resource 
networks. Access to and embeddedness in the social relationships and collective organisation 
of place involving friends, family or kin groups and dependent on the resource heterogeneity 
of scale across geographic space can potentially soften the impact of the diverse threats to 
livelihoods outlined in Chapter 4. Ultimately, a focus on these social networks represents a 
more positive view of people's capacity to 'cope' with the debilitating constraints of 
Protracted crises. It underscores that individuals are not passive in the face of problems 
where livelihood systems have developed for short- and long-term survival and well being. 
While there may be a lot of social capital (in the sense of networks of contacts and 
connections and resource transfers arising as a product of these social interactions), other 
scapitals' are insufficient to allow the majority of people to escape from the status of 
vulnerability. Therefore, these networks should not be glamorised. Resource transfers do 
little to raise wealth levels in the longer-term. 
Furthermore, these networks may be extensive, spreading over hundreds if not thousands of 
kilometres but they are not inexhaustible. They are after all wealth levelling or redistributive 
mechanisms. Chapter 6 demonstrated that in the midst of complex and chronic situations of 
political instability new formations of social space are produced or reconstituted. While 
livelihood networks have evolved in response to the mostly localised impacts of drought, for 
the most Part vulnerable war introduces a hermetic quality to social and geographic space. 
Frontlines, separating waning factions, limit seasonal livelihood migration patterns and the 
movement of people and things. War also ruptures the bonds of kinship between and within 
kinship groupings leading to a contraction of resource networks. But for those able to escape 
the violence of conflict, finding refuge abroad, new network connections are established 
across geographic space. 
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This suggests that a more subtle understanding of the spatial impacts of not only disaster but 
of the social spaces of livelihoods is required. This must move beyond the platitudes of 
household economic resources of bounded place and the undersocialised world of the 'two- 
dimensional victim' that are so prominent in the policies and practices of the World Food 
Programme, Somalia, brought to light in Chapter 7. 
The contestation of place is most noticeable at the interface between two very different 
cultures: the organisational culture and functional ignorance of humanitarian assistance, 
framed within the institutional machinery of the human rights of individuals, and the largely 
egalitarian culture of the multiple networks of place, of household, friendship, community, 
religion, and kinship. And there are consequences for both parties: for WFP the efficacy of 
emergency food assistance is questioned; and, for the Reewin, a lack of trust between the 
provider and the receiver becomes operational through a lack of participation and 
empowerment in the targeting of food aid resources. 
In challenging the vulnerability of place model outlined in Chapter 3 this thesis not only 
illuminated the dynamic livelihood networks of the Reewin, it questioned the current 
humanitarian assistance policies and practices of VvTP. Ideally, a re-definition of 
vulnerability, which in a globalised world cannot be understood in isolation from the 
multiple political, economic and social scales of everyday life, should have a significant 
effect on the institutions participating in disaster response and remedial action and 
consequently the life-worlds of the disaster affected. 
While disasters will, unfortunately, continue to occur, their worst impacts on human well- 
being certainly can and should be mitigated. This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible 
for humanitarian agencies to function with a greater degree of sensitivity in the provision 
emergency food assistance than has been the case to date. The starting point for this 
improvement is the spatial invigoration of place. This can be achieved by understanding the 
multiple livelihood networks of individual and interactional collective life, and by 
questioning the scales of vulnerability analysis and action. People, or more specifically those 
affected by disaster, are central to this process. 
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8.3 NEW DIRECTIONS 
Much of the research in this thesis has been exploratory in nature, although it has at least 
been grounded in the disaster realities of an active aid organisation and of the disaster 
affected, the Reewin. The understanding of the vulnerability of place supported by the 
geographies of vulnerability of the Reewin and the particular confluence of protracted 
political instability, biophysical factors, and economic uncertainty has applications beyond 
the borders of Somalia. Indeed, this research has relevance beyond the 'confines' of so 
called complex emergencies. 
The desire for the development and implementation of a utilitarian theory of vulnerability is 
understandable, and indeed desirable. However, a critical tension exists between the anti- 
essentialism of postmodernism and the functional demands of humanitarian policy makers 
and Practitioners. Highlighting deficiencies in current vulnerability analysis, or finding fault 
with a particular organisation, is relatively straightforward. Finding alternatives that do not, 
as I warned in Chapter 3, fall back into the reification of abstract conceived spaces of 
disaster and that can inform policy and practice is less easy. 
One of the problems in describing the inherently complex dynamic web of social networks 
and livelihood strategies is that any attempt to codify these systems inevitably results in an 
Overly static picture and an oversimplification of the issues. in current conceptions of 
disaster and vulnerability the desire for generalisation and simplification becomes inevitable 
and necessary in the search for instruments to deal with the pressing needs of (and provision 
of assistance to) the vulnerable. This reductionism and loss of spatial sensitivity could be 
considered one of the 'trade-offs' or an accepted weakness in the provision of targeted relief 
assistance. The difficulty comes when one tries to apply this expanded concept of 
vulnerability to concrete situations. For agencies there is scope for thinking in a more 
innovative manner about how to engage with vulnerable populations. I suggest that two 
directions can be taken. 
8.3.1 Fine grained analysis, fine grained programming 
Firstly, working within the existing constraints of the mandate and policies of humanitarian 
agencies an improvement in cur-rent practice can be sought. With an understanding of the 
SOCiO-Cultural spatial milieu within which people organise themselves, acquire food, and 
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support each other in times of livelihood threat, organisations such as the World Food 
Programme will be better informed about the multiple impacts of their interventions, both 
positive and negative. After all, fine-grained analysis should lead to more fine-grained 
programming and the targeting of resources. 
Livelihood networks have to be fully understood and accounted for if external food 
interventions arc to proceed smoothly and with the most advantageous use of the extant 
human and food aid resources. Accordingly, this will increase the potential to get food to the 
most needy in a timely and appropriate manner. In this context the extended household and 
the networks of place are assets that should not be overlooked or underestimated. Thus, 
cultural sensitivity to kinship mechanisms of support, and the active participation of, 
beneficiary communities is stressed. This should inform the processes of the targeting cycle, 
from the assessment of vulnerability to the distribution of resources. As Chapter 7 argued, 
and at least in the context of southern Somalia where this research was undertaken, this 
means questioning the scales of analysis and scales of action. Why focus on individuals or at 
best households? These are after all embedded in wider layers of social interaction across 
social and geographic space - compound, geographic community, and social community (for 
example, kinship affiliation). 
This type of research can also lead to improvements in disaster early warning. The earlier 
problems are identified by humanitarian agencies, the earlier the necessary resources for 
assistance can be sought from the donor community. Growing flows of remittances, or the 
receipt of zakat or 'gifts' for example, will indicate a change in vulnerability status of the 
recipient household or community. Given that the resource pipeline of WFP Somalia had, on 
occasions, a six month delay from donor pledge to the receipt of food aid this is an important 
factor in preventing asset depletion and maintaining the viability of households. Prevention 
must certainly be better than cure. 
8.3.2 Scanning globally, acting globally ... ? 
The second direction is more profound. Humanitarian relief agencies focus on the short 
term, by definition, and function at the micro level of humanitarian needs. For WFP this 
means free food distributions to some predetermined site(s). But the problems of the 
vulnerability ofp1ace cannot be remedied by resource provision in place. Bounded, localised 
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action Cannot hope to engage with the wider political, economic and social processes (or 
gcapitals') that shape the dynamics of vulnerability and livelihood strategies that were 
described in Chapter 3. In the absence of other inputs food aid may be preferable to no 
action at all but this short-termism and the provision of a single resource to meet the 
multiple problems and causative factors of livelihood insecurity cannot be anything more 
than the drip, drip of 'band aid'. It is then hardly surprising that criticisms of aid dependency 
are levelled at humanitarian organisations, even if the provision of resources was frequent 
enough and of sufficient quantity at the household level to warrant these accusations. There 
is a marked difference between food aid becoming part of the mixed toolbox of livelihood 
strategies and total dependency, where aid is the only resource (or tool) available. 
The next step then is an alternative strategy based on the livelihoods approach, 
complemented by the understanding of vulnerability that has been explored in this thesis. 
But this requires a marked change in emphasis in international (or national) disaster 
assistance from both donors and field based agencies. It demands that we dismantle the 
macro labels of disaster (relief, rehabilitation, development, natural, man-made, war, 
peace ... ) and the micro labels of vulnerability (women headed households, IDP, children 
under five ... ). Instead, by concentrating on how people actually live and by involving them 
in the processes of aid we can help them to meet their daily and longer term needs. 
As Deborah Eade (1996) reminds us all disasters are complex. Does it make any sense to 
isolate situations of violent conflict or biophysical disaster from the more mundane violence 
of everyday life and the failure of development process? As Chapter 3 argued vulnerability 
is a function of the failure of the development process and the many violences of everyday 
life, not just, which is too often the case, a palliative function of immediate needs in the 
aftermath of a disaster. A livelihoods approach is not a panacea to the needs of the disaster 
affected, nor to those of the international community. Livelihoods approaches must meet 
more than just the livelihood 'capital' needs of household. By not addressing the underlying 
causative factors of vulnerability, a wider range of household needs are met, but the same 
problems of 'band aid' will continue to exist. 
A livelihoods approach demands that action is taken not only at the local, in community of 
place, but efforts are made to address these wider or global dynamics. This means a degree 
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of co-ordination that reaches beyond the boundaries of the local, an involvement of local and 
regional, national and the instruments of the State (where they exist), and international actors 
in the problems of place. If the focus remains on the local we wrench vulnerability and 
livelihoods from their global context. Conversely, if the focus is on the global we gloss over 
the local. Rather, these should be connected, integrated and complementary scales of action. 
As Michael Bhatia and Jonathan Goodhand suggest elsewhere (13hatia et al, 2002) this 
requires that donors and agencies need to think beyond unconnected, individual short term 
projects. This requires joined up policy and joined up projects and a realisation that 
individual actors do not have the capacity to solve these problems on their own: it demands a 
range of complementary resources and complementary activities. This places a heavy burden 
upon the instruments of co-ordination (in the case of Somalia the United Nations 
Development Programme, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the 
SACB). Or, more radically in the case of the United Nations, a rethinking of the structure 
and mandates of its constituent organisations. 
It also raises some further challenges. After all, we have not learned how to do relief 
effectively, now I am proposing to broaden the analysis and scope of activities. This is more 
than the 'in and out, of relief assistance, but rather the dissolution of the divides between 
relief and development and a transparent commitment to a networked community of place. 
This will put heavy demands on the resources of organisations, including the continuity of 
staff (both national and international). Furthermore, listening to the multiple voices of the 
disaster affected in determining the forms that assistance might take, and who will benefit 
from it, places greater demands on the participatory skills of those staff. 
This is asking a lot of the international aid community, where some countries (such as 
Somalia) fall of the face of the humanitarian funding map. It is easy to be cynical and 
suggest that the status quo will remain. While the prevailing security situation may dictate 
that only the immediate needs of the household are met, a wider and longer-term perspective 
of livelihood needs should be kept in mind. Such a livelihoods approach would enable us to 
better advocate for the needs of the disaster affected. 'I'his in itself is an achievement. As this 
thesis has demonstrated geography matters, not only in understanding the sense of place but 
in understanding the dynamics of the livelihood threat. 
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8.4 NOTES TOWARDS AN AUTOCRITIQUE '- 
The use of the geographies of space has proved enriching to our understanding of the 
vulnerability of place. This broader perspective and the breaking down of the labels of 
disaster results in a struggle to describe the ways in which peoples and places are related and 
mutually constituted and how these constitutions are affected by the multiple processes of 
everyday life and of disaster. This has made our analytical problems more complex, and in 
so doing favours; research that is more ecumenical in its approach to theory and in method. 
Gaps and weaknesses certainly remain. This last section attempts to draw attention to some 
of these. 
8.4.1 Gaps and weaknesses 
This thesis emphasised the use of the predominantly qualitative research methodologies of 
the organic ethnographies of space and the bricolage of place. Although replicability is 
reduced with these approaches, qualitative data are more likely to be able to describe the 
lived spaces of everyday life that cannot be easily drawn with a few direct quantitative 
questions. These allowed for descriptions and interpretations of complex social processes 
that generated a depth and richness of information and analysis lacking from formal 
questionnaire surveys. It brought to light new connections across the spaces of disaster that 
informed our understanding of the contestation of place. It also provides a descriptive 'View 
from a village' - something that is missing in the current analysis of vulnerability in 
southern Somalia. Furthermore, comparison across multiple sites allows more robust 
conclusions about the factors that appear to influence vulnerability and livelihood networks. 
However, the strength of this type of research is also its weakness. It provides only a 
snapshot of a particular context at a given point in time, a snapshot that was largely dictated 
by the security dynamics of protracted political instability and my own conceptual desire to 
search for the geographies of vulnerability. Furthermore, the heterogeneity and complexity 
of war and drought-affected economies make simple gcneralisation extremely difficult. 
Although the assumptions for the choice of site (including place) were clear enough (see 
Chapter 5) we can never be sure that different sites or livelihood groups may generate 
alternative descriptions. In the mainly pastoral economies of central and northern Somalia 




War, drought and the violence of everyday life have very real consequences for the 
vulnerable. However, as Bebbington and Batterbury (2001) argue this does not mean that 
our thcorisations of vulnerability and livelihoods ought to be prisoners of place. Inevitably 
the comparative organic cthnographies across sites, between households, within places, and 
between places and regions becomes thinner than traditional ethnographic practices and 
'thick' descriptions of Clifford Geertz. This conceptual eclecticism provides far more 
opportunity to inquire methodologically into the nuances and details of the multiple spaces 
of livelihoods and the disaster affected and ways in which the global and the local become 
enmeshed in particular places. But a balance must be achieved between place-specific depth 
and comparative breadth. In effect, as livelihoods become increasingly trans-spatial, so 
vulnerability has to be seen in the same way. But our attention must remain on the problems 
of place. 
The ability to undertake empirical research of this nature is largely governed by the 
prescnce, absence or even perception of conflict. While researchers may have the luxury of 
time we need to question whether this sort of analysis can be undertaken in acute emergency 
situations where resource response to disaster situations is of the essence. This puts 
incrcascd demands upon the maintenance or improvement of accurate socio-cultural as well 
as socio-cconomic baseline data which is a prerequisite for vulnerability and livelihood 
analysis and therefore the effective programming of resources. 
Chapter 3 questioned the theoretical dichotomies of disaster, notably those of war and peace 
that continue to challenge policy makers and aid practitioners. The empirical research in this 
thesis also highlighted the pressing need to understand the nature and scale of the factors that 
shape the networks of place. This led to a number of questions: how localised is the drought; 
how widely dispersed are the networked assets of the household; and, what is the nature of 
conflict and its impact upon the household and community? More subtle analysis of the 
nature and impact of shocks and stresses on livelihood systems would help break down these 
rather vaguc platitudes. 
As Chapter 5 argues, there are significant problems to be overcome in the collection of this 
information, not least the positionality of 'insider' and 'outsider' for researchers. There is an 
inherent tension in being part of an international organisation while at the same time 
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contributing potentially to its destabilisation as a provider of an authoritative evaluation. 
However, without this insider status gaining insights of the daily practices of the 
organisation would have been impossible. (Similarly, this research would have been 
impossible without a Reewin field guide or the interpretation provided by the Somali staff of 
WFP-) But for the purposes of this thesis an important question remains. Did this interaction 
play a Signif icant role in the overall interpretive process? 
At the outset I def ined clearly the boundaries of interaction with the World Food Programme 
and with the Reewin of southern Somalia. As an insider, as Jennifer Hyndman discovered, 
"The terms of my participation changed my research, my access to information, and the trust 
accorded to me ... By engaging with people on their terms, doors were opened and 
invitations 
extended" (Hyndman, 2001: 268). Outsiders without my obvious privileges of access may 
not have sought to contextualise the problems that the organisation faces in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. An acceptance of this empirical position reinforced my status 
within the organisation and it is evident in the final interpretation of data (see Chapters 4 and 
7). Even though, as Melissa Gilbert (Gilbert, 1994: 94) comments, "I have the final power of 
interpretation". I suggest that without this contextualisation this thesis would be incomplete 
and unbalanced. 
'Outsider' status among the Reewin also led to a significant weakness in this, study. 
Although considerable efforts were made to break down the barriers of a patrilineal, 
patriarchal, and patrilocal society and the internal boundaries of household (see Chapter 5), 
th e intra-household dynamics of gender remain largely unexplored. Similar criticisms can be 
levelled on the issues of 'minorities', social stratification and social network endowment 
described in Chapter 6. 
Further problems remain. 'Snapshots' of particular places or 'normal' year baseline studies 
are unlikely to capture the importance of resource transfers in the household economy 
during 
periods of livelihood downturn or throughout a season or year. The reasons 
for this 
'snapshot' approach were made clear in Chapter 5. But, security conditions permitting, 
longitudinal quantitative studies over a much longer period and across various shocks and 
stresses would elaborate upon the largely qualitative understanding developed 
in this thesis 
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and demonstrate the importance of these mechanisms (such as remittances, zakat, or 'gifts' 
from family or clan) within selected households or communities. 
As this autocritique has demonstrated there are gaps and weaknesses in this thesis. However, 
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Time and duration of interview: 
Type of group (for example, elders, women's group, social group): 
Questionnaire section: 
Names of facilitators: 
I low many people were present: 
What was the breakdown of the group (age, sex): 
Evaluation of interview (how did it go): Good/Fair/Poor 
Additional commcnts: 
DICTIONARY AND DEFINITIONS 
Provide the Somali words for those listed below. If there is no direct translation please note 
(NDT). If there is no direct translation describe the Somali equivalent(s) and in what sense 
and how this is used. Family, Hut, Village, Village (large), Village (small), Community, 
Poor, Poverty, Rich, Depcndant, Beggar, To beg, Well-being, Ill-being, Dependent, outcast, 
Mutual assistance Clan-based mutual assistance, Credit, To borrow, To loan, To share, 
Rcmittance(s), Gift, To give gifts, Noble, Commoner, Kinship, Food, Food-aid, Coping 
strategy, Weak (physical), Weak (economic), Weak (clan), Strong (physical), Strong 
(economic), Strong (clan), Vulnerable (economic), Vulnerable (physical), Vulnerable (clan), 
Vulnerability, To help, What words are there for hunger, to be hungry, To starve, Starvation, 
Famine, Drought, Future, Past, Migration (for example, for employment, stress migration to 




G1 What does the village name mean. 
G2 Briefly describe the history of the village, including events that have affected 
the village, since it was established. 
G3 Describe the physical makeup of this village - draw a map showing, for 
example, the village, water points, communal grain stores, school, tracks, the 
mosque, major landmarks, and the hamlets attached to this village. 
G4, What resources (for example, water, grazing areas, livestock, agriculture, food 
stores (bakars), schools, mosque, fences/boundaries, roads, health, firewood, 
livewood, and minerals) in this community are held and managed communally 
and which are held and managed by households or individuals. 
G5 What is the administrative level of this centre. For example, district, main 
village, beel, satellite, or han-Aet. 
a. Then explain the administrative structure of this centre. For example, 
government administration, traditional elders and their interaction with the 
various levels of administration existing in the region. 
G6 Describe the decision making processes for this village. For example, who 
makes the decisions, who is excluded from this process. 
G7 Describe the clan makeup of the village. 
G8 How important is religion and what is the role of religious leaders in this 
ý1- community. 
G9 What taxes are paid by the community. Do, for example, the inhabitants pay 
hut tax, land tax, livestock tax, water tax, shop tax, market tax, restaurant tax 
and vehicle tax. What are these taxes used for. 
G10 What is the population of this village (number of households, number of 
individuals): During the gu season, During the jilaal season, During the civil 
war. 
a. If there are differences between these figures can you explain them - where do 
people go to/come from, when and why. 
SEASONAL CALENDARS 
SCI Describe the crop and livestock production cycle in a normal year. For 
example, for crops land preparation, sowing (varieties), weeding, bird scaring, 
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green harvesting, for livestock high/low milk production, reproduction, sales, 
migration, and herd splitting. 
SC2 Describe community activities and the roles of males and females (adults and 
children) in employment and market activities, agricultural production 
throughout a normal year. 
WATER AND DOUGHT 
WDI List all the sources of water in order of importance, their location, 
ownership/management, users (domestic or livestock), the seasons used and 
distance from the village (time/km). 
WD2 Does everyone in this village has equal accesshights to water. 
2. For human consumption. Yes/No 
b. For livestock. Yes/No 
C. If not, why not. 
WD3 Can you explain how the water resources are managed (the heer for water use), 
including decision making structure, rules, penalties and fines. 
WIM What is the definition of a 'drought'. Are there different terms for different 
levels of 'drought'. 
WDS List/name the droughts that have affected this village (in living memory). For 
example, year, drought name, type of drought, meaning. 
WD6 What are the effects or impact of drought on the village. 
a. Is every household affected in the same way, and if not, why not. 
WD7 What is 'normal' and 'good' rainfall for the gu and deyr seasons. 
WD7 Is rainfall variable from season to season and year to year. Yes/No 
a. If YES, what measures do you take, in advance of the rains, to lessen the 
impact of variable rainfall (for example for crop and livestock production). 
For 
example, use the proverb "a stitch in time saves nine". 
b. What measures do you take, and when do you take them, if the gu rains fail. 
VULNERABILITY 
vi What are the local definitions and understandings of the terms: 
'A good quality of life'. 






V2 Can you list and discuss in decreasing order of severity, the events (man-made 
and natural) that have NEGATIVELY affected the livelihoods of people in this 
village in living memory. 
a. Discuss the important events identified above. 
V3 Can you list, and discuss in decreasing order of severity, the events (man-made 
and natural) that have POSITIVELY affected the livelihoods of people in this 
village in living memory. 
a., Discuss the important events identified above. 
V4 How many different status categories are there in this village. Name and list 
these categories (for example, clan, economic, occupation). 
V5 Having identified these categories, list/discuss the criteria used for these 
categories. 
V6 Having listed these categories work out the proportion M, by using 
proportional piling, of households or individuals in each category alongside the 
relevant criteria. 
,, 
V7, Have these events affected all categories equally in this village or are there 
differences. Explain these differences. 
V8 Has there been any change in the % breakdown of categories identified above 
compared to before the civil war. Yes/No 
a., If YES, discuss why and how. This should also include: changes in the number 
of categories, the types of categories, and the number of households in each 
category. 
In this village are some categories, better able to cope with these events. 
Yes/No 
, 
a. If YES, which, how and why. 
V10 In general, are some villages better able to cope with these events. Yes/No 
a. If YES, which, how and why. 
Vil In general, are some clans better able to cope with these events. Yes/No 
a. If YES, which, how and why. 
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V12 What permanent changes in lifestyle have categories, households or individuals 
taken to cope with these events. 
V13 How has life in this village changed as a result of these events listed above. For 
example, has social cohesion (inter-group conflicts) changed in the last decade 
as a result of the civil war, drought, or for any other reason - enforced and 
respected rules and regulations for water and pasture sharing; watering animals 
together; helping the needy regardless of their origin; solving disputes mutually 
and amicably; having xeer (contracts) for solving and controlling social issues. 
V14 List the problems (for example, of infrastructure, social, material, natural) 
currently faced by the different groups in this village, prioritise them and 
discuss the main problems, their causes and their potential solutions. 
Discuss if these problems are common to everyone or if they affect different 
groups within the village. 
b. Are these problems the same compared to before the civil war. 
HOUSEHOLD 
III What is a 'household' and discuss the term 'household'. 
2. What is the average number (and the range) of people that live/sleep in the 
same house in this village. Low/Average/High 
112 Provide breakdown (%) of household marriage status in village: Married, 
Widowed, Divorced, Female-headed, Unaccompanied children. 
2. If this breakdown has changed in recent years, discuss why and the impact of 
this upon the village. 
113 Discuss control of household resources. 
a. Who controls the resources of the household, do these roles change and, if so, 
why. 
b. Who makes the decisions about food purchase in the household - is this the 
same throughout the year. If not, why not and what changes take place. 
C. Who makes the decisions about food use (for example grain for sale, purchase 
of food stuff or consumption) in the household - is this the same throughout the 




RSI During times of stress, do people in this village receive help from others IN the 
village. Yes/ No 
a. If YES, which institutions are important (rank them importance and show any 
change from pre-war era) and what form is help given (for example money raw 
food, cooked food, labour, livestock). Council of elders, Religious men, 
Kinship support, Regional administration, Local administration, Credit 
association, Neighbours, Village headman, Somali NGOs, UN agencies, 
Business men, Work association, Marriage, Overseas remittances, Ilealth 
facilities, Women support groups, Youth associations, Zakat. 
b. For INTERNAL assistance, describe the mechanisms and help given. 
RS2 During times of stress, do people in this village receive help from others 
OUTSIDE of the village. Yes/No 
a. If YES, which institutions are important (rank them importance and show any 
change from pre-war era) and what form is help given (for example money raw 
food, cooked food, labour livestock). Council of elders, Religious men, Kinship 
Support, Regional administration, Local administration, Credit association, 
Neighbours, Village headman, Somali NGOs, UN agencies, Business men, 
Work association, Marriage, Overseas remittances, Health facilities, Women 
support groups, Youth associations, Zakat. 
b. For EXTERNAL assistance, describe the mechanisms and help given. 
RS3. Use proportional piling to find out the relative importance (%) of those 
institutions providing food during times of food shortage. For example, Council 
of elders, Religious men, Kinship support, Regional administration, Local 
administration, Credit association, Neighbours, Village headman, Somali 
NGOs, UN agencies, Business men, Work association, Marriage, Overseas 
remittances, Health facilities, Women support groups, Youth associations, 
Zakat. 
a. For those institutions that are of particular importance find out why they are. 
RS4. Detail the periods of food stress experienced by people in this village. When 
were these periods and detail any help received from the institutions listed 
above (by type and institution). 
RS5. If assistance is received is it received evenly throughout the year. Yes/No 
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2. If NO, discuss this. 
b. Is the help given and received always timely. Yes/No 
C. Discuss this answer. 
RS6 What are the problems and benefits of giving and receiving help. For example, 
are these informal transfers enough to reduce the problems of poverty and food 
insecurity for those that receive them and is there a burden of giving. 
RS7 How does the village and community support those who not have enough food 
and may not be able to look after themselves. For example, when a stranger 
comes to the village who is responsible for looking after him/her, and who 
looks after the masaakin, faqiir, habar agoomed (agoonley). 
RS8 Is there an expectation of 'repayment' on the part of the giver of this help. 
Yes/No 
a. If YES, what are the obligations and conditions of 'repayment'. For example, 
are terms agreed upon beforehand, when is 'repayment' made, is it like-for-like 
or in another form (money, food, labour, or other commitment). 
b. If NO, what are the incentives for giving help (for example, altruism, 
moral/religious). 
RS9 Arc there any 'penalties' for not sharing for those who could. Yes/No 
2. If YES, what are these 'penalties' and how are they enforced. 
RS10 Do the 'givers' give in accordance with their 'wealth'. For example, the 
wealthier they are the more they give. Yes/No 
RS11 Discuss the evolution of mutual assistance. For example, if people receive help 
from family, clan, or neighbours why and how did these mechanisms of mutual 
assistance evolve (for example are these mechanisms a consequence of the 
harsh environment or a product of Islam). 
RS12 Is it seen to be humiliating to RECEIVE assistance from: Zakat, Credit brokers, 
Neighbours, Family, Aid agency (international), Aid agency (local), Clan, 
Local authority, Other (specify). 
a. For these answers, has this changed in the last decade and why. 
IIS13 Is it seen to be humiliating to ASK for assistance from: Zakat, Credit brokers, 
Neighbours, Family, Aid agency (international), Aid agency (local), Clan, 
Local authority, Other (specify). 
For these answers, has this changed in the last decade and why. 
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RS14 Discuss if begging is acceptable. 
RS15 Have these social support mechanisms changed over the decade as a 
consequence of the shocks listed in the vulnerability section above. For 
example, has there been a change in the amounts given, the ability to give or 
the willingness to give. 
RS16 Discuss if all groups and households receive help in this village and if they do 
not why not. 
RS17 What are the normal formal social obligations in this village that involve 
expenditure (for example, weddings, religious festivals, burials, collections at 
the mosque). 
ZAKAT 
zi What is zakat. 
What are the origins of zakat. 
b. What are the motives for making zakat payments. 
Z2 In general, to whom is zakat distributed - what are the categories of receivers. 
Z3 Is zakat collected in this village. Yes/No 
a. If YES, when is it and by whom is it collected and managed. 
b. What are the rates for crops and livestock in this village. 
C. Discuss if these are always the same. 
Z4 Is zakat distributed in this village. Yes/No 
a. If YES, who distributes it and when is it distributed in this village. 
Z5 If zakat is collected is it always distributed only to those who live within this 
village. Yes/No 
2. If NO, where and to whom is it distributed. 
Z6 In this village, which of the categories listed in Z2 receive zakat. 
Z7 What proportion (%) of the zakat that is collected is distributed for the relief of 
the 'poor' in this village. 
a. Discuss if this is the same from year to year. 
Z8 If people receive zakat in this village what criteria are used to select those who 
receive it. 
Z9 In this village, are those who receive zakat the same every year. Ycs/No 
2. If NO, explain why. 
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Z10 Are there 'penalties' for those who avoid giving zakat. Yes/No 
a. If YES, what are they. 
Z11 What are benefits and problems of zakat for the givers and receivers. 
LABOUR AND LAND 
LLI What is the size of the area of fannland 'owned' by this village. 
2. What proportion of the available productive cropping area was planted during 
the last gu season. 
b. I las this area (b) changed in recent years. Yes/No 
C. Explain the answers above. 
LL2 What is the area of gazing land used by this village. 
a. I las this area changed in recent years. Yes/No 
b. If YES, why. 
LL3 Is there any form of collective land/resource ownership (co-ops, kin-based land 
holding group). What proof of ownership exists. 
LL4 Is the labour pool in the village adequate for land preparation prior to planting 
for the: 
a. gu season (Yes/No) 
b. deyr season (Yes/No) 
C. If NO, does labour come from elsewhere, if so where. If not, discuss the 
problems that this may cause. 
d. I las labour availability changed over the last decade. Yes/No 
C. If YES, how and why. 
LL5. Discuss labour sharing networks. 
LL6. Who engages in wage labour in this village. 
MIGRATION 
r*1 I Discuss the local understandings of SEASONAL migration (for example, are 
there different words for different types of migration such as seasonal migration 
for employment, or moving with livestock, to move in search of help from clan 
or family, or in search of food, water, or food aid). Type of migration, Season, 
Where do they go, Why (push and pull factors). Note, Refer to maps and draw 
in migration routes. 
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M2 Discuss the local understandings of STRESS migration. Type of migration, 
Season, Where do they go, Why (push and pull factors). Note, refer to Maps 
and draw in migration routes. 
M3 Discuss seasonal migration and stress migration. Do people temporarily leave 
this village during the year. Yes/No 
a. If YES, who leaves (which groups, households or individuals), when and why. 
b. If YES, where do they go to and why do they go there. 
C. If YES, what proportion (%) of the village leaves. 
d. If YES, who (groups, households or individuals) stays and why. 
e. When do people return and how do they know when to return. 
M4 In the last decade, has mobility been restricted by any factors. Yes/No 
a. If YES, how and when. 
FOOD AID 
FAI Has this village received aid (non-food aid) of any kind in the past. Yes/No 
a. If YES, what kind, by whom and when. 
FA2 Has this village received food aid of any kind in the past. Yes/No (if NO, skip 
Food aid section). 
a. If YES, when were these distributions, by whom, and what commodity. 
'b. 
If YES, was it distributed at the right time. Yes/No 
C. If NO, why not and what problems did this create. 
FA3 Is it shameful to be seen accepting food aid from the international community: 
Currently (Yes/No), In the past (Yes/No) 
a. If there are differences in the answers can you explain these - what brought 
about the change in attitude and when did this come about. 
FA4 Discuss the decision making process for the distribution of food aid in the 
village. 
a. Who takes the responsibility for the distribution of food aid in this village? 
For 
example, Malaak, Sheikh, VVTP, Womens Group, Elders, Other. 
b. What is the reason why this group or person is used. 
C. Do women play a 'formal' role in this decision making. Yes/No 
d. If NO, why not. 
e. If NO, do women have an informal say in what happens to food aid. Yes/No 
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f. If YES, how do they. 
9. How is food aid distributed and why this way. 
FA5 What factors are considered when the person or group allocates food aid. For 
example, main village, satellite village, clan, sub-clan, household. What criteria 
are used. 
a. Is every household allocated food aid. Yes/No 
b. If YES, why. 
C. If NO, why not. 
d. Is every individual allocated food aid. Yes/No 
C. If YES, why. 
C If NO, why not. 
9. Are some groups, households or individuals allocated more food aid than 
others. Ycs/No 
11. If YES, who is prioritised, why and what criteria are used. 
FA6 Discuss the problems and limitations of food aid distribution. 
2. Have previous food aid distributions created any problems in the village. 
Ycs/No 
b. If YES, what were these problems. 
C. Discuss whether it would be possible to give food aid (GFD and FFW) to one 
village and not another within the same sub-district. 
d. Discuss whether it would be possible to give food aid (GFD and FFW) to one 
clan, or sub-clan, and not another. 
FA7 I las this village been asked to pay a proportion of the food aid it has received to 
anyone. Yes/No (If NO, skip following questions). 
2. If YES, when were you asked: before the distribution/or after. 
b. If YES, what proportion (%)were you asked for. 
C. What proportion (%) did you give. 
d. Who did you give it to. 
C. Did you give this voluntarily. Yes/No 
f. If YES, why. 
9. If NO, did this cause you any problems. 
FA8 Is there any difference between how food aid is used within the household and 
other food resources (such as zakat, or gifts from family). Yes/No 
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a. If YES, why. 
FA9. What are the positive and negative impacts of food aid. 
FA10 Would you change WFP distribution methods and if so, how. 
PROVERBs 
Are there any proverbs about: Women on men, Men on women, About mutual assistance, 
About sharing and not sharing, About war, About food, About sharing food, About food aid, 
About the importance of family and clan, About gifts, About water, About drought, About 
hunger, About zakat, About children, On minority groups, Others. 
OPEN DISCUSSION 
-, ' Are there any questions/points that you would like to raise/discuss. 
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Time and duration of interview: 
I lousehold category: 
Namc(s) and age(s) of interviewee(s): 
Relationship to head of household: 
Names of facilitators: 
Evaluation of interview (how did it go): Good/Fair/Poor 
Additional comments: 
COMPOUND 
C1. Draw and describe the structure of the compound in which you are living. 
C2. Briefly describe the history of this compound including a list of the key events 
that have affected this household since it was established. 
HOUSEHOLD ROLE 
IIRL Discuss this household and its role within the village. For example, what roles 
do the household occupants play within the village, what 'occupations' do the 
householders have, what associations or groups do they belong to. 
KINSHIP CHART 
KCI. Record the name, age and sex of the household head, all of his/her present 
spouses and their whereabouts, all of the household head's children (but not the 
children of his/her spouses by a previous marriage) and their whereabouts, the 
children's spouses and their children and their whereabouts. The age and sex of 
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anyone else living in the qoys should also be included, along with their 
relationship to the head of the household. 
KC2. Complete for your (household) all the PREVIOUS wives and children NOT 
LIVING WITH YOU NOW. 
ASSET PROFILE 
AP1. Land ownership. Do you own any farms. YeslNo 
a. If YES, how many do you own. Location (village, town, region), their size (if 
local measurements are used explain these), and their distance from the qoys 
(time/km). 
AP2. In the last cropping season was all this farm land cropped. Yes/No 
a. If NO, what proportion was cropped, and explain the difference. 
AP3. What did you harvest in the gu (2000) season (note whether in loose grain or 
heads, quintal or kg). By farm and by crop (sorghum, maize, cow pea, mung 
bean, other). 
AP4. How did this harvest compare with the previous gu season (note whether 
T or 
and try to quantify the harvest). By farm and by crop (sorghum, maize, cow 
pea, mung bean, other). 
AP5. How will you use the stocks from this gu harvest. Try to find out the proportion 
M) of the harvest that will be used, in the form of the grain, for each of the 
categories (Own consumption, Agricultural inputs (e. g. seeds), Sale, Zakat, 
Gifts, Barter, Other). 
a. For AP5 (sale) discuss what the resource will be used for. For example, will it 
be used to pay back debts or pay for school fees, purchase other foodstuffs, 
medicine, clothes, other. 
b. How much debt do you currently have. Discuss. 
C. For AP5 (barter) discuss how the resource will be used. For example, what Will 
the resource be exchanged for. 
d. How long will these stocks last you. 
AP6. During the last 2fasal (growing seasons), did you farm or graze on someone 
else's land. Yes/No 
a. If YES, What type of land (farm, pasture), How much land, 
What was the 
agreement (for example, type of payment, time period, from whom)- 
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AP7. During the last 2fasal (growing season), did someone farm or graze on your 
land. Yes/No 
a. If YES, What type of land (farm, pasture), How much land, What was the 
agreement (for example, type of payment, time period, from whom). 
AP8. Livestock. Did you own any livestock in the past 12 months. Yes/No 
If YES, try to quantify seasonal household livestock relative numbers. By 
season ( Gu '99, Hagai '99, Deyr '99, Jilaal '00, Gu '00) and by livestock 
species (Camels, Cattle, Goats, Sheep, Chickens, Donkeys). 
b. Explain any differences in these numbers. 
AP9. In each of the seasons ( Gu '99, Hagai 199, Deyr '99, Jilaal '00, Gu '00), 
where was your livestock (Camels, Cattle, Goats, Sheep, Chickens, Donkeys). 
APIO. Farm labour. During the past 2 fasal (growing season), were there enough 
people in your household to do the work on your farm when you needed it. 
Yes/No 
If NO, check activity for which there was a shortage of labour. Preparation for 
planting, Planting, Weeding, Bird scaring, Harvesting, Other. 
AIII 1. During the past 2 fasal, have you had anyone, other than household members, 
work on your farm. Yes/No 
a. If YES, who were these people, where were they from and what were the terms 
of payment. 
AP12. During the past 2fasal, did you help someone else on their farm. Yes/No 
2. If YES, who did you help, and where and what were the terms of payment. 
AP13. Describe, and try to quantify if possible, the 'IN-COMINGS' to the household 
for the current and previous season (name). For example, from where, by 
whom, and under what terms. Own production, Wild food, credit - formal and 
informal, Zakat, Gifts - family, clan and neighbours, Food aid, Remittances, 
Self-employment, Employment, Sale, Other. 
2. Once this is done work out (using proportional piling) the relative income 
on each category. 
AP14. Try to describe and quantify, the 'OUTGOINGS' pattern for the current and 
previous season (name). For example, when, to whom, for what and in what 
form payment is made. Food, Agricultural inputs inc. wages, Remittances, 
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Repayment of debts, Schools, Clothes and shoes, Zakat, Gifts - family, clan 
and neighbours, Social obligations, Other. 
a. Once this is done work out (using proportional piling) the relative expenditure 
M on each category by season if possible or by year. 
AIP15. What variability in income do you experience from year to year. For example, 
how much does it vary, why does it vary, and how do you prepare for this 
variability. 
VULNERABILITY 
V1. What are the local definitions and understandings of the terms: 'A good quality 
of life', 'A bad quality of life', 'wealthy', 'poor', 'destitute'. 
V2. What do you consider is the status of your household in this village and why. 
V3. Can you lisý in decreasing order of severity, the events that have 
NEGATIVELY affected the livelihood of this household in living memory. 
a. Discuss the important events identified above and how the household coped 
with these shocks (temporary and permanent measures). 
V4. Can You list, in decreasing order of importance, the events that have 
POSITIVELY affected the livelihoods of people in this village in living 
memory. 
a. Discuss the important events identified above. 
V5. How has life in this household changed as a result of these events listed above. 
For example, what has been the impact of the war upon this household, and has 
your status (material, social) changed in the last decade and, if so, how. 
V6. Which years would you consider 'good', 'average', 'normal', or 'poor' and 
'why'. 
V7. List the problems (for example, of infrastructure, social, material, natural) 
currently faced by this household, prioritise them and discuss the main 
problems and their causes. 
V8. Would you consider this household to be typical compared to others in this 
Village. Yes/No 
a. If NO, discuss this (for example, in terms of economic and social status, and 




RS1. During times of stress, do people in this household RECEIVE help from others 
IN THE VILLAGE. Yes/No 
If YES, which institutions are important (and rank them), when is help 
received, and what form is help given (for example, money raw food, cooked 
food, labour, livestock, other). Council of elders, Religious men, Kinship 
support, Regional administration, Local administration, Credit association, 
Neighbours, Village headman, Somali NGOs, UN agencies, Business men, 
Work association, Marriage, Overseas remittances, Health facilities, Women 
support groups, Youth associations, Zakat, Other. 
b. When was the last time that this household received help from others in this 
village. 
RS2. During times of stress, do people in this household RECEIVE help from others 
OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE. Yes/No 
If YES, which institutions are important (rank them importance), when is help 
received, and what form is help given (e. g. money raw food, cooked food, 
labour, livestock, other). Council of elders, Religious men, Kinship support, 
Regional administration, Local administration, Credit association, Neighbours, 
Village headman, Somali NGOs, UN agencies, Business men, Work 
association, Marriage, Overseas remittances, Health facilities, Women support 
groups, Youth associations, Zakat, Other. 
b. When was the last time that this household received help from others outside of 
this village. 
RS3. Use proportional piling to find out the relative importance (%) of those 
institutions providing food during times of food shortage (an identified period), 
i. e. WFP compared to others. Council of elders, Religious men, Kinship 
support, Regional administration, Local administration, Credit associations, 
Neighbours, Village headman, Somali NGO's, International NGO's, UN 
agencies, Business men, Worker associations, Marriage, Overseas remittances, 




RS4. Using proportional piling work out the relative importance (%) of the sources 
Of food (during an identified period). For example, Institutions, Own 
production, Purchase, Wild foods, Other (specify). 
RS5. If this assistance from within and outside of this village stopped, how would it 
affect this household. 
a. Is there an expectation of 'repayment' on the part of the giver of this help. 
Yes/No 
b. If YES, what are the obligations and conditions of repayment. For example, are 
terms agreed upon beforehand, when is 'repayment' made, is it like-for-like or 
in another form (money, food, labour, or other commitment). 
RS6. For the previous year, detail the periods of food stress experienced by people in 
this household. When were these periods and detail any help received from the 
institutions listed above (by type and institution). 
a. If assistance is received is it received evenly throughout the year (see RS6). 
Yes/No. If NO, discuss this. 
b. If assistance is received is it always timely. Yes/No. Discuss this. For example, 
if NO how does the family fill the 'food gap' if there is one. 
RS7. During times of stress, do people in this household GIVE help to others IN 
THIS VILLAGE. Yes/No 
a. If YES, who do you give help to, when do you give it, and in what form does it 
take. 
RS8. During times of stress, do people in this household GIVE help to others 
OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE. Yes/No 
a. If YES, who do you give help to, where do they live, when do you give it, and 
in what form does it take. 
b. If YES, how do you determine how much to give to them. What is this 
decision 
based upon. 
C. If YES, discuss if you mind giving help. 
d. Has your ability to help others changed in the last decade and, if so, how and 
why. 
RS9. Are there any social obligations in this household in the last year that involved 
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expenditure (money, food, or other). For example, weddings, religious 
festivals, contributions to relatives, burials, collections at the mosque, diya. 
Yes/No 
a. If YES, what are these and in what form did your expenditure take. 
ZAKAT 
ZI. Is this household a giver or receiver of zakat. Giver/Receiver 
2. Has this status changed in the last decade. Yes/No. If YES, how and why. 
b. If GIVER, who do you give it to, When, Why. 
C. If RECEIVER, who do you receive it from and where do they live, When, 
Why. 
FOOD CONSUMPTION 
FCI. Where is the food that you eat cooked. 
a.. Who shares this food. 
b. Are all these members of your household. Yes/No 
C. Are the people who share this food always the same. Yes/No 
d. If NO, why not and what is their relationship to the household and what is their 
reason for eating with this household. 
FC2. How many meals are normally cooked in this household in a day. 
2. Does this always remain the same through out the year. Yes/No 
b. If NO, why not. 
FC3. Who cats first and last in the household. 
2. Is this always the same. Yes/No 
b. If NO, why not. 
FOOD AID 
FAL Has this household received food aid of any kind in the past. Yes/No. (If NO, 
skip section). 
2. If YES, list when were these distributions, by whom, how much, and what 
commodity. 
b. If YES, was it distributed at the right time. Yes/No 
C. If NO, why not and what problems did this create. 
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FA2. For the last distribution were you told of your entitlements. Yes/No 
a. If YES, by whorn. 
b. If YES, what was your entitlement. 
C. Did you receive this. Yes/No. If NO, what did you receive and explain the 
difference. 
FA3. For the last distribution, how did you use the food aid. 
a. Did you consume the food aid in the household. Yes/No. If YES, what 
proportion (%) did you consume. 
b. How long did it last. 
C. Did you give food aid to others. Yes/No. If YES, who did you give it to, what 
is their relationship to this household, and why did you give it. 
d. Did you sell any of the food aid. Yes/No. if YES, what did you use the money 
for. 
e. Did you barter or exchange the food aid. Yes/No. If YES, what 
did you barter 
or exchange it for. 
Other uses. For example, repaying credit. 
9- By using proportional piling work out for the last distribution 
how much (%) of 
the food aid was consumed within the household, sold, 
bartered, given to 
others, or other use. 
FA4. Is there any difference between how food aid is used within the household and 
other food resources (such as zakat, or gifts from family). Yes/No 
a. If YES, why. 
FA5. What are the positive and negative impacts of food aid in this household. 
DECISION MAKING 
DMI. What role does this household play in the decision making processes of this 
village. 
DM2. In general, does this household feel that they are well represented by those 
making the decisions in the village. Yes/No. If NO, why not. 
DM3. In general, does this household feel that they are well represented by those 
making the decisions about food aid in the village. Yes/No- If NO, why not. 
DM4. What problems do you experience in the following areas, who solves these 
problems and what are the mechanisms used to solve them: Land disputes 
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(Grazing lands, farmlands, settlement), Water, Vegetation/pasture, Wild food, 
Firewood, Employment (labour), Tradelbusiness, Market, Livestock 
production, Agricultural production, Household (domestic problems), Personal 
disputes, Food aid, Criminal and civil offences (crimes), Other. 
DN15. Who controls the various resources of the household (including food), do these 
roles change and, if so, why. Food purchase, Bringing food aid into the 
household, Decisions on the use of food in the household. 
OPEN DISCUSSION 
Are there any questions/points that you would like to raise/discuss. 
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APPENDIX 4: H)Ps IN THE NORTHEAST AND NORTHWEST 
INTERVIEW DETAILS 
Location of interview: 
Date of interview: 
Name of interviewee: 
Age of interviewee: 
Sex of interviewee: 
Relationship to head of household: 
Clan, sub-clan, and sub-sub-clan of interviewee: 
1. Where have you moved from: Region/District/Vil ]age. 
a. How long had you lived there before you moved: Number of years and months. 
b. When did you move here (Year). 
C. Why did you move here. What had happened to make you leave home 
and why did you choose this town/city. 
2. What were assets of the household pre-war (1990). Number of farms, their 
location (region, town, village), and their size (length and width). Livestock 
type (camels, cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, chickens) and their numbers. Other. 
3. What are the assets of the household now. Number of farms, their location 
(region, town, village), and their size (length and width). Livestock type 
(camels, cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, chickens) and their numbers. Other. 
4. What assets do you have in this town. 
5. How many people were there in your household before you moved herc. List 
all these people (names, ages, sex, relationship to head of household). 
a. How many of these people are with you now. 
b. If not all the household are with you now, why did you leave them behind. 
C. What are those you left behind doing. 
6. Did you know anyone (family or friends) that was here before you camc. 
Yes/No 
a. If YES, what relationship do you have with them. 
7. For each member of the household who is with you now what do thcy do (for 
example, type of formal employment, begging, informal employment). 
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List their 'incomes' per week. 
What do they do with this 'income'. For example, do they send the income to 
household or family members. 
How do you feel you are treated here. 
When will you leave. 
Why will you leave. 
Where will you go. 
OPEN DISCUSSION 
Are there any questions/points that you would like to raise/discuss. 
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